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HISTORY 



OF THE 



Ejatling E[im Detacjment 



FIFTH ARMY CORPS. 



SANTIAGO, 

With a Few Unvarnished Truths Concerning 
that Expedition. 



BY 

JOHN K. PARKER, 

1st Lieut. Uth Inf. 

Late Commanding Gatling Gun Detachment. 
Fifth Army Corps, at Santiago. 



PRESS CF THE 

HUDSON-KIM BER1.Y PUBLISHING CO. 

KAN SAS CITY. MO. 



"\ 






Copyrighted 1898, 
\ BY 

HUDSON-KlMBERLT PUBLISHING Co. 

.Kansas City, Mo. 




s g s g \q^acV:ri. c re> 



\ 



DEDICATION. 

To the Enlisted Members of the Detach- 
ment, Who, by Their Devotion, Cour- 
age and Endurance, Made Its Suc- 
cess Possible, this Volume is 
Dedicated as a Token of 
Esteem by the 
Author. 



The photographic illustrations in this work are 
due to the courage and kindness of Mr. John N. 
Weigle, of Gettysburg, Pa. This young man was 
first sergeant of the Gatling Gun Detachment, 
and took with him a large supply of material. It 
was his delight to photograph everything that oc- 
curred, and his pleasure to furnish a set of photo- 
graphs for the use of the author. Mr. Weigle was 
recommended for a commission in the Kegular 
Army of the United States, for his extreme gal- 
lantry in action, and is a magnificent type of the 
American youth. The thanks of the author are 
tendered to him for the photographic illustrations 
so generously supplied. 



PREFACE. 

On the morning of July 1st, the dismounted 
cavalry, including my regiment, stormed Kettle 
Hill, driving the Spaniards from their trenches. 
After taking the crest, I made the men under me 
turn and begin volley-firing at the San Juan Block- 
house and intrenchments against which Hawkins' 
and Kent's Infantry were advancing. While thus 
firing, there suddenly smote on our ears a pecu- 
liar drumming sound. One or two of the men 
cried out, "The Spanish machine guns!'' but, after 
listening a moment, I leaped to my feet and called, 
"It's the Gatlings, men! It's our Gatlings!" 
Immediately the troopers began to cheer lustily, 
for the sound was most inspiring. Whenever the 
drumming stopped, it was only to open again a lit- 
tle nearer the front. Our artillery, using black 
powder, had not been able to stand within range 
of the Spanish rifles, but it was perfectly evident 



that the Gatlings were troubled by no such consid- 
eration, for they were advancing all the while. 

Soon the infantry took San Juan Hill, and, 
after one false start, Ave in turn rushed the next 
line of block-houses and intrenchments, and then 
swung to the left and took the chain of hills 
immediately fronting Santiago. Here I fouud my- 
self on the extreme front, in command of the frag- 
ments of all six regiments of the cavalry division. 
I received orders to halt where I was. bnt to hold 
the hill at all hazards. The Spaniards were 
heavily reinforced and they opened a tremen- 
dous fire upon us from their batteries and trenches. 
We laid down just behind the gentle crest of 
the hill, firing as we got the chance, but, for the 
most part, taking the fire without respondiug. 
As the afternoon wore on, however, the Spaniards 
became bolder, and made an attack upon the posi- 
tion. They did not push it home, but they did ad- 
vance, their firing being redoubled. We at once 
ran forward to the crest and opened on them., and. 
as we did so, the unmistakable drumming of the 
Gatlings opened abreast of us, to our right, and 
the men cheered again. As soon as the attack 
was definitely repulsed, I strolled over to find 
out about the Gatlings, and there I found Lieut. 
Parker with two of his guns right on our left, 



abreast of our men, who at that time were closer 
to the Spaniards than any others. 

From thence on, Parker's Gatlings were our 
inseparable companions throughout the siege. 
They were right up at the front. When we dug 
our trenches, he took off the wheels of his guns and 
put them in the trenches. His men and ours slept 
in the same bomb-proofs and shared with one an- 
other whenever either side got a supply of beans 
or coffee and sugar. At no hour of the day or 
night was Parker anywhere but where we wished 
him to be, in the event of an attack. If a troop of 
my regiment was sent off to guard some road or 
some break in the lines, we were almost certain to 
get Parker to send a Gatling along, and. whether 
the change was made by day or by night, the Gat- 
ling went. Sometimes we took the initiative and 
started to quell the fire of the Spanish trenches; 
sometimes they opened upon us; but. at whatever 
hour of the twenty -four the fighting began, the 
drumming of the Gatlings was soon heard through 
the cracking of our own carbines. 

I have had too little experience to make my 
judgment final; but certainly, if I were to com- 
mand either a regiment or a brigade, whether of 
cavalry or infantry. I would try to get a Gatling 
battery — under a good man — with me. I feel sure 
that the greatest possible assistance would be 



itling battery, if well handle 

that it rou Id be p - •' the 

firing-line. At anj bis ie 

Park 

S n Juan, and when he k.-pt it in the 
- de the B _ 

■ 




MUDSON-KIMBERLY PUB. CO., ENG.R S. 



THE GAT LING GUNS AT SANTIAGO 



NT1 



CHAPTER I. 

V Envoi, 

The history of the Gatling Gun Detachment, 
Fifth Army Corps, is to a certain extent the his- 
tory of the Santiago campaign. The detachment 
was organized on the spur of the moment, to util- 
ize material which would otherwise have been 
useless, and was with the Fifth Corps in all the 
campaign. It participated in all the fighting of 
that campaign, except the fight at La Guasimas, 
and was disbanded upon the return of the Fifth 
Corps to Montauk. Whatever hardships were 
endured by the Fifth Corps were shared by this 
detachment; whatever dangers were faced by the 
Fifth Corps were faced by it also ; where the hot- 
test fighting occurred this detachment went in 
and stayed; and at the surrender it was paraded, 
to use the words of General Shaffer, "Upon that 
portion of the line which it occupied so promptly 
and defended so well." 

But this memoir is not intended as a history of 
that campaign nor of the Fifth Corps. The author 
has not the data available to cover so large a field, 



10 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 



nor the ability to do justice to the courage, forti- 
tude, and endurance so heroically displayed by 
that gallant army. That story will be written by 
abler pens, and will be the wonder of the world 
when it is told. 

This story is that of an experiment. It is told 
to lay before the general public, as well as the 
military critic, the work of a little detachment of 
thirty-seven men, armed with an untried weapon, 
organized in the short space of four days preced- 
ing July 1, 1898, and which without proper equip- 
ment, adequate instruction, or previous training, 
in the face of discouragements and sneers, and in 
spite of obstacles enough to make the mere retro- 
spect sickening, still achieved for itself a warm 
place in the hearts of all true soldiers, and cov- 
ered itself with glory upon the hardest fought 
battle-field of the Hispano- American War. 

This story is to commemorate the gallantry of 
the enlisted men who helped to make history and 
revolutionize tactics at Santiago. It will tell of 
the heroism of the plain American Kegular, who, 
without hope of preferment or possibility of re- 
ward, boldly undertook to confute the erroneous 
theories of military compilers, who, without orig- 
inality or reason, have unblushingly cribbed the 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 11 

labored efforts of foreign officers, and foisted these 
compilations of second-hand opinions upon the 
American Army as military text-books of author- 
ity and weight. These literary soldiers declared, 
following the lead of their foreign guides, that 
"The value of machine guns on the battle-field is 
doubtful," and that "Their offensive value is prob- 
ably very small." They also agreed, with most 
touching unanimity, that "A direct assault upon 
a fortified position, occupied by good, unshaken 
infantry, armed with the modern rifle and plenti- 
fully supplied with ammunition is sure to fail, 
unless made by overwhelming numbers and pre- 
pared by strong and accurate fire by artillery." 

These servile imitators of foreign pen soldiers 
were destined to see all their pet theories exploded 
by the grim old mountain puma from California 
and his brave Fifth Corps. They were to learn, 
so far as they are capable of learning, that the 
American Regular makes tactics as he needs 
them; that the rules of war established by pen 
soldiers do not form the basis of actual operations 
in the field; that theories must go to the wall 
before the stern logic of irrefutable facts; and 
that deductions based on the drill-made autom- 
atons of European armies are not applicable to 



12 THE GAT LING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

an army composed of American Volunteer Regu- 
lars, led by our trained officers. 

We shall see that an army destitute of cavalry, 
and hence without "eyes"; not supported by artil- 
lery; in the most difficult country over which sol- 
diers ever operated, and without maps or recon- 
noissance — in twenty days shut up and captured 
an army of twice its own effective strength, in a 
strongly fortified city, with better served and 
more numerous artillery. 

We shall find that when the "sledge" was not 
at hand, American ingenuity was able to use the 
"mallet" instead, making light machine guns per- 
form all the function of artillery, and dispensing 
altogether, so far as any practical results were 
concerned, with that expensive and much over- 
rated arm; that the Regular private is capable of 
meeting all demands upon his intelligence, and 
that the American non. com. is the superior of for- 
eign officers. 

It is also hoped to place before the intelligent 
American public some correct ideas of the new 
arm which was tried thoroughly at Santiago for 
the first time in the history of the world. The 
machine gun is the latest practical product of 
American inventive genius applied to war. The 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 13 

first form of this weapon tried, the mitrailleuse, 
was not very successful. It failed, not on account 
of faults of construction, or imperfect mechanism, 
but because its proper tactical employment had 
not been thought out by the French army. Since 
that time machine guns have been greatly im- 
proved, but no one has succeeded in making their 
great value appreciated by military authorities. 
The failures of the French brought the gun into 
disfavor, and created a prejudice against its 
employment. 

The Artillery of the world, which poses in every 
country as an elite body of scientific fighters, and 
is often found on the battle-field to be an aggrega- 
tion of abstruse theorists, were jealous and con- 
temptuous. They said, "See how easily the artil- 
lery knocked out machine guns at Gravelotte." 
The Cavalry of the world, famous everywhere for 
an esprit-du-corps which looks haughtily down on 
all other arms of the service, were too deeply ab- 
sorbed in the merits of saber vs. revolver, and in 
the proper length of their spectacular plumes, to 
give a second thought to this new, untried, and 
therefore worthless weapon. The world's Infant- 
ry, resting upon the assumption that it is the back- 
bone of all armies, and the only real, reliable fight- 



14 THE GATLING GUNS AT BANTIA GO. 

ing body under all conditions, left the consid- 
eration of these vague dreams of mechanical 
destructiveness to lunatics, cranks, and philan- 
thropists. 

In our own country the Ordnance Department, 
which is the trial court before which all military 
inventions must appear, scouted the idea of use- 
fulness of machine guns even after war was de- 
clared, and adhered to the view that machine guns, 
in the very nature of things, could never be useful 
except in the defense of fortified positions; that 
they never could be brought up on the battle-field, 
nor used if they were brought up. This view was 
that of a prominent young officer of that depart- 
ment who wrote a report on the subject, and it 
seemed to express the views of the department. 

This view must have been that of our War 
Department, for it did not even acknowledge the 
receipt of drawings and specifications for a ma- 
chine gun carriage, offered freely to the Govern- 
ment as a gift by the inventor six months before 
the war, together with the first correct tactical 
outline of the proper use of machine guns ever 
filed in any War Office in the world. This inven- 
tion was designed to facilitate the use of the 
machine gun by making its advance with the skir- 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 15 

mish line possible on the offensive, and was rec- 
ommended by the whole staff of the Infantry and 
Cavalry School as a meritorious device, worthy of 
trial. The discussion filed with the invention 
pointed out, for the first time, the correct tactical 
employment of the weapon, and staked the mili- 
tary reputation and ability of the author and in- 
ventor on the correctness of his views. 

From these facts it may be gathered that there 
was required a certain degree of originality and 
energy to get together and organize a machine 
gun battery for the Santiago campaign. 

The project was conceived and executed. The 
service rendered by this battery has forever set at 
rest the question of the proper tactical use of the 
machine gun arm, both on the offensive and de- 
fensive. These things are now beyond the realm 
of theory. They are a demonstrated problem. 
The solution is universally acknowledged to be 
correct. 

This is the history of that detachment 



16 THE GATLING Gl VS A I 8 l \ // LGGL 



CHAPTER II. 

Inception. 

From the 26th of April until the <'»th of June, 
Tampa and Port Tampa were tin- military centers 
of greatest interest in the United States. Troops 
were rushed into these places on special t tains 
and camped on available sites, pending tin- or- 
ganization of a proposed expedition to — some- 
where. Supplies of every description came pout- 
ing in on long trains of express and freight cars; 
mounted officers and orderlies ploughed their 
rushing way through great heaps and dunes of 
ever-shifting sand, leaving behind them stifling 
clouds of scintillating particles, which filtered 
through every conceivable crevice and made the 
effort to breathe a suffocating nightmare. Over 
all the tumultuous scene a torrid sun beat down 
from a cloudless sky, while its scorching rays. 
reflected from the fierce sand under foot, produced 
a heat so intolerable that even the tropical vege- 
tation looked withered and dying. In this cli- 
mate officers and men, gathered mostly from 



THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 17 

Northern posts, were to "acclimate 1 - themselves 
for a tropical campaign — somewhere. 

They never encountered as deadly a heat, nor a 
more pernicious climate, in Cuba nor in Porto 
Rico, than that of southern Florida. Its first 
effect upon men just emerging from a bracing 
Northern winter was akin to prostration. Then 
began to follow a decided tendency to languor; 
after this one was liable to sudden attacks of 
bowel troubles. The deadly malaria began to 
insidiously prepare the way for a hospital cot; the 
patient lost flesh, relish of food became a remi- 
niscence, and an hour's exertion in the sun was 
enough to put a man on his back for the rest of the 
day. Exposure to the direct action of the sun's 
rays was frequently followed by nausea, a slight 
chill, and then a high fever. The doctors subse- 
quently called this "thermal fever," which is sus- 
pected to be a high-sounding name calculated to 
cover up a very dense ignorance of the nature of 
the disease, because no one ever obtained any re- 
lief from it from them. Recurrence of the expos- 
ure brought recurrence of the fever, and, if per- 
sisted in, finally produced a severe illness. 

One reason for this was that the troops con- 
tinued to wear the winter clothing they had worn 



18 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

on their arrival. The promised "khaki" did not 
materialize. Some regiments drew the brown 
canvas fatigue uniform, but the only use made of 
it was to put the white blanket-roll through the 
legs of the trousers, thereby adding to the weight 
of the roll, without perceptible benefit to the 
soldier. 

Such a climate, under such surroundings, was 
not conducive to original thought, prolonged exer- 
tion, or sustained study. Everybody felt "mean" 
and was eager for a change. Nobody wanted to 
listen to any new schemes. The highest ambition 
seemed to be to get out of it to somewhere with 
just as little delay and exertion as possible. It 
was at this juncture that the plan of organizing a 
Gatling gun battery was conceived, and the at- 
tempt to obtain authority began. 

The Gatling gun is one of the two machine guns 
adopted in the land service of the United States. 
Not to enter into a technical description, but 
merely to convey a general idea of its working and 
uses, it may be described as follows: 

The gun is a cluster of rifle barrels, without 
stocks, arranged around a rod, and parallel to it. 
Each barrel has its own lock or bolt, and the 
whole cluster can be made to revolve by turning a 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 19 

crank. The bolts are all covered in a brass case 
at the breech, and the machine is loaded by means 
of a vertical groove in which cartridges are placed, 
twenty at a time, and from which they fall into 
the receivers one at a time. As the cluster of bar- 
rels revolves each one is fired at the lowest point, 
and reloaded as it completes the revolution. The 1 
gun is mounted on a wye-shaped trunnion; the 
lower end of the wye passes down into a socket in 
the axle. The gun is pointed by a lever just as 
one points a garden hose or sprinkler, with the 
advantage that the gun can be clamped at any 
instant, and will then continue to sprinkle its 
drops of death over the same row of plants until 
the clamps are released. The axle is hollow and 
will hold about a thousand cartridges. It is hori- 
zontal, and on its ends are heavy Archibald 
wheels. There is also a heavy hollow trail, in 
which tools and additional ammunition can be 
stored. The limber resembles that used by the 
Artillery, and is capable of carrying about 9600 
rounds of cartridges. The whole gun, thus 
mounted, can be drawn by two mules, and worked 
to good advantage by from six to eight men. It 
is built of various calibers, and can fire from 300 to 
900 shots per minute. The guns used by the Gat- 



20 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

ling Gun Detachment, Fifth Army Corps, were 
built by the Colt's Arms Co., were the latest im- 
proved model, long ten-barrel gun, and fired the 
Krag-Jorgenson ammunition used by the Regular 
Army. 

The attempt to obtain authority to organize a 
machine gun battery met with many discourage- 
ments and repeated failures. No one seemed to 
have thought anything about the subject, and 
Tampa was not a good place nor climate in which 
to indulge in that form of exercise, apparently. 
Perhaps the climate was one reason why so little 
thinking was done, and everything went "at sixes 
and sevens." 

The officer who had conceived the scheme was 
a young man, too. He was only a second lieutenant 
("Second lieutenants are fit for nothing except to 
take reveille"), and had never, so far as his mili- 
tary superiors knew, heard the whistle of a hostile 
bullet. He had made no brilliant record at the 
Academy, had never distinguished himself in the 
service, and was not anybody's "pet." He was, 
apparently, a safe man to ignore or snub if occa- 
sion or bad temper made it desirable to ignore or 
snub somebody, and, above all, had no political 
friends who would be offended thereby. 



THE GAT LING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 21 

"Politics" cut quite a figure in Tampa in some 
respects. An officer who was known to be a per- 
sonal friend of Senator Somebody, or protege of 
this or that great man, was regarded with consid- 
erable awe and reverence by the common herd. 
It was ludicrous to see the weight attached to the 
crumbs of wisdom that fell from the friends of 
the friends of somebody. They shone only by a 
reflected light, it is true; but nobody there at 
Tampa had a lamp of his own, except the few who 
had won renown in the Civil War, and reflected 
light was better than none at all. A very young 
and green second lieutenant who was able to 
boast that he had declined to be a major in a cer- 
tain State was at once an oracle to other lieu- 
tenants — and to some who were not lieutenants. 
The policy which governed these appointments 
was not so well understood at that date in the 
campaign as it is now. 

When the court of a reigning favorite was es- 
tablished at the Tampa Bay Hotel as a brigadier, 
and people began to get themselves a little settled 
into the idea that they knew who was in com- 
mand, they were suddenly disillusioned by the 
appointment of another and senior brigadier to 
the command. They settled down to get ac- 



22 THE GATLING GUNS AT SAXTIAGO. 

quainted with the new authority, and were just 
beginning to find out who was who, when the tele- 
graph flashed the news that the deposed potentate 
had been made a major-general, and, of course, 
was now in command. The thing was becoming 
interesting. Bets began to be made as to which 
would come in ahead under the wire. The other 
also became a major-general. Then came a period 
of uncertainty, because the question of rank 
hinged upon some obscure and musty record of 
forgotten service some thirty-four years before. 
From these facts will be apparent the difficulty 
under which a subordinate labored in trying to 
create anything. 

It is hardly worth while in any case of that sort 
to waste time with subordinates. The projector 
of an enterprise had better go straight to the one 
who has the necessary authority to order what is 
wanted; if access to him can be had, and he can 
be brought to recognize the merits of the plan — 
that settles it; if not — that also settles it. In ei- 
ther case the matter becomes a settled thing, and 
one knows what to depend upon. 

But who was the man to see there at Tampa? 
Nobody knew. 

The first officer approached was the one in 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 23 

direct line of superiority, Col. A. T. Smith, 13th 
Infantry. The idea was to ascertain his views 
and try to obtain from him a favorable endorse- 
ment upon a written plan to be submitted through 
military channels to the commanding general at 
Tampa. Perhaps it was the deadly climate; for 
the reply to a request for a few minutes' audience 
on the subject of machine guns was very gruff and 
curt: "I don't want to hear anything about it. 
I don't believe in it, and I don't feel like hearing 
it. If you want to see me about this subject, come 
to me in office hours." That settled it. Any 
effort to get a written plan through would have to 
carry the weight of official disapproval from the 
start, and even a "shavey" knows that disapproval 
at the start is enough to kill a paper in the official 
routine. 

The next officers approached were Major Will- 
iam Auman and Capt. H. Cavanaugh, of the 13th 
Infantry, who were asked for advice. These two 
officers, both of whom rendered very distinguished 
services on the battle-field, listened with interest 
and were convinced. Their advice was: "Get 
your plan in tangible shape, typewritten, showing 
just what you propose; then go straight to the 
commanding general himself. It he listens to 



2i THE GATLING GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 

you, he will be the responsible party, and will have 
waived the informality; if he will not receive you, 
no harm is done." 

This advice was followed and the following plan 
prepared : 

Scheme for Organization of Division Gatling dun 
Detachment. 

"Material: 

"Three guns with limbers and caissons; 28 
horses and 16 saddles; 6 sets double harness, 
wheel, and G lead; 1 escort wagon, team and driv- 
er; and 100,000 rounds, .30 cal. 
"Personnel: 

"One first lieutenant, 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 
1 clerk, 1 cook, and 35 enlisted men selected for 
their intelligence, activity, and daring; volunteers, 
if possible to be obtained, as the service will be 
hazardous. 
"Equipment: 

"Officer: Revolver, saber, or machete, and field- 
glass. 

"Enlisted men : Revolver and knife. 

"Fifty rounds to be carried on person for re- 
volver, and 50 in ordnance train. 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 25 

"Camp Equipage: 

"Four conical wall-tents, 2 'A' wall-tents, and 
the ordinary cooking outfit for a company of 41 
men. 
"Organization: 

"In the discretion of the detachment com- 
mander, subject to approval of division com- 
mander; probably as follows, subject to modifica- 
tions by experience: 

"Three detachments under a sergeant. A de- 
tachment to be composed of 1 gunner and 7 men. 
The gunner should be a corporal. 
"Administration : 

"The Division Gatling Gun Detachment to be 
subject only to the orders of the division com- 
mander, or higher authority. Its members are 
carried on 'd. s.' in their respective organizations. 
Its commander exercises over it the same author- 
ity as a company commander, and keeps the same 
records. Returns, reports, and other business are 
transacted as in company, except that the detach- 
ment commander reports directly to and receives 
orders directly from Division Headquarters. The 
detachment is not subject to ordinary guard or 
fatigue. When used as part of a guard, whole 
detachments go with their pieces. 



26 THE OATLlSr, t;i \s.\i SANTIAGO. 

"Instruction: 

"The organization is punk expi rimental; hence 
the greatest possible latitude musl be allowed the 

detachment commander, and he should be held 
accountable for the results. He should urn be 
subjected to the orders or interference of any sub- 
ordinates, however able, who have made do spe- 
cial study of the tactical us.* or instruction for 
machine guns, and who may qoI have faith in the 
experiment. It will be useless to expeel efficiency 
of the proposed organization unless this liberty 
be accorded its organizer. The field is a new one, 
not yet well discussed by even the text -writers. 
Organization and instruction must be largely ex 
perimental, subject to change as the result of 
experience; but no change from the plans of the 
organizer should be made except for good and 
sufficient reasons. 
"Tactical Employment: 

"This organization is expected to develop: 
"(a) The fire-action of good infantry. 
"(&) The mobility of cavalry. 

"Its qualities, therefore, must be rapidity and 
accuracy, both of fire and movement. 

"Its employment on the defensive is obvious. 
On the offensive it is expected to be useful with 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 27 

advance guards, rear guards, outposts, raids, and 
in battle. The last use, novel as it is, will be most 
important of all. The flanks of the division can 
be secured by this organization, relieving reserves 
of this duty; it will give a stiffening to the line of 
support, and at every opportune occasion will 
be pushed into action on the firing line. The moral 
effect of its presence will be very great; it will be 
able to render valuable assistance by its fire (over 
the charging line) in many cases. Last, but very 
important, the occupation of a captured line by 
this organization at once will supply a powerful, 
concentrated, and controlled fire, either to repulse 
a counter-charge or to fire on a discomfited, re- 
tiring enemy. Being a horsed organization, it can 
arrive at the critical point at the vital moment 
when, the defender's first line having been thrust 
out, our line being disorganized, a counter-charge 
by the enemy would be most effective, or con- 
trolled fire by our own troops on him would be 
most useful. 

"It is urged that this last use of machine guns is 
one of the most important functions, and one 
which has been overlooked by writers and tac- 
ticians. 

"There is one vital limitation upon the proposed 



28 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

organization; viz., it must not be pitted against 
artillery. 

"It is urgently suggested that this organization 
can be perfected here and now without difficulty, 
while it will be very difficult to perfect after the 
forward movement has begun. Horses and har- 
ness can be easily procured at Tampa; there will 
be no difficulty if some energetic officer be author- 
ized to proceed with the work, and directed to 
attend to the details. 

"Believing earnestly in the utility of the pro- 
posed organization, which will convert useless im- 
pedimenta into a fourth arm, and realizing the 
dangerous nature of the proposed service, I re- 
spectfully offer my services to carry these plans 
into effect. John H. Parker, 

"2d Lieut. 13th Infty." 
With this plan well digested and with many a 
plausible argument in its favor all thought out, 
Col. Arthur McArthur, assistant adjutant-gen- 
eral to Gen. Wade, who was at that moment in 
command, was approached. 

Col. McArthur was a very busy man. He was 
also a very business-like man, and one of hand- 
some appearance, easy access, and pleasant ad- 
dress. He sandwiched in a fifteen-minute inter- 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 29 

view between two pressing engagements, and 
manifested both interest and approval. But noth- 
ing could be done at that time. "Come again a 
week from to-day," said he, "and I will try to ob- 
tain you a hearing before one who can do what 
you wish by a single word. I believe in your 
scheme and will help you if I can." The week 
rolled by and a change of commanding generals 
occurred. Gen. Wade was ordered away, taking 
McArthur with him, and no progress had been 
made. It was discouraging. 

The next step in the plan was by lucky accident. 
Lieutenant (now Lieut-Col.) John T. Thompson, 
Ordnance Department, who was in charge of the 
Ordnance Depot at Tampa, accidentally met the 
would-be machine-gun man, and was promptly but- 
tonholed over a dish of ice cream. Thompson was 
himself a young man and a student. His depart- 
ment placed an insuperable obstacle in the way 
of himself carrying out a plan which he, also, 
had conceived, and he was keen to see the 
idea, which he fully believed in, demonstrated 
on the battle-field. He had, moreover, as ord- 
nance officer, just received an invoice of fifteen 
Catling guns, complete, of the latest model, and he 
had access to the commanding general by virtue 



30 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

of being a member of his staff. By reason of the 
terrible rush of overwork, he needed an assistant, 
and it seemed practicable to try to kill two birds 
with one stone. But all he said was, "I believe in 
the idea; I have long advocated it. It may be pos- 
sible for me to get you your opportunity, and it 
may not. If so, you will hear from the matter." 

The attempt to get the thing going had been 
apparently abandoned, when, utterly without 
notice, the regimental commander received or- 
ders per letter, from Headquarters Fifth Army 
Corps, which resulted in the following orders: 

"Headquarters 13th Infantry, in the Field, 
"Tampa, Fla., May 1*7. 1898. 
"Special Orders No. 22: 

"Pursuant to instructions contained in letter 
from Headquarters 5th Army Corps, May 2C. 
1898, 

2d Lieut. John It. Parker 13th Infantry, 

Sergeant Alois Weischaar Company A, 

Sergeant William Ryder Company O, 

Private Lewis Kastner Company A, 

Private Joe Seman Company B, 

Private Abram Greenberg Companv C, 

Private Joseph Hoft Company D, 

Private O'Connor L. Jones Company D, 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 31 

Private Louis Misiak Company E, 

Private George C. Murray Company F, 

Private John Bremer Company G, 

Private Fred H. Chase Company EL 

Private Martin Pyne Company H, 

will report to Lieut. J. T. Thompson, ordnance 
officer, for duty in connection with the Gatling 
Gun Battery. 

"These men will be fully equipped, with the ex- 
ception of rifle, bayonet, scabbard, and blanket- 
bag, and will be rationed to include May 31, 1898. 

"By order of Colonel Smith. 

"M. McFarland, 
"1st Lieut. 13th Infty., Adjutant." 

These men were selected by their company 
commanders. It is not known whether the selec- 
tions were made with a view to special fitness or 
not. They had no notice that the detail was to 
be anything but a transient character; in fact, 
one company commander actually detailed the 
cook of his private mess, and was intensely dis- 
gusted when he found that the detail was to be 
permanent or semi-permanent. The men were 
sent fully armed and equipped; carrying rifles, 
knapsacks, etc., and marched down to the Ord- 
nance Depot for instructions. These instructions 



32 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

were to return to camp, turn in their rifles, bay- 
onets, cartridges, belts, and knapsacks, and return 
early the following morning equipped with blank- 
et-roll complete, haversack, and canteen. Each 
man, after full explanation of the hazardous duty, 
was given a chance to withdraw, but all volun- 
teered to stay. 

The instructions were obeyed, and the Gatling 
Gun Detachment was born — a pigmy. 



THE GATLiyG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 33 



CHAPTER III. 

The Ordnance Depot. 

The Ordnance Depot at Tampa was located on 
Lafayette Street, at the end of the bridge over the 
river, next to the Tampa Bay Hotel. The river 
washed the sides of the building, which was occu- 
pied by the Tampa Athletic Club, and had for- 
merly been used as a club-house. There were two 
stories and a basement. The basement was near- 
ly on a level with the river, the main floor on a 
level with the bridge, and there was also a spa- 
cious upper floor. The main floor was used for 
storage of light articles of ordnance; the base- 
ment for heavy articles and ammunition. Hun- 
dreds of thousands of rounds of rifle and revolver 
ball cartridges, thousands of rounds of Hotch- 
kiss fixed ammunition, and many hundreds of 
pounds of powder charges for field artillery and 
mortars were here stored. Miscellaneous assort- 
ments were daily coming in, generally without 
any mark on the box by which to learn what were 
the contents. The name of the arsenal, if from 



34 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

an arsenal, was usually stamped on the seal; gen- 
erally there was no mark whatever to designate 
the origin or contents of the many boxes which 
came from ordinary posts. The invoices came 
from a week to ten days behind or in advance of 
the arrival of the boxes, and there was not the 
slightest clue to be gained from them. Conse- 
quently those who had to check up invoices and 
prepare for issues were at their wits' end to keep 
things straight. A requisition for so many articles 
would come in, duly approved; unless the boxes 
containing these articles happened to have been 
unpacked, it was uncertain whether they were on 
hand or not. No wholesale merchant of any sense 
would ship out boxes of goods without some in- 
dication of their contents; but that was exactly 
what was done from all over the country to the 
Ordnance De'pot at Tampa. 

The upper floor consisted of one large room. A 
rope railing was placed around it to preserve clear 
space around the desks. There were several of 
these for the ordnance officer and the various 
clerks. A chief clerk, an assistant clerk, a ste- 
nographer, and two ordnance sergeants looked 
after the red tape. An overseer with four subordi- 
nates and a gang of negro stevedores attended to 



THE GAT LING GUN 8 AT SANTIAGO. 35 

loading and unloading boxes, storing them, count- 
ing out articles for issue or receipt, and such other 
duties as they were called on to perform. There 
was an old janitor named McGee, a veteran of the 
Civil War, whose business it was to look after the 
sweeping and keep the floors clean. 

Four guns in their original boxes were issued 
to the detachment on the 27th of May. They were 
new, and apparently had never been assembled. 
On assembling them it was found that the parts 
had been constructed with such "scientific" ac- 
curacy that the use of a mallet was necessary. 
The binder-box on the pointing lever was so tight 
that in attempting to depress the muzzle of the 
gun it was possible to lift the trail off the ground 
before the binder-box would slide on the lever. 
The axis-pin had to be driven in and out with an 
axe, using a block of wood, of course, to prevent 
battering. A truly pretty state of affairs for a 
gun the value of which depends on the ease with 
which it can be pointed in any direction. 

Inquiry after the war at the factory where the 
guns are made disclosed the fact that these parts 
are rigidly tested by a gauge by the Government 
inspectors, and that looseness is regarded as a 
fatal defect. Even play of half a hundredth of an 



36 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

inch is enough to insure the rejection of a piece. 
The very first thing done by the Gatling Gun De- 
tachment, upon assembling these guns, was to 
obtain a set of armorers' tools and to file away 
these parts by hand until the aim of the piece 
could be changed by the touch of a feather. The 
detachment was ordered to rely upon the friction 
clutches for steadiness of aim, when necessary, 
and not upon the tight fit of the parts. It was 
ordered that there must be no doubt whatever of 
easy, perfectly free manipulation at any and all 
times, even if the pointing lever should become 
rusted. This precaution proved on July 1st to 
have been of great value. 

The instruction of the detachment began imme- 
diately, and consisted, at first, of unpacking, 
mounting, dismounting, and repacking the guns. 
The four guns were mounted and a drill held each 
time in the loading and firing of the piece. This 
system of instruction was continued until the de- 
tachment was ordered on board ship on the 6th of 
June. During this instruction members of the 
detachment were designated by name to fall out, 
and the remainder of the detachment required to 
execute all the maneuvers of the piece as before. 
In fact, this instruction was carried to sucfi a 



M 

JO 

d 




THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 37 

point that one man alone was required to load, 
aim, and fire the gun at designated objects without 
any assistance. 

The detachment at once assumed the position of 
an independent command. It reported directly 
to Maj.-Gen. W. R. Shafter, commanding the 5th 
Corps, in everything so far as its duties with Gat- 
ling guns were concerned, was regarded as an in- 
dependent command, kept its own records in the 
same manner as a company, obtained cooking 
utensils from the quartermaster and ran its own 
mess, and furnished its own guard. This status, 
that of a separate command, continued until the 
detachment was finally disbanded at Montauk. 

On the 27th of May the detachment commander 
was summoned to Gen. Wheeler's headquarters 
and there requested to explain to the general in 
person his plans for organizing a Gatling gun de- 
tachment. Gen. Wheeler had just assumed com- 
mand of all the Cavalry belonging to the 5th Army 
Corps. His headquarters, instead of being in a 
suite of rooms in the palatial Tampa Bay Hotel, 
where all the other general officers had their head- 
quarters, were located about half a mile from the 
hotel in a treeless pasture. The cavalry guidon 
floating from a lance-head was the only indica- 



38 THE GATLINQ GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

tion of headquarters, and the half-dozen "A" 
tents in an irregular line gave no sign that one of 
the most distinguished generals in the world had 
here his headquarters in the field. 

The general was easily accessible. The first 
thing that impressed one of him was his extra- 
ordinary quickness. His eye seemed to take in 
everything within sight of him a1 a single glance, 
and to read one's thoughts before the tongue could 
give expression to them. He graspi <1 ideas wlicn 
they were only half ul i ered and immediately drew 
deductions from mere statements of simple facts. 
the result of years of careful study. These deduc- 
tions, which Gen. Wheeler drew instantly, wen- in 
every case correct, and showed a keener and more 
correct appreciation of the proper tactical employ- 
ment of machine guns than was shown by any 
other officer of the 5th Corps. The result of the 
interview with the general was that a scheme for 
the organization of a tactical unit to be composed 
of three Gatling guns and to be employed with 
the cavalry division, was drawn up on the spot, 
under Gen. Wheeler's personal direction, and was 
submitted by him to Gen. Shafter, with the request 
that authority be granted for the organization of 
this command for the purpose indicated. 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 39 

'In the application Gen. Wheeler stated that 
he believed that such a battery of machine guns, 
if properly handled, could go anywhere that cav- 
alry could go, could take the place of infantry 
supports, could dash up and hold any ground or 
advantageous position that a body of cavalry 
might seize, could be thrown out to one flank of 
the enemy and assist in his demoralization in 
preparation for the cavalry charge, and would be 
of particular service in case the enemy attempted 
to form infantry squares, which were at that time 
supposed to be the main part of the Spanish tac- 
tics of battle. This application was disapproved. 
On the 30th of May, Gen. Lee sent for the de- 
tachment commander for an interview on the 
subject of Gatling guns. Gen. Lee was at this 
time quartered at the Tampa Bay Hotel, and was 
engaged in the organization of the 7th Army 
Corps. It was supposed that the 7th Corps was 
designed for the Havana campaign, and it was 
believed that the attack upon Havana would begin 
at a very early date. The result of the interview 
with Gen. Lee was that he directed a scheme for 
the organization of a tactical unit to be composed 
of 9 guns, 3 batteries of 3 guns each, to be pre- 
pared for service with the 7th Army Corps. 



40 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT S AST [AGO. 

It was desired that this organization be a volun- 
teer organization, and the application was there- 
fore made for authority from the President, under 
that law of Congress authorizing the employment 
of special troops. Col. Guild, well and favora- 
bly known from his connection with the Massa- 
chusetts National Guard, was prepared to furnish 
a volunteer organization already in existence, 
well drilled and already officered, composed of the 
flower of the youth of Massachusetts, very largely 
of college graduates, who had already been com- 
municated with on the subject, and who were even 
at that time expecting momentarily a telegram 
calling them to this duty. Nothing resulted from 
this effort. 

Meantime the drill instruction of the little de- 
tachment continued. Its members had acquired 
a considerable degree of proficiency in the mechan- 
ical handling of their guns, and were beginning to 
appreciate the destructive possibilities of their 
weapon. They were enjoying a degree of liberty 
which they had not found in their regimental 
camp, because when not on duty they were free 
to come and go at will, when and where they 
pleased. The hours for instruction were desig- 
nated in the morning and in the cool of the after- 



THE GATLING GUN& AT SANTIAGO. 41 

noon, leaving the middle of the day and the eve- 
ning for the men's own recreation. The result of 
this system of treatment was that esprit-du-corps 
began to be developed in the detachment. They 
began to feel that they were a special organization, 
expected to do special work, and that they were 
receiving very special treatment. They began to 
be proud of being members of the Gatling Gun 
Detachment, to take greater interest in the work, 
and when on the first of June they received their 
monthly pay not a single member of the detach- 
ment committed any excesses in consequence of 
this unusual degree of freedom. No one was 
intoxicated. No one was absent without per- 
mission. 

The detachment had not been at the Ordnance 
Depot very long before an opportunity occurred 
for some of its members to exhibit those qualities 
which made the success of the battery so conspicu- 
ous on the battle-field afterward. The detach- 
ment commander had been detailed by verbal 
orders on the first of June in charge of the issues 
of ordnance property to the Santiago expedition. 
This was in addition to his duties with the Gatling 
guns. The work would commence about 6 
o'clock in the morning, and from that time until 



42 THE GATLIXU GUNS AT SAXTIAGO. 

dark there was a continual stream of wagons car- 
rying away stores such as rifles, haversacks, meat 
ration cans, tin cups, and all the articles needed by 
troops in the field during a campaign. The am- 
munition which was issued to the troops at this 
time was drawn at the same place. 

When wagons arrived to receive issues, steve- 
dores were directed to count out the different arti- 
cles under the direction of an overseer, and these 
piles of articles were verified by the officer in 
charge of the issues. The stevedores then loaded 
them on the wagons which were to haul them to 
the different camps. Receipts in duplicate were 
always taken and invoices in duplicate were al- 
ways given, in the name, of course, of Lieut. John 
T. Thompson, who was responsible for the stores. 

On the 4th of June issues were being made of 
rifle-ball cartridges. These cartridges came 
packed in boxes of 1000 rounds each, and each box 
weighed 78 pounds. A great quantity of it was 
stored in the basement, where there was also a 
considerable quantity of fixed Hotchkiss ammu- 
nition, as well as several thousand rounds of 
powder charges in boxes. The Hotchkiss ammu- 
nition, which comes with projectile and powder 
both set in a brass case, is bad ammunition to 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 43 

pack; for, no matter how carefully it is handled, 
there is almost always some leakage of powder 
from the cartridge case, thus causing a certain 
amount of loose powder to sift into the box in 
which it is packed. 

About half past 11 o'clock on this morning a 
negro stevedore accidentally dropped a box of rifle 
ammunition near a pile of Hotchkiss fixed, and the 
next instant the laborers saw smoke ascending 
toward the ceiling of the basement. They yelled 
"Fire! fire!" at the top of their voices, and every- 
body in the basement at once made a rush for the 
two doors. It was a panic. The danger was 
imminent. The smoke curled up to the ceiling 
and then curled down again, and the excited, 
panic-stricken faces of the negroes as they rushed 
through the door made an awful picture of human 
terror. People on the oustide of the building 
began to shout "Fire!" 

At this juncture MeGee, the old janitor, who had 
just reached the door, cried out, "Lieutenant, there 
is a box in here on fire!" speaking to Lieut. Parker, 
who was verifying issues just outside the door. The 
lieutenant replied, "Let 's throw it into the river," 
and dashed toward the box through the door, 
pushing the excited negroes to each side in order 



44 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

to assist McGee, who had instantly started for the 
box. When Lieut. Parker reached the box, he 
found that McGee had already taken it up, and 
was staggering under its weight. He placed one 
arm around McGee's shoulder and with the other 
assisted him to support the box, from which the 
smoke was still ascending, and the two rushed for 
the door, throwing the whole momentum of their 
weight and speed against the crowd of frightened 
negroes, who were falling over each other in their 
panic-stricken efforts to escape. Priv. Greenberg, 
of the 13th Infantry, a member of the Gatling Gun 
Detachment, who was the sentinel on post at the 
time, saw the two men coming with the box, and 
with great presence of mind added his own weight 
with a rapid rush to the shock they had produced, 
thus enabling them to break their way through 
the dense throng at the door. It was only the 
work of an instant to then throw the box in the 
river, where it sank in the water and for a moment 
the blue smoke continued to bubble up from the 
box, which lay clearly visible on the bed of the 
river, the water being only about two feet deep at 
this point, which was, however, enough to entirely 
cover the box and thus extinguish the fire. 

At the outcry of "Fire!" Lieut. H. L. Kinnison, 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 45 

of the 25th Infantry, who was waiting outside of 
the basement with a wagon, started in at the other 
door, and Serg. Weischaar, acting first sergeant 
of the Gatling Gun Detachment, started for water. 
Just as the two men emerged from the door carry- 
ing the box, Lieut. Kinnison reached the spot 
where the fire had originated, and Serg. Weis- 
chaar appeared with two buckets of water. He 
and Lieut. Kinnison at once flooded the floor, 
seized a woolen cloth which happened to be near, 
and wetted down the boxes of Hotchkiss ammuni- 
tion as a measure of precaution. 

McGee, the hero of this episode, is an old vet- 
eran of the Civil War, having served three years 
in the Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry during 
the war, and five years in the Regular Army after 
the war. He has never drawn a pension nor ap- 
plied for one, although he suffers considerably 
from disease and wounds contracted and received 
during the war, and certainly should be rewarded 
by a grateful government for his conspicuous 
heroism. The explosion of this magazine would 
have brought the whole expedition to a standstill, 
besides inflicting tremendous destruction of prop- 
erty and frightful loss of life. 

The same day the Artillery of the army began to 



46 THE GATLIXG GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 

draw its material for the campaign, and for a 
period of thirty-nine hours there was no rest for 
anybody connected with the issue of ordnance 
stores. It was at this time that the lack of intel- 
ligent marking and packing of the boxes was 
keenly felt. The greatest difficulty was experi- 
enced in selecting, from the mass of stores in the 
de'pot, the stores that were required by the Artil- 
lery. It was especially difficult during the work 
by night, when the only light that could possibly 
be allowed was a single lantern, on account of the 
danger of fire. 

At the close of this thirty-nine hours of arduous 
duty, the officer in command of the Oatling Gun 
Detachment learned that orders had been issued 
for the embarkation of the 5th Army Corps at 
Port Tampa, and that no reference had been made 
to the Gatling Gun Detachment in these orders. 
He at once sought Lieut. Thompson, who could 
offer no light on the omission, but said, "I have 
orders to send at once to the Cherokee 521,000 
rounds of rifle-ball cartridges and all the revolver 
ammunition on hand. This is the reserve ammu- 
nition of the 5th Army Corps. I will send you in 
charge of this ammunition and you will see it to its 
destination. You mav take an escort or not, as 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 47 

you please. The ammunition is to go on the 4 
o'clock train and you must make all the arrange- 
ments in regard to it. Get box-cars, haul the 
ammunition over there and put it in the cars, see 
that it goes on that train, and as soon as it arrives 
at Port Tampa, see that it is properly put on board 
the Cherokee." 

In order to fully understand the situation of the 
Gatling Gun Detachment at this juncture, the 
following correspondence on the subject is 
necessary: 

"Office of Ordnance Officer, 
"Lafayette Street, West of Bridge, 

"Tampa, Fla., June 3, 1898. 
"The Assistant Adjutant-General, 5th Army Corps, 

Tampa, Florida: 

"Sir,— Replying to your letter of June 1, 1898, in 
reference to Gatling Gun Detachment, I have the 
honor to submit the following report: 
Guns, men, and equipment required for a 4-gun 

detachment: 

Guns. Serg. Corp. Priv. 

Total required: 4 5 4 28 

On hand: 4 2 10 

Required: 3 4 18 

The gun crews thus organized will give most 
effective service for the detachment. 



48 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

Ammunition: Each limber carries 9,840 rounds 
cal. .30. Four limbers, 27,300; nec- 
essary reserve, 32,640; total, 60,000. 
Tentage: Two conical wall-tents for enlisted 
men; one 'A' wall-tent for officer. 
Camp equipage, in addition to that on hand in 
Gatling Gun Detachment: one buz- 
zacot, small; four mess-pans, one 
dish-pan, one coffee-mill. 
Blanket-roll complete; revolver with 50 rounds 
per man ; waist-belts and entrench- 
ing-knives. 
"It is recommeneded that Priv. Butz, 'G' Co., 
13th Infantry, Corp. Kobert S. Smith, <C Co., 
13th Infantry, and Serg. Weigle, 9th Infantry, be 
members of the detachment; and that detachment 
be taken from 9th Infantry, which has some well- 
instructed men. 

"It is further recommended that the detachment 
be fully horsed as soon as practicable, and that 
the whole be placed under the command of Lieut. 
John H. Parker, 13th Infantry, as acting captain. 
"I recommend that I be authorized to issue the 
4 Gatling guns and parts to him. 

"The details should carry the rations prescribed 



v 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 49 

in General Orders 5th, May 31, 1898, 5th Army 
Corps. Very respectfully, 

(Signed) "Jno. T. Thompson, 

"1st Lieut., Ord. Dept, U. S. A." 
This letter, prepared by Lieut. Parker and signed 
by Lieut. Thompson, was endorsed as follows: 

First Endorsement. 
"Headquarters 5th Army Corps, 

"Tampa, Fla., June 5, 1898. 
"Respectf ully returned to Lieut. J. T. Thompson, 
Ordnance Officer. 

"If Lieut. Parker, in charge of the detachment 
as at present constituted, can make the arrange- 
ments suggested within, he may take action; but, 
in view of the limited time remaining, it is thought 
the detachment already organized will answer. 
"By command of Maj.-Gen. Shaft er. 

"E. J. McClernand, 
"Assistant Adjutant-General." 

Second Endorsement. 
"Office of the Ordnance Officer, 

"Lafayette Street Bridge, 
"Tampa, Fla., June 5, 1898. 
"Respectfully referred to Lieut. John H. Parker 
for his information. Jno. T. Thompson, 

"1st Lieut., Ordnance Dept., U. S. A." 



50 TEE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

It will be seen from the first endorsement that 
a certain amount of discretion was left to the 
detachment commander. He was authorized to 
take action if he could make the arrangements 
suggested within. Lieut. Thompson had author- 
ized an escort for the reserve ammunition, if it 
was considered necessary. The detachment com- 
mander resolved to take action by using his whole 
detachment as an escort, putting it on board the 
Cherokee, with the reserve ammunition, and ac- 
companying it to its destination — in Cuba, trust- 
ing to the future to enable him to complete the 
detachment according to the first endorsement. 

It was now 11 o'clock in the forenoon. Between 
that time and 4 o'clock it was necessary to obtain 
two freight cars, have them placed upon the sid- 
ing at a convenient point, have more than twenty 
wagon-loads of ammunition, camp equipage, etc., 
placed in these cars, have the four guns with their 
limbers placed on board, and, more difficult than 
all the rest, go through the necessary red tape at 
the quartermaster's office in order to get the 
two cars moved to Port Tampa. It was all 
accomplished. 

The general freight agent was bluffed into be- 
lieving that unless the two cars were instantlv set 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 51 

where they were wanted his whole railroad would 
be tied up. The quartermaster was hypnotized 
and dropped formality, putting all the clerks to 
work upon papers and making out the necessary 
bill of lading, invoices, etc., in time to catch the 
4 o'clock train. He also issued the necessary 
transportation for the officer and men of the de- 
tachment from Tampa to Port Tampa, accepting 
the first endorsement above as sufficient orders 
for that purpose. 

One member of the detachment, Priv. Murray, 
had been very ill with what we afterward learned 
to call the Cuban fever, and, while apparently con- 
valescent, was entirely too weak to accompany 
the detachment. He was a splendid fellow, and 
the tears rolled down his emaciated face when he 
was told he must remain behind. He was fur- 
nished with a descriptive list and a letter was writ- 
ten to the chief surgeon of the Division Hospital, 
requesting him to send an ambulance immediately 
for the sick man. One member of the detachment 
carried this letter to Tampa Heights, and so sharp 
was the work of getting away that this man had 
to board a moving train as it was pulling out to 
keep from getting left; but Priv. Murray was 



52 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

taken to the hospital and cared for, and Priv. 
Bremer did not get left. 

The detachment reached Port Tampa about sun- 
down, and Maj. Cushing, who had charge of the 
loading of the transports, at once authorized the 
cars to be set alongside the Cherokee. The am- 
munition, guns, camp equipage, men, and all were 
promptly put aboard. The training in packing 
and unpacking the guns was the only thing which 
enabled the work to be done in the limited time 
allotted. Not so much as a ten-penny nail be- 
longing to the detachment was left behind. 

During the night the troops that were to occupy 
the Cherokee came on board, and it was found the 
next morning that five or six tons of regimental 
baggage had been piled on top of the guns, mak- 
ing it practically impossible to disembark, even if 
such a movement should be ordered. 



THE GAT LING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 53 



CHAPTER IV. 

The Voyage and Disembarkation. 

It seemed that the work had been accomplished 
none too soon, for on the morning of June 7th 
orders came to the Cherokee to leave the slip and 
proceed down the bay. There were on board at 
this time, beside the little Gatling Gun Detach- 
ment, the 17th Infantry, under command of Col. 
Haskell, and a battalion of the 12th Infantry, un- 
der command of Col. Comba, who was the senior 
officer on board. The ship was frightfully 
crowded. The berth deck and lower deck had 
been arranged for the accommodation of the men 
by nailing rows of two 2x4 scantlings just far 
enough apart to leave room for a man to lie down, 
and fastening three tiers of bunks to these scant- 
lings. The men were packed in these bunks like 
sardines in a box. The ventilation was conspicu- 
ous by its absence, the heat below deck was fright- 
ful and the misery entailed by such accommoda- 
tions was beyond description. But the men were 
very cheerful, and, being allowed the privilege of 



54 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

the upper deck, very little in the way of com- 
plaint was heard. Everybody was anxious to be 
off. The hope most frequently expressed was for 
a quick passage and a sharp, swift campaign. 
It was easily foreseen by the officers on board the 
ship that a long sojourn on shipboard under such 
conditions would have a very bad effect on the 
men. 

The ship dropped down the bay to the quaran- 
tine station, starting about noon, and there lay to, 
waiting, as was supposed, for the remainder of 
the fleet. Suddenly, about 8 p. m.. one of the tor- 
pedo cruisers came tearing down the bay under 
full steam, and we heard the message sounded 
through the megaphone: "Return to port. Three 
Spanish cruisers within three hours' sail of the 
offing." It was a thrilling moment. Officers and 
men were lounging, taking, as they supposed, 
their last view of the American shores, without 
a suspicion of present danger, when they were 
rapidly brought to a realizing sense that "war 
is hell," by a notice that the enemy was upon 
them. Whether they were in danger or not, the 
danger was deadly real and imminent to them at 
the time. 

The Cherokee had been anchored pretty well 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 55 

inside. She immediately got up steam and went 
out to warn other vessels farther out in the offing, 
and then made safely for the harbor. Officers and 
men behaved with perfect coolness. It was hope- 
less to attempt to escape by concealment, so Col. 
Comba ordered out the band of the 17th Infantry 
and the good ship fled up the bay, in momentary 
expectation of a smashing shot from the enemy, 
to the strains of "There '11 be a hot time." What 
little excitement there was displayed itself in a 
feverish searching of the bay with field-glasses for 
signs of the enemy. The older officers, upon 
whom the responsibility was resting, sat upon the 
quarter-deck, smoking their pipes and discussing 
the situation. The captains quietly moved about, 
assigning stations to their companies, in case of 
attack, with the view of trying the effect of the 
modern rifle upon the armored sides of a Spanish 
man-of-war, and two of the younger officers took 
advantage of the catchy air which the band was 
playing to dance a two-step on the quarter-deck. 
So the evening wore away. The moon went down. 
The myriad little stars came out, twinkling in the 
deep blue sky, and at last both officers and men, 
tired of looking for an enemy who was never to 
appear, turned in for such sleep as they could 



53 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

get, leaving a small guard on deck to keep a look- 
out. When they awoke next morning, the ship 
was in the deepest part of the nearest slip, moored 
fast by her guy-ropes to the dock. Thus ended 
the first engagement with the enemy. 

From the 8th until the 13th, the Cherokee lay at 
anchor in the slip. She was relieved on the 10th 
of about 200 men, thus slightly lightening her 
overcrowded condition. In the meantime, this 
overcrowded condition of the ship had led to 
some discussion as to who could best be moved on 
board some other ship, with some prospect that 
the Gatling Gun Detachment might be disturbed. 
The situation was not at all satisfactory. With 
four guns, no mules, no harness, no authority, and 
only twelve men, the Gatling Gun Detachment did 
not appear to be in a very fair way toward inflict- 
ing much damage upon the enemy. So on the 11th 
of June the detachment commander visited Gen. 
Shafter at his headquarters, determined to bring 
the matter to an issue, definitely, one way or the 
other. This w r as the first time he had met the 
general, and, under the circumstances, the manner 
of his reception appeared to be doubtful. 

Gen. Shafter is a big man. This is not noticed 
at first glance. He is above the average height, 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 57 

but his corpulent figure does not indicate that 
he is full five feet nine inches in height, because 
his girth is of like proportion. His hands are big; 
his arm is big; his head is big. The occipuf is 
especially full, and the width of head just over the 
ears is noticeable. There is plenty of room for 
the organs of combativeness. One would think 
he is probably a lover of children ; during this in- 
terview he patted the head of an inquisitive dog, 
which evidently belonged somewhere on board the 
flag-ship, and which strayed into the room. His 
eyes are big, very full and very keen. As you 
enter he says curtly, "Take a seat." He waits, 
looking down, for you to state your business, then 
suddenly fixes you with a piercing glance, and 
goes to the heart of the subject by one incisive sen- 
tence, which leaves no more to be said. This 
description is a general type of several interviews 
with him. On this occasion the general inquired 
concerning the facts, looking keenly, searchingly, 
and meditatively at the detachment commander. 
The machine gun man was "on trial." Then the 
general broke the silence by one short question, 
"What do you want?" and the reply was in kind, 
"Twenty men, general, with the privilege of 
selecting them." The general suggested the ad- 



58 THE GATLING GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 

visability of taking a complete organization; to 
which was replied, "That at this late hour in the 
expedition it is imperative to have selected men 
in order to perform the required duty; that men 
taken at random, as would be the case in a com- 
plete organization such as a company, would not 
be likely to have the required characteristics." 
The general tersely remarked, "You may have 
them. Make out your list, name any man in the 
corps that you want, and hand the list to me. I 
will send the men to you." The trial was over, 
and the Machine Gun Detachment was a settled 
fact. 

Accordingly on the following day Special Or- 
ders No. 16 were issued, as follows: 
Extract. 
"Headquarters 5th Army Corps, 

"On Board S. S. Seguranga, 
"Tampa Bay, Fla., June 11, 1898. 
"Special Orders, No. 16: 

************ 
"4. The following named enlisted men are de- 
tailed for duty with the Gatling Gun Detachment, 
5th Army Corps, and will report at once to 2d 
Lieut. John H. Parker, 13th Infantry, command- 
ing the detachment for duty: 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 59 

"9th Infantry: Sergeant Weigle. 

"12th Infantry: Privates Voelker, Company A; 
Anderson, Lauer, and Timberly, Company C; 
Prazak, Company E. 

"18th Infantry: Sergeant Green, Company H; 
Corporals Stiegerwald, Company A; Doyle, Smith, 
and Rose, Company C; Privates Corey and Power, 
Company A; Barts, Company E; and Schmadt, 
Company G. 

"17th Infantry: Privates Merryman and Schulze, 
Company A; McDonald, Company B; Elkins, Del- 
lett, and McGoin, Company D; Click, Needle, Snif- 
fer, and Sine, Company E. 

"Each of the soldiers will report equipped as 
follows: Blanket-roll complete, haversack and 
contents, canteen, waist-belt of leather, hunting- 
knife, and revolver, and they will be rationed with 
ten days' travel rations. Descriptive lists of these 
men will be sent to the commanding officer of the 

detachment. 

************ 

"By command of Maj.-Gen. Shafter. 

"Official. J. D. Miley, E. J. McClemand, 

"Aide. Asst. Adj.-Gen." 



60 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

"Headquarters 5th Army Corps, 

"On Board S. S. Seguranga, 
"Tampa Bay, June 11, 1898. 
"Special Orders, No. 16: 

Extract. 

* * * ********* 

"5. 2d Lieut. John H. Parker, 13th Infantry, 
commanding the Gatling Gun Detachment, 5th 
Army Corps, is authorized to make the usual 

requisitions for supplies. 

************ 

"By command of Maj.-Gen. Shafter. 

"Official. J. D. Miley, E. J. McClernand, 

"Aide. Asst. Adj.-Gen." 

The organization was thus perfected by a single 
stroke of the general's pen on the 11th of June, 
theoretically; practically it was the 14th of June 
before the details from the 12th and 17th Infantry 
reported, and when they did, instead of being 
equipped as directed, they carried rifles with 100 
rounds of ammunition. 

Serg. Weigle, of the 9th Infantry, who reported 
at the same time, carried a revolver. On the 14th 
a wigwag message was received from the 13th 
Infantry, inquiring whether the detail was desired 
to report at once or not, to which the reply was 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 61 

sent that it was desired to report at the earliest 
possible moment. It did not report. 

The detachment was at once organized as well 
as possible for the trip on board the transport, and 
the guns brought up from the hold of the ship and 
mounted in such a way that they would be ready 
for instant use. It was not known but that the 
detachment might have to participate in a naval 
engagement, and the value of machine guns in 
the navy has long been demonstrated. At any 
rate, it was determined to be ready to give a warm 
reception to any torpedo vessel which might at- 
tempt to attack the Cherokee. One object of get- 
ting the guns up was to give instruction to the 
new men who reported on the 14th. Sergt. Wei- 
gle was well instructed in the use of Gatling guns, 
but none of the other members of the detachment 
had ever received any instruction, and had been 
selected rather on the ground of their superior 
intelligence and courage than on any special 
knowledge of machine guns. They were given a 
drill each day in loading and firing the piece, dur- 
ing the time they remained on board the transport^ 
when the weather permitted. 

The condition of the troops on board the trans 
port was miserable. The following extract from 



62 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

a letter written at that time will convey some idea 
of the crowded, ill-ventilated condition of the 
vessel: 

"We have now been on board the transport 
a week, and are getting into a frame of mind 
suitable for desperate work. If you can imagine 
1000 men crowded into space needed for 500, and 
then kept there without room to stand or move 
or sit for seven days, under a tropical sun, in foul 
holds utterly without ventilation (just imagine 
it!), endured without a single murmur or com- 
plaint, not stoically, but patiently and intelligent- 
ly, while every officer on board is kicking as hard 
and as often as possible for the relief of his men, 
then you will have some idea of the situation. The 
men are very patient, but they know someone has 
blundered. Talk about the heroism of the Light 
Brigade! It is nothing to the heroism that goes 
cheerfully and uncomplainingly into the Black 
Hole of Calcutta (there is nothing else that will 
compare with these transports), all because it is 
duty. When will the people appreciate the hero- 
ism of the Regular Army?" 

This was the actual condition of affairs on 
board the Cherokee up to the time of leaving port 
on the 14th of June, and it was modified onlv bv 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 63 

the hoisting of wind-sails, after we got under way. 
These were not very efficient and there were only 
two of them, so very little relief was given to the 
overcrowded berth-deck. Most of the men spent 
their time on the upper deck, and one whole com- 
pany was quartered there. At night, after 8 
o'clock, Col. Comba authorized the men to sleep 
on deck, and there was always a rush, when the 
ship's bell struck the hour, for good places on the 
quarter-deck. The only thing that made the voy- 
age endurable was the good weather which pre- 
vailed. This prevented seasickness, to a certain 
extent. 

The squadron reached Santiago de Cuba, and 
after tacking about for several days, either for 
the purpose of deceiving the enemy, or of waiting 
a decision as to the landing-place, finally ap- 
proached Baiquiri, which had been selected for the 
landing. The troops on the Cherokee began to 
land on the 23d of June, the battalion of the 12th 
Infantry going first. This was followed by the 
17th Infantry, and upon its departure the captain 
of the Cherokee put to sea. The reason for this 
maneuver is not known. The orders issued by 
Gen. Shafter in regard to the landing were that 
the Gatling Gun Detachment should accompany 



64 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

Gen. Lawton's Division. This movement of the 
Cherokee completely blocked the landing of the 
Gatling guns. The ship's captain was finally 
induced to put back into the bay and speak to the 
Seguranca, and Gen. Shafter directed that the 
detachment should be taken off the next morning. 

An effort was made, therefore, to obtain the use 
of a lighter which was not at that time in use, but 
the Commissary Department refused to yield the 
boat, and it remained until 11 o'clock the next 
morning tied up to the wharf with half a load of 
commissaries on board before it became available, 
and then was seized by the Quartermaster's De- 
partment. An effort was then made to obtain 
the use of three pontoons, belonging to the Engin- 
eer Department, which had been drawn up to the 
shore and were of no use to anybody. The young 
engineer officer in charge of these boats, a pre- 
mature graduate of the class of '98, was "afraid 
the boats might get smashed in the surf," and 
could not consent without seeing Col. Derby. Col. 
Derby could not be found. 

A wigwag came from Gen. Shafter, asking 
whether the Gatling guns had been landed. The 
reply, "No; may I use pontoons?" was answered 
at once, "Use pontoons, and get off immediately." 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 65 

On returning to shore with a party to work the pon- 
toons, the party was stopped in the act of launch- 
ing the first boat by Gen. Sumner, and ordered 
to proceed to the Cherokee, take her out into the 
offing, and order another to take her place to un- 
load. Protesting against this action, and inform- 
ing Gen. Sumner of the urgent orders for the Gat- 
ling guns to disembark at once, that officer in- 
quired the opinion of the prematurely graduated 
engineer as to the practicability of using the pon- 
toons, and this experienced young man again ex- 
pressed the fear that the boats might be injured in 
the surf. To the detachment commander's indig- 
nant exclamation, "What the h — were these boats 
made for, if they are not to be used and smashed?" 
Gen. Sumner responded by a peremptory order to 
warp the Cherokee out from the pier and send the 
other vessels in. The order was obeyed, and all 
the circumstances reported to Gen. Shafter the 
same evening, with the expression of the opinion 
that if the general wanted the Gatling guns land- 
ed, he would have to attend to it personally, be- 
cause the Gatling gun commander did not have 
sufficient rank to accomplish it in the face of all 
these obstacles. Early on the morning of June 
25th, therefore, Gen. Shafter sent peremptory 



66 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

orders to the lighter to lay alongside the Cherokee, 
take the Gatling guns and detachment on board, 
and land them on the dock. The transfer began 
at 8 o'clock in the morning, Gen. Shatter coming 
out in person in his steam launch to see that his 
order was executed. By 11 o'clock the guns, car- 
riages. 30,000 rounds of ammunition, four sets of 
double harness, and the detachment were on board 
the lighter. This had been accomplished a mile 
outside in the offing, with the vessel rolling and 
pitching in the trough of the sea and on the crest 
of the gigantic rollers in so violent a manner that 
it was almost impossible for men to stand on their 
feet, much less handle such heavy material as 
guns and ammunition. The lighter was warped 
to the pier at 11 o'clock, and the general tied his 
steam launch alongside to see that it was not dis- 
turbed until the debarkation was completed. At 
1 o'clock everything was ashore, and, in compli- 
ance with the general's instructions, the best 
mules in the corral were taken, and as they were 
led away from the corral-gate, a fat, sleek, black 
streaked, long-eared specimen, which had been 
selected for a saddle-mule, set up a cheerful "Aw! 
hee haw! haw!" which produced a burst of laugh- 
ter and cheering from the members of the detach- 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 67 

inent and the soldiers in the vicinity. It was a 
cheerful omen. These Missouri mules were capa- 
ble of pulling anything loose at both ends, and 
four experienced drivers had been selected from 
the detachment who were capable of riding any- 
thing that walked on four feet, or driving any- 
thing from an Arab courser to a pair of Shetland 
ponies. 

Priv. J. Shifter had been selected as corral boss 
of the detachment. The most picturesque figure, 
the most boyish member, and as brave a soldier as 
ever shouldered a musket; broad of shoulder, 
stout of limb, full of joke, as cheerful as a ray of 
sunlight, this man was the incarnation of courage 
and devotion. He loved a mule. He was proud 
of the job. With the instinct of a true teamster, 
he had snapped up the best pair of mules in the 
whole corral and was out before the detachment 
commander had selected a single mule. This 
team was as black as Shifter's shoes and as strong 
as a pair of elephants. They were worked harder 
than any other team in the 5th Army Corps, and 
when they were turned in to the quartermaster in 
August, they were as fat, as sleek, as strong, and 
as hardy as on the day they were taken from 
the corral in Baiquiri. The other three team- 



68 TEE GATLING GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 

sters were like unto the first. They were all 
handy men. They were as capable of fighting 
or aiming a gun as of driving a team. Any 
one of the four could take a team of mules up 
a mountain-side or down a vertical precipice in 
perfect safety. They could do the impossible with 
a team of mules, and they had to do it before the 
detachment reached the firing-line. The success 
of the battery was to depend to a very large degree 
upon the coolness, good judgment, and perfect 
bravery of these four teamsters. 

It should be noted that the use of mules was an 
experiment. The "scientific" branch of service 
has always held that the proper animal to draw a 
field-piece is the horse. They expatiate with great 
delight upon the almost human intelligence and 
sagacity of that noble animal; upon his courage 
"when he snuffeth the battle afar," and upon the 
undaunted spirit with which he rushes upon the 
enemy, and assists his master to work the destruc- 
tion of his foes. The Artillery claims that mules 
are entirely too stubborn, too cowardly, and too 
hard to manage for the purpose of their arm of 
the service. It was also an experiment to use two 
mules per gun. The Engineer Department had 
reported that the road to the front was impassable 



o 
> 
< 
> 

x 




THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 69 

for wheeled vehicles, and even the general had 
apparently thought that four mules per gun would 
be necessary. The necessity of economizing 
mules, and the opinion of the detachment com- 
mander that two mules per gun would be suffi- 
cient, had led to the issue of that number. Those 
who despise the army mule for the purposes of 
field artillery know very little of the capacity of 
this equine product of Missouri when properly 
handled. It was demonstrated that two mules 
can pull a Gatling gun with 10,000 rounds of am- 
munition, loaded down with rations and forage, 
where eight horses are required to draw a field- 
piece; and that mules are equally as easy to man- 
age under fire as horses. 

The landing was completed and the detachment 
organized at 3 p. m., having rations, forage, and 
ammunition complete. There was no tentage, 
except the shelter-halves which some of the men 
had brought with them. Capt. Henry Marcotte, 
retired, the correspondent of the Army and Navy 
Journal, requested permission to accompany the 
detachment, which was granted, and soon all 
were en route for the front, entrusted with the task 
of opening the way for wheeled transportation 



70 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

and of demonstrating the practicability of the 
road for army wagons and field artillery. 

For the first mile the road was excellent. It lay 
through one of the most fertile parts of the most 
fertile island in the world. A little stream trick- 
ling along the side of the road furnished plenty of 
water for both men and animals. At the end of 
the mile the detachment found a steep hill to 
descend. The Ordnance Department, which de- 
signed and built the carriage for the Gatling guns, 
had never foreseen the necessity for a brake, and 
it was therefore necessary to cut down bushes 
from the roadside and fasten the rear wheels by 
placing a stout pole between the spokes and over 
the trail of the piece. This locked the wheels, 
and the guns were thus enabled to slide down the 
steep hill without danger of a runaway. From 
this point the road became a narrow defile. The 
rank jungle closed in upon the trail, the long 
barbed leaves of the Spanish bayonet hung across 
and lacerated the legs of the mules until the 
blood trickled down to the hoofs; the boughs of 
the trees hung down over it so that even the men 
on foot had to stoop to pass under them, and the 
tortuous path winding in and out amid the dense 
tropical undergrowth made it impossible to see 



TEE OATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 71 

in places more than twenty-five or thirty yards 
ahead at a time. 

The advance guard, consisting of all the mem- 
bers of one gun crew, had been organized at once 
upon starting, and this guard moved along the 
road about two hundred and fifty yards in advance 
of the detachment, scouting every path vigilantly 
to the right and left, and keeping a constant, care- 
ful lookout to the front. Their orders were^ in 
case of encountering the enemy, to scatter in the 
underbrush, open fire with magazines, so as to pro- 
duce the impression upon the enemy that there 
was a large force, and then slowly fall back upon 
the battery. The plan was, upon the first alarm, to 
bring the two leading guns into battery upon the 
road, with the fourth gun ready to be opened to 
either flank, while the gun crew of the third gun, 
which formed the advance guard, were to act as 
infantry support to the battery. It was hoped 
that the enemy would follow the advance guard 
as it retreated, and it was believed that the Gat- 
ling gun battery could take care of two or three 
regiments of Spaniards without help if necessary. 

This form for the march had been adopted as 
the result of mature reflection. The general had 
offered a cavalry escort of two troops, and Gen. 



72 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

Sumner bad rather urged the use of an escort, but 
it was desired to demonstrate that a battery of 
machine guns, properly manned and equipped, is 
capable of independent action, and does not need 
the assistance of either arm of the service. In 
fact, the Gatling gun men would have been rather 
pleased than not to have had a brush with the 
enemy without the assistance of either infantry or 
cavalry. But it was not to be. 

The march was continued until darkness fell 
over the landscape, and the battery arrived at a 
beautiful camping-place about one mile east of 
Siboney, where a break in the water-pipe near the 
railroad track gave an ample supply of excellent 
water, and a ruined plantation, now overgrown 
with luxuriant sugar-cane, provided ample forage 
for the mules. The two troops of cavalry, which 
had been offered and refused as an escort, had 
reached this camping-place some time before, so 
that the wearied members of the detachment 
found pleasant camp-fires already throwing their 
weird lights and shadows over the drooping 
branches of the royal palm. 

Here, in the midst of the jungle, they pitched 
their first camp in Cuba. The condition of the 
mules was duly looked to, their shoulders washed 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 73 

down with strong salty water, their feet carefully 
examined, and the animals then tethered to graze 
their fill on the succulent sugar-cane, after having 
had a bountiful supply of oats. Meantime the 
camp cooks had a kettle full of coffee simmering, 
and canned roast beef warming over the fire, and 
after a hearty meal the tired men stretched them- 
selves upon the ground, with no canopy except the 
stars and only one sentinel over the camp, and 
slept more soundly than they had on board the 
tossing Cherokee. 



74 TEE GAT LING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 



CHAPTER V. 

The March. 

At early dawn the battery arose, and, after a 
quick breakfast, resumed the march. Some half- 
mile farther on they passed a battery of light artil- 
lery which had preceded them on the road by 
some nine hours, and which had camped at this 
point awaiting forage. At Siboney the detach- 
ment stopped to look after the detail from the 13th 
Infantry, which had not yet reported. The de- 
tachment commander sought out the regimental 
adjutant, who referred him to the regimental 
commander, Col. Worth. This colonel was at 
first reluctant to allow the men to go, but, on being 
informed of the necessity for them, and after in- 
quiring about the orders on the subject, he direct- 
ed the detail to report immediately. All the mem- 
bers of this detail reported at once, except Corp. 
Rose, who had been left by his company com- 
mander on board ship. 

The road from Siboney to the front was not 
known. There was no one in camp who even 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 75 

knew its general direction. Application was 
therefore made to Gen. Castillo, who was in com- 
mand of a body of Cubans at Siboney, for a guide. 
After a great deal of gesticulation, much excited 
talk between the general and members of his 
staff, and numerous messengers had been dis- 
patched hither and thither upon this important 
and very difficult business, a Cuban officer was 
sent with instructions to furnish a guide who 
could conduct the detachment to Gen. Wheeler's 
headquarters at the front. In the course of some 
twenty minutes, a dirty slouchy, swarthy, lousy- 
looking vagabond was pointed out as the desired 
guide, and was said to know every by-path and 
trail between Siboney and Santiago. He was told 
to go with the detachment to Gen. Wheeler's head- 
quarters and then return, and the detachment 
commander started for his command followed by 
his sable guide. Passing through a group of these 
brave Cuban heroes, he lost sight of his redoubta- 
ble guide for an instant, and has never since found 
that gentleman. 

It would be just as well to add a description of 
the patriotic Cuban as he was found by the Gat- 
ling Gun Detachment during their campaign in 
behalf of Cuban independence, in the name of 



78 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

humanity; and this description, it is thought, tal- 
lies with the experience of all officers in the 
expedition. 

The valiant Cuban! He strikes you first by his 
color. It ranges from chocolate yellow through all 
the shades to deepest black with kinky hair; but you 
never by any chance see a white Cuban, except the 
fat, sleek, well-groomed, superbly mounted ones in 
'•khaki," who loaf around headquarters with high- 
ranking shoulder-straps. These are all imported 
from the United States. They comprise the few 
wealthy ones of Spanish descent, who are renegade 
to their own nativity, and are appealing to the 
good people of the United States to establish them 
in their status of master of peons without any 
overlord who can exact his tithes for the privilege. 

The next thing you notice is the furtive look of 
the thief. No one has ever yet had a chance 
to look one of these chocolate-colored Cubans 
straight in the eye. They sneak along. Their 
gait has in it something of that of the Apache, the 
same soft moccasined tread, noiseless and always 
stealthy. Your impressions as to their honesty 
can be instantly confirmed. Leave anything loose, 
from a heavy winter overcoat, which no one could 
possibly use in Cuba, to — oh well, anything — and 








r 



rai 






I' 



f 






TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 77 

any Cuban in sight will take great pleasure in dis- 
pelling any false impressions that honesty is a 
native virtue. 

Next you notice that he is dirty. His wife does 
sometimes make a faint attempt at personal clean- 
liness; this is evident, because in one bright in- 
stance a white dress w T as seen on a native woman, 
that had been washed sometime in her history. 
But as to his lordship, the proud male citizen of 
Cuba libre, you would utterly and bitterly insult 
him by the intimation that a man of his dignity 
ought ever to bathe, put on clean clothes, or even 
wash his hands. He is not merely dirty, he is 
filthy. He is infested with things that crawl and 
creep, often visibly, over his half-naked body, and 
he is so accustomed to it that he does not even 
scratch. 

Next you observe the intense pride of this 
Cuban libre. It is manifested the very first time 
you suggest anything like manual labor — he is 
incapable of any other — even for such purposes as 
camp sanitation, carrying rations, or for any other 
purpose. His manly chest swells with pride and 
he exclaims in accents of wounded dignity, "Yo 
soy soldado!" Still his pride does not by any 
chance get him knowingly under fire. At El 



78 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

Poso some of him did get under fire from artillery, 
accidentally, and it took a strong provost guard to 
keep him there. If he ever got under fire again 
there was no officer on the firing-line who knew it. 

He is a treacherous, lying cowardly, thieving, 
worthless, half-breed mongrel; born of a mongrel 
spawn of Europe, crossed upon the fetiches of 
darkest Africa and aboriginal America. He is 
no more capable of self-government than the Hot- 
tentots that roam the wilds of Africa or the Bush- 
men of Australia. He can not be trusted like the 
Indian, will not work like a negro, and will not 
fight like a Spaniard; but he will lie like a Cas- 
tilian with polished suavity, and he will stab you 
in the dark or in the back with all the dexterity of 
a renegade graduate of Carlisle. 

Providence has reserved a fairer future for this 
noble country than to be possessed by this horde 
of tatterdemalions. Under the impetus of Ameri- 
can energy and capital, governed by a firm niili 
tary hand with even justice, it will blossom as the 
rose; and, in the course of three or four genera- 
tions, even the Cuban may be brought to appre 
date the virtues of cleanliness, temperance, indus- 
try, and honesty. 

Our good roads ended at Siboney, and from 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 79 

there on to Gen. Wheeler's headquarters was 
some of the worst road ever traveled. Part of 
it lay through deep valleys, where the sun was vis- 
ible scarcely more than an hour at noontime, and 
the wet, fetid soil was tramped into a muck of 
malarial slime under foot of the mules and men. 
The jungle became ranker, the Spanish bayonets 
longer and their barbs sharper in these low bot- 
tom jungles. The larger undergrowth closed in 
more sharply on the trail, and its boughs overhung 
so much in some places that it became necessary 
to cut them away with axes in order to pass. 

These guns were the first wheeled vehicles that 
had ever disturbed the solitude of this portion of 
Cuba. The chocolate-colored natives of Cuba 
sneak; the white native of Cuba, when he travels 
at all, goes on horseback. He very seldom travels 
in Cuba at all, because he is not often there. Con- 
sequently the roads in Cuba, as a rule, are merely 
small paths sufficient for the native to walk along, 
and they carry the machete in order to open a path 
if necessary. These low places in the valleys were 
full of miasmatic odors, yellow fever, agues, and 
all the ills that usually pertain to the West Indian 
climate. 

At other places the road ran along the tops of 



80 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

the foot-hills from one to two hundred feet higher 
than the bottom of these valleys. Here the coun- 
try was much more open. The path was usually 
wide enough for the guns to move with compara- 
tive ease. Sometimes one wagon could pass an- 
other easily. These parts of the road were usually 
more or less strewn with boulders. The road was 
rarely level and frequently the upland parts were 
washed out. Sometimes it was only the boulder- 
clad bottom of a ravine; again the water would 
have washed out the gully on one side so deep as to 
threaten overturning the guns. The portions of 
the road between the valleys and the top of these 
foot-hills were the worst places the detachment 
had to pass. These ascents and descents were 
nearly always steep. While not at all diffi- 
cult for the man upon horseback or for the 
man on foot, they were frequently almost too 
steep for draft, and they were always washed 
out. In places it was necessary to stop and fill 
up these washouts by shoveling earth and stone 
into the places before the detachment could pass. 
On one of these occasions, while heaving rock to 
fill up a bad washout, Priv. Jones was stung by 
a scorpion. Jones did not know what had bitten 
him, and described it as a little black thing about 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 81 

as long as his finger. Fortunately there was a 
small supply of whisky with the detachment, and 
this remedy was applied to Jones internally. Some 
soldier in the detachment suggested that a quid of 
tobacco externally would be beneficial, so this 
also was done. It was not a dressing favorable 
to an aseptic condition of the wound, perhaps, nor 
was there anything in the quid of tobacco calcu- 
lated to withdraw the poison or neutralize its 
effects, so the doctors may characterize this as 
a very foolish proceeding; but country people 
skilled in simples and herb remedies might tell 
some of these ultra scientific surgeons that the 
application of a quid of tobacco or of a leaf of 
tobacco to the sting of a wasp or the bite of a 
spider, or even the sting of a scorpion, is nearly 
always attended by beneficial results. In fact, 
when Jones was stung there was a surgeon, a med- 
ical officer, who turned up even before Jones was 
treated with the whisky cure, and, upon receiving 
Jones' explanation that he had been heaving rock 
and had been bitten on the end of the finger by a 
little black thing, and after hearing the remarks of 
the men that it was very probably a scorpion sting, 
this medical officer very sagely diagnosed the acci- 
dent to that effect, but was unable to prescribe 



82 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

any remedy because he bad not brought along his 
emergency case. This medical officer, with his 
two attendant hospital satellites, had left both 
litter and emergency case upon the transport. 

The ordinary line officer or soldier who is some- 
what accustomed to carrying weights and does 
not require a hospital drill to teach him to carry a 
wounded comrade a few yards, looks with a cer- 
tain degree of envy upon the possession of a hos- 
pital litter with its convenient straps for weight- 
carrying, and would consider this a very conven- 
ient means for carrying a pack. This litter is 
designed to enable two men, hospital attendants 
or band men, to pick up a wounded soldier weigh- 
ing some 160 or 180 pounds and cany him from 
fifty yards to a mile if necessary, to a dressing- 
station or hospital shack. The medical field-case 
No. 1 weighs about sixty pounds filled, and field- 
case No. 2 weighs about forty pounds. These 
two cases contain all the medicines necessary to 
run a division hospital; the case of emergency in- 
struments does not weigh above ten or twelve 
pounds, and would not be a burden for a child to 
carry. It is therefore difficult for the small- 
minded officer of the line to see why the Medical 
Department was unable to have these medicines 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 83 

up at the front. They had the same means of 
locomotion provided for the other soldiers, by 
Nature, and they had, moreover, no particular 
necessity for all rushing to the extreme front. On 
the contrary, they had from the 23d of June, when 
the landing began, at Baiquiri, until the 1st of 
July, to accomplish a distance of less than twenty 
miles; and it would seem reasonable that they 
might have had their medicine-cases up where they 
were needed by that time. 

These gentlemen pose as the most learned, ex- 
pert, scientific, highly trained body of medical 
men in the world. They are undoubtedly as well 
trained, as highly educated, and as thoroughly 
proficient as the medical officers of any army in 
the world. A summons of an ordinary practi- 
tioner would bring with him his saddle-bags of 
medicines; no physician in the city would pretend 
to answer even an ambulance call without having a 
few simple remedies — in other words, an emer- 
gency case; but it was an exception, and a very 
rare exception at that, to find a medical officer 
who took the trouble to carry anything upon his 
aristocratic back on that march to the front. 

A conversation overheard between two medical 
officers on board a transport just before landing 



84 THE GATLINQ GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

may serve to partially explain the state of affairs. 
Said surgeon No. 1 to surgeon No. 2, "We are going 
to land this morning; are yon going to carry your 
field-case?'' To which surgeon No. 2 indignantly 
replied, "No, I 'm not a pack-mule l" Surgeon No. 
1 again inquired, "Are you going to make your 
hospital men carry it?" To which surgeon No. 2 
replied, "No; my men are nor beasts of burden." 
Both of these medical officers went ashore; one of 
them had his field-case carried; the other did not. 
Both of them were up at the tiring-line, both did 
good service in rendering first aid. Both of them 
worked heroically, both seemed deeply touched by 
the suffering they were compelled to witness, and 
both contracted the climatic fever. But in the 
absence of medicines the role of the surgeon can 
be taken by the private soldier who has been in- 
structed in first aid to the injured; for in the ab- 
sence of medical cases and surgical instruments 
the first-aid packet is the only available source of 
relief, and these first-aid packets were carried by 
the private soldier, not by the Medical Depart- 
ment. 

A little less "theory," a little less "science," a 
little less tendency to dwell on the "officer" part 
of the business, with a little more devotion to the 



3 

> 


o 




THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 85 

duty of relieving suffering humanity — in short, a 
little less insistence upon "rank," would have vast- 
ly improved the medical service of the United 
States Army in the field at this time. 

These remarks do not apply to the heroes like 
Ebert, Thorpe, Brewer, Kennedy, Warren, and a 
few others, who fearlessly exposed their lives upon 
the very firing-line. These men are the very "salt 
of the earth." The escape of even a "frazzle" of the 
5th Corps was due to their superhuman energy 
and exertions. They did much to redeem the good 
name of their corps and to alleviate suffering. 

But Priv. Jones recovered from the sting of 
the scorpion. In fact, soldiers were heard to ex- 
claim that they would be glad to find a scorpion 
when they saw the character of the remedy ap- 
plied in Jones' case. 

The detachment left Siboney about 10 o'clock in 
the morning and tramped steadily along the road 
up hill and down until 12; then, upon finding a con- 
venient place, it halted for dinner. The mules 
were unharnessed, coffee prepared, and, just as the 
detachment was about to begin this noonday meal, 
two of the peripatetic newspaper fraternity joined, 
en route to the rear. The ubiquitous correspond- 
ent had for the first time discovered the Gat- 



86 THE GAT LING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

ling Gun Detachment, and they thought it was 
Artillery. 

One of these gentlemen was a long, slim, frayed- 
out specimen of humanity, with a wearied and ex- 
pressive droop of the shoulders; the other was a 
short, stout, florid, rotund individual, and his "too, 
too solid flesh" was in the very visible act of melt- 
ing. The newspaper gentlemen were invited to 
participate in the noonday meal, and, with some 
gentle urging, consented. It was only after the 
meal was over that it was learned that this was 
the first square meal these men had had in over 
forty-eight hours. They had been with Gen. 
Wheeler at La Guasimas, had rejoined Wheeler 
after reporting that fight, in hopes of making an- 
other "scoop," and were now on their way to Sib- 
oney, hoping to buy some provisions. Poor devils! 
They had w T orked for a "scoop" at La Guasimas; 
they had gone up on the firing-line and had sent 
back authentic accounts of that little skirmish; 
but they did not make the "scoop." The "scoop" 
was made by newspaper men who had remained on 
board the transports, and who took the excited ac- 
count of a member of the command who had come 
back delirious with excitement, crazed with fear, 
trembling as though he had a congestive chill — 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 87 

who, in fact, had come back faster than he had 
gone to the front, and in his excited condition had 
told the story of an ambuscade; that Wheeler, 
Wood, and Roosevelt were all dead; that the ene- 
my was as thick as the barbs on the Spanish bay- 
onet; and that he, only he, had escaped to tell the 
tale. This was the account of the battle that got 
back to the newspapers in the form of a "scoop," 
and it was nothing more nor less than the excited 
imagination of the only coward who at that time' 
or ever afterwards was a member of the famous 
Rough Riders. He was consequently returned to 
civil life prematurely. 

The newspaper correspondent in Cuba was of a 
distinguished type. You recognized him immedi- 
ately. He was utterly fearless; he delighted in 
getting up on the firing-line — that is, a few of him 
did. Among these few might be mentioned Mar- 
shall, and Davis, and Remington, and Marcotte, 
and King, and some half-dozen others; but there 
was another type of newspaper correspondent in 
Cuba, who hung around from two miles and a half 
to three miles in rear of the firing-line, and never by 
any possibility got closer to the enemy than that. 
The members of this guild of the newspaper fra- 
ternity were necessarily nearer the cable office 



S8 TEE GATLIXG Gl \s AT SANTIAGO. 

than their more daring comrades; in fact, there 
were a few who were known to have been eight or 
nine miles nearer to the cable office during bat- 
tles, and those correspondents were the ones who 
made the great ''scon})" in the New York papers, by 
which a regiment that laid down and skulked in 
the woods, or ran wildly to the rear, was made to 
do all the fighting on the first day of July. This 
latter class of journalists wen- a menace i<» the 
army, a disgrace to their profession, and a blot 
upon humanity. Even the Cubans won- ashamed 
of them. 

The detachment resumed the march at half past 
1, and encountered some very difficult road, diffi- 
cult because it needed repairs. The most difficult 
places were the ascents and descents of the hills, 
and in nearly every case fifteen or t wenty minutes' 
careful investigation was able to discover a means 
of getting around the worst places in the road. 
When it Avas not practicable to go around, J. Shaf- 
fer and his three fellow-teamsters would take a 
twist of their hands in the manes of their long- 
eared chargers, and apparently lift them down, or 
up, as the case might be, always landing on their 
feet and always safely. It was merely a question 
of good driving and will to go through. The 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 89 

worst places were repaired by the detachment be- 
fore these reckless attempts at precipice-scaling 
were made. At one place there was a detachment 
of the 24th Infantry engaged in an alleged effort 
to repair the road. They did not seem to work 
with much vim. Chaplain Springer, having in the 
morning exhorted them to repentance and a bet 
ter life and to doing good works unto their breth- 
ren, the enemy, was engaged at this point in the 
afternoon, it being Sunday, in a practical demon- 
stration of what he considered good works. In 
other words, the chaplain, whose religious enthu- 
siasm no one doubts, was engaged in heaving 
rocks with his own hands to show these colored 
soldiers how they ought to make good road, and 
he was doing a good works." 

It is but a just tribute to Chaplains Springer 
and Swift, of the Regulars, to say that they were 
conspicuous in the hour of danger at the point of 
greatest peril. In the fearless discharge of their 
holy office, they faced all the dangers of battle; 
nor did they neglect the care of the body while 
ministering to the spiritual needs of the soldiers. 
Springer, for example, collected wood and made 
coffee for all on the firing-line, within 400 yards 
of the block-house at El Caney; and Swift was 



90 THE GAT LING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

equally conspicuous in relieveing suffering, bind- 
ing up wounds, and caring for the sick. There 
were probably others equally as daring; but the 
author knows of the deeds of these men, and de- 
sires to pay a tribute of respect to them. Chaplains 
of this stamp are always listened to with respect- 
ful attention when they express their views of the 
true course of life to obtain a blessed hereafter. 
They were in very sharp contrast to the long- 
visaged clerical gentlemen who were so much in 
evidence at Tampa, and who never got within 500 
miles of danger. 

The detachment safely passed all the bad places 
and obstacles in the road, arriving at Gen. Wheel- 
er's headquarters about half past 4 o'clock, and 
reported. It was assigned a position between the 
advance outposts and directed to dispose of its 
guns in such a manner as to sweep the hills on 
which these outposts were placed. High hills to 
the right at a distance of about 2000 yards were 
supposed to be infested by the enemy, and a block- 
house which stood out against the sky-line was 
thought to contain a Spanish detachment. A 
high hill to the left at a distance of about 1000 
yards had not yet been explored, and it was 
thought probable that some of the enemy was con- 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 91 

cealed on this hill also. The detachment com- 
mander was directed to report, after posting his 
battery, in which duty he was assisted by Col. 
Dorst, to Gen. Chaffee, who had charge of the out- 
posts. The General inquired what the battery 
consisted of, and upon being informed that "It 
consists of four Gatling guns, posted so as to com- 
mand the neighboring hills," remarked in a very 
contemptuous manner, "You can't command any- 
thing." Gen. Chaffee subsequently had reason to 
revise his opinion, if not to regret the expres- 
sion of it. 



92 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 



CHAPTER VI. 

The Batterji in Camp Wheeler. 

At this point in the history of the detachment, 
it would be well to give some acount of the reason- 
ing which led to its formation and the personnel 
of the detachment. 

Since the days of '65 the armies of the civilized 
world have adopted a rifle whose effective range is 
more than twice as great as that used in the Civil 
War. Very able discussions have been made 
upon the theoretical changes of the battle-field thus 
brought about, but no proper conclusion had been 
reached. It was acknowledged by all text-book 
writers that the artillery arm of the service would 
find much greater difficulty in operating at short 
ranges, and that assaults upon fortified positions 
would be much more difficult in the future. But 
only Gen. Williston, of the United States Artil- 
lery, had ever taken the advanced ground that in 
a machine gun arm would be found a valuable 
auxiliary as a result of these changed conditions. 
This theory of Gen. Williston's was published in 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 93 

the Journal of the Military Service Institute in the 
spring of '86, but never went, so far as Gen. Wi-1- 
liston was concerned, beyond a mere theory; nor 
had the detachment commander ever heard of 
(Jen. Williston's article until after the battle of 
Santiago. 

A study of the science of tactics — not merely 
drill regulations, but tactics in the broader sense of 
maneuvering bodies of troops upon the battle-field 
— had led Lieut. Parker to the conclusion that the 
artillery arm of the service had been moved back 
upon the battle-field to ranges not less than 1500 
yards. This not because of lack of courage on the 
part of the Artillery, but as an inherent defect in 
any arm of the service which depends upon draft 
to reach an effective position. It was not believed 
that animals could live at a shorter range in any- 
thing like open country. The problem of support- 
ing an infantry charge by some sort of fire imme- 
diately became the great tactical problem of the 
battle-field. Admitting that the assault of a forti- 
fied position has become much more difficult than 
formerly, the necessity of artillery support, or 
its equivalent in some kind of fire, became corre- 
spondingly more important, while under the condi- 



94 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

tions it became doubly more difficult to bring up 
this support in the form of artillery fire. 

The solution of this problem, then, was the prin- 
cipal difficulty of the modern battle-field; and yet. 
strange to say, the curtailed usefulness of artil- 
lery does not seem to have suggested itself to any- 
body else in the service previous to the first day 
of July. This problem had been made the subject 
of special study by him for several years, and had 
led to the conclusion that some form of machine 
gun must be adopted to take the place of artillery 
from 1500 yards down. This in turn led to the 
study of machine guns. The different forms in 
use in the different armies of the world had been 
considered, and it was found that there was none 
in any service properly mounted for the particular 
use desired. All of them required the service of 
animals as pack-mules, or for draft, while the very 
conditions of the problem required a gun to be so 
mounted that the use of animals could be dis- 
pensed with. 

The Maxim gun has been reduced in weight to 
about 60 pounds, and is furnished with a tripod 
weighing about the same; but this is too heavy, 
and the supply of ammunition at once becomes a 
critical question. The Colt's automatic rapid- 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 95 

fire gun has been reduced to 40 pounds, with a 
tripod of equal weight, but here again the same 
difficulty presents itself. The soldier is capable 
of carrying only a limited amount of weight; and 
with his already too heavy pack, his three days' 
rations, together with the heat, fatigue and excite- 
ment of battle, it did not appear possible for any 
tripod-mounted gun to be effectively used. 

The problem therefore resolved itself into the 
question of carriages: A carriage capable of car- 
rying any form of machine gun using small-caliber 
ammunition, capable of being moved anywhere by 
draft, capable of being dismantled and carried on 
a pack-mule, and, above, all, capable of being 
moved by hand; required also some device for get- 
ting the requisite amount of ammunition up to the 
firing-line. A carriage and ammunition cart was 
invented fulfilling all these conditions and the in- 
vention was presented to the adjutant-general of 
the army for consideration, accompanied by a dis- 
cussion of the proper tactical use of the gun so 
mounted. This discussion, in part, was as follows : 

"It is claimed for this carriage that a machine 
gun mounted on it can be carried with a firing-line 
of infantry on the offensive, over almost any kind 
of ground, into the decisive zone of rifle fire and to 



96 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

the lodgment in the enemy's line, if one is made. 

"On broken ground the piece can be moved for- 
ward by draft under cover of sheltering features 
of the terrain to a position so near the enemy that, 
under cover of its fire, an infantry line can effect 
a lodgment, after which the piece can be rushed 
forward by a sudden dash. 

"The machine gun, mounted on this carriage, is 
especially adapted for service with the reserve of 
a battalion on the offensive, acting either alone or 
in regiment. Its use will enable the commander 
to reduce the reserve, thereby increasing the 
strength of the fighting-line, and yet his flanks 
will be better protected than formerly, while he 
will still have a more powerful reserve. If the 
fighting-line be driven back, the machine guns 
will establish a point of resistance on which the 
line can rally, and from which it can not be driven, 
unless the machine guns be annihilated by artil- 
lery fire. 

"In case of counter-charge by the enemy, the 
superior weight and intensity of its fire will shake 
the enemy and so demoralize him that, in all prob- 
ability, a return counter-charge will result in his 
complete discomfiture. 

"Retiring troops as rear guards have in this 




- .* 1 





THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 97 

weapon par excellence the weapon for a swift and 
sharp return with the power of rapidly withdraw- 
ing. If the enemy can by any means be enticed 
within its range, he will certainly suffer great 
losses. If he cannot be brought in range, his dis- 
tance will be rather respectful." 

This discussion as presented was entirely and 
absolutely original with the author and the result 
of his own unaided researches on the subject. It 
will be seen in the account of the battle how ac- 
curately the conditions there laid down were 
fulfilled. 

But the carriage in use by the Gatling Gun De- 
tachment was not the one proposed to the War 
Department. That carriage has not, as yet, been 
built, nor has the War Department in any way 
recognized the invention or even acknowledged 
the receipt of the communication and drawings. 

The problem, therefore, confronting the Gatling 
Gun Detachment was to demonstrate the above 
uses of the machine gun, taking the obsolete artil- 
lery carriage drawn by mules, and endeavor to get 
the guns into action by draft. The personnel of 
the detachment alone accounts for their success. 
They got the guns up on the firing-line, not be- 
cause of any superiority of the carriage over that 



98 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

in use by the artillery, for there was none; not 
because of aid rendered by other arms of the ser- 
vice, for they actually went into battle as far as 
100 yards in advance of the infantry skirmishers; 
but because the Gatling Gun Detachment was 
there for the purpose of getting into the fight and 
was determined to give the guns a trial. 

In the first place, all the members of the Gatling 
Gun Detachment were members of the Regular 
Army. All but three of them were natives of the 
United States, and those three were American 
citizens. Every man in the detachment had been 
selected by the detachment commander, or had 
voluntarily undertaken to perform this duty, real- 
izing and believing that it was an extremely haz- 
ardous duty. Every member of the detachment 
possessed a common-school education, and some of 
them were well educated. All of them were men 
of exceptionally good character and sober habits. 
The drivers were Privs. Shiffer, Correll, Merryman, 
and Chase. The description formerly given of 
Shiffer applies, with slight modifications, to all 
the four. The first sergeant, Weigle, a native of 
Gettysburg, a soldier of eight years' experience in 
the Regular Army, a man of fine natural ability 
and good educational attainments, was worthy to 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 99 

command any company in the United States 
Army. Thoroughly well instructed in the mechan- 
ism of Gatling guns, of exceptionally cheerful and 
buoyant disposition, he was an ideal first ser- 
geant for any organization. Steigerwald, acting- 
chief of gun No. 1, was of German birth, well edu- 
cated. He had chosen the military profession for 
the love of it; he was a man of wonderfully fine 
physique, a "dead sure" shot, and one who hardly 
understood the meaning of the word "fatigue." 
He was ambitious, he was an ardent believer in the 
Gatling gun, and he was determined to win a com- 
mission on the battle-field. 

Corporal Doyle was a magnificent type of the 
old-time Regular— one of the kind that composed 
the army before Proctorism tried to convert it into 
a Sunday-school. In former days Doyle had been 
a drinking man; but the common opinion as ex- 
pressed by his company officers even in those days 
was, "I would rather have Doyle, drunk, than any 
other non-commissioned officer, sober; because 
Doyle never gets too drunk to attend to duty." 
Two years before this Doyle had quit drinking, 
and the only drawback to this most excellent non- 
commissioned officer had been removed. He was 
a thorough disciplinarian; one of the kind that 



100 TEE GATLINO GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 

takes no back talk; one who is prone to using the 
butt end of a musket as a persuader, if necessary ; 
and Doyle was thoroughly devoted to the detach- 
ment commander. Corp. Smith was another of 
the same stamp. Corp. Smith loved poker. In 
fact, his sobriquet was "Poker Smith." He was 
one of the kind of poker -players who would "see" 
a $5 bet on a pair of deuces, raise it to $25, and 
generally rake in the "pot." It was Corp. Smith 
who thought in this Gatling gun deal he was hold- 
ing a pair of deuces, because he didn't take much 
stock in Gatling guns, but he was a firm believer 
in his commanding officer and was prepared to 
"bluff" the Dons to the limit of the game. 

Sergeants Ryder and Weischaar were splendid 
types of the American Regular non-commissioned 
officer, alert, respectful, attentive to duty, reso- 
lute, unflinching, determined, magnificent soldiers. 
Serg. Green was a young man, only twenty-three, 
the idolized son of his parents, in the army because 
he loved it; enthusiastic over his gun, and fully 
determined to "pot" every Spaniard in sight. 
Corp. Rose was like unto him. They were eager 
for nothing so much as a chance to get into action, 
and equally determined to stay there. The pri- 
vates of the detachment were like unto the non- 



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in 

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THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 101 

commissioned officers. They had volunteered for 
this duty from a love of adventure, a desire to win 
recognition, or from their personal attachment to 
the commanding officer; and there was not a man 
who was not willing to follow him into the "mouth 
of hell" if necessary. The gunners were expert 
shots with the rifle. Numbers 1 and 2, who turned 
the crank and fed the gun, respectively, were se- 
lected for their dexterity and coolness ; the drivers, 
for their skill in handling mules ; and each of the 
other members of the detachment was placed on 
that duty which he seemed best fitted to perform. 
The roll of the detachment and its organization 
as it went into battle on the first day of July are 
subjoined: 

Gatling Gun Detachment, Fifth Army Corps. 
Commanding Officer, John H. Parker, first lieu- 
tenant, 13th Infantry. 
Acting First Sergeant, Alois Weischaar, sergeant, 

Co. A, 13th Infantry. 
Acting Quartermaster Sergeant, William Ryder, 

Co. G, 13th Infantry. 
Gun No. 1: 

Acting Chief and Gunner, Charles C. Steiger- 

wald, corporal, Co. A, 13th Infantry. 
No. 1, Private Voelker, Co. A, 12th Infantry. 



102 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

No. 2, Private Elkins, Co. D, 17th Infantry. 

No. 3, Private Schmandt, Co. G, 13th Infantry. 

No. 4, Private Needles, Co. E, 17th Infantry. 

No. 5, Private Click, Co. E, 17th Infantry. 

No. 6, Private Jones, Co. D, 13th Infantry. 

Driver, Private Shifter, Co. E. 17th Infantry. 
Gun No. 2: 

Chief, Sergeant William Ryder, Co. G, 13th In- 
fantry. 

Gunner, Corporal Geo. N. Rose, Co. C, 13th In- 
fantry. 

No. 1, Private Seaman, Co. B, 13th Infantry. 

No. 2, Private Kastner, Co. A, 13th Infantry. 

No. 3, Private Pyne, Co. H, 13th Infantry. 

No. 4, Private Schulze, Co. A, 17th Infantry. 

No. 5, Private Barts, Co. E, 13th Infantry. 

Driver, Pivate Correll, Co. C, 12th Infantry. 
Gun No. 3: 

Chief, Sergeant Newton A. Green, Co. H, 13th 
Infantry. 

Gunner, Corporal Matthew Doyle, Co. C, 13th 
Infantry. 

No. 1, Private Anderson, Co. C, 12th Infantry. 

No. 2, Private Sine, Co. E, 17th Infantry. 

No. 3, Private Lauer, Co. C, 12th Infantry. 

No. 4, Private Dellett, Co. D, 17th Infantry. 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 103 

No. 5, Private Cory, Co. A, 13th Infantry. 

No. 6, Private Greenberg, Co. G, 13th Infantry. 

Driver, Private Merryman, Co. A, 17th Infantry. 
Gun No. 4: 

Chief, Sergeant John N. Weigle, Co. L, 9th In- 
fantry. 

Gunner, Corporal Eobert S. Smith, Co. C, 13th 
Infantry. 

No. 1, Private McGoin, Co. D, 17th Infantry. 

No. 2, Private Misiak, Co. E, 13th Infantry. 

No. 3, Private Power, Co. A, 13th Infantry. 

No. 4, Private McDonald, Co. B, 17th Infantry. 

No. 5, Private Prazak, Co. E, 12th Infantry. 

Driver, Private Chase, Co. H, 13th Infantry. 

Cook, Private Hoft, Co. D, 13th Infantry. 

Assistant cook, Private Bremer, Co. G, 13th In- 
fantry. 

Absent, sick, Private Murray, Co. F, 13th In- 
fantry, at Tampa. 

Sergeant Weigle was subsequently appointed 
first sergeant of Co. L., 9th Infantry, and of the 
Gatling Gun Detachment, vice Weischaar, re- 
lieved at his own request. 



104 THE GATLING Gl V8 AT SANTIAGO. 

Another element which contributed much to the 
success of the detachment was the presence with 
it of Captain Marcotte. This excellent officer had 
served with great distinction in the Civil War. hav- 
ing been promoted from a private in the ranks 
through all of the grades up to a captaincy, for 
meritorious conduct in battle, and haying failed 
of higher grades only because he was too badly 
shot to pieces to continue with the Army. He 
joined the detachment on the 25th of June, and 
his valuable advice was always at the disposal 
not merely of the commander, but of any member 
of the detachment who wished to consult him. 
He had spent seventeen years in the Cuban climate 
and was thoroughly familiar with all the condi- 
tions under which we were laboring. He con- 
tributed not a little, by his presence, his example, 
and his precept, to the final success of the organi- 
zation. When the battery went under fire, Mar- 
cotte was with it. It was the first time most of 
the members had passed through this ordeal, but 
who could run, or even feel nervous, with this 
gray-haired man skipping about from point to 
point and taking notes of the engagement as coolly 
as though he were sitting in the shade of a tree 
sipping lime-juice cocktails, a mile from danger. 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 105 

Such was the personnel of the detachment. It 
lay in Camp Wheeler, which was only about a mile 
and a half from El Poso, where the first engage- 
ment occurred on the first of July, until that morn- 
ing. The mules were daily harnessed up and 
drilled in maneuvering the pieces, and the mem- 
bers of the detachment experimentally posted in 
different positions in order to get the most effect- 
ive service. 

On the 27th, Serg. Green was sent back to Sib- 
oney with orders to bring Corp. Kose or his body. 
He brought Corp. Rose, and the corporal was very 
glad to be brought. 

The mules were fed with oats and on the juicy 
sugar-cane. It is worthy of mention that no other- 
organization at the front had oats. A feed or two 
of oats was given to Gen. Wheeler and Col. Dorst 
for their horses; it was the first time their horses 
had tasted oats since leaving the transports, and 
was probably the last time until after the sur- 
render. Furthermore, the Catling Gun Detach- 
ment had "grub." Of course, it was "short" on po- 
tatoes, onions, and vegetables generally ; these lux- 
uries were not to be well known again until it re- 
turned to the United States; but it did have hard- 
tack, bacon, canned roast beef, sugar, and coffee, 



106 TEE OATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

having drawn all the rations it could carry before 
leaving Baiquiri, and was the only organization 
which had as much as twenty-four hours' rations. 
Gen. Hawkins and his whole brigade were living 
from hand to mouth, one meal at a time. The 
same was true of Gen. Wheeler and the whole 
cavalry division, and they were depending for that 
one meal upon the pack-mule train. On the 30th 
of June a complete set of muster- and pay-rolls, 
was prepared for the detachment, and it was duly 
mustered in the usual form and manner. It was 
the only organization at the front of which a 
formal muster was made, and was the only one 
there which had muster- and pay-rolls. 

It rained on the 29th and 30th of June. Not 
such rains as the people of the United States are 
familiar with, but Cuban rains. It was like stand- 
ing under a barrel full of water and having the 
bottom knocked out. These rains caused the rifles 
and carbines of the army to rust, and some quick- 
witted captain bethought himself to beg oil from 
the Gatling Gun Detachment. He got it. An- 
other, and another, and still another begged for 
oil; then regiments began to beg for oil ; and final- 
ly application was made for oil for a whole bri- 
gade. This led to the following correspondence: 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 107 

"Camp Six Miles from Santiago, 

"29th June, 1898. 
"The Adjutant-General, Cavalry Division, Present: 

"Sir, — I have the honor to inform you that I 
have learned that some of the rifles in this com- 
mand are badly in need of oil, and that in some 
companies there is no oil to use on them. These 
facts I learned through requests to me for oil. 

"I therefore report to you that my men found at 
Altares (the second landing-place) and reported 
to me four (4) barrels of lard oil and three (3) bar- 
rels of cylinder oil, in an old oil-house near the 
machine shops. 

"If this be procured and issued, it will save the 
rifles and carbines from rust. 

"Very respectfully, 

"John H. Parker, 
"Lt. Comdg. G. G. Detachment, 5th Corps." 

First Endorsement. 
"Headquarters Cavalry Division, 
"Camp 6 miles east of Santiago de Cuba, 

"June 29, 1898. 
"Respectfully referred to the adjutant-general, 
5th Army Corps. 

"Jos. Wheeler, 
"Major-General U. S. Vols., Comdg." 



108 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

Second Endorsement. 

"Headquarters 5th Corps, 

"June 29, 1898. 
"Keturn. Lt. Parker will send a man back to- 
morrow to obtain the necessary oil. 
"By command of Gen. Shatter. 

"E. J. McClernand, 

"A. A. G." 

Third Endorsement. 
"Headquarters Cavalry Division, 

"June 29, 1898. 
"Return Lt. Parker. Attention invited to the 
foregoing endorsement. 

"J. H. Dorst, 
"Lieutenant-Colonel." 

Fourth Endorsement. 

"June 30, 1898. 
"The Quartermaster, Altares, Cuba: 

"Please furnish to Sergeant Green of my detach- 
ment transportation for two (2) barrels of oil. He 
will show you an order from Gen. Shatter, and 
the matter is urgent. The soldiers must have this 
oil at once, as their rifles are rusting badly. 

"John H. Parker, 
"Lt. Comdg. Gatling Gun Detach." 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 109 

The quartermaster furnished the transportation 
and two barrels of oil were duly forwarded to 
the front and placed in charge of brigade quarter- 
masters at different points, with orders to distrib- 
ute out one quart to each company. This oil, per- 
raps, had some bearing upon the condition of the 
rifles in the fight following. 

On the 27th of June, Captain Marcotte and the 
detachment commander made a reconnaissance of 
a high hill to the left of Camp Wheeler, and, hav- 
ing gained the top, reeonnoitered the city of San- 
tiago and its surrounding defenses with a power- 
ful glass, and as a result reported to Gen. Wheeler 
that the key of Santiago was the Morro mesa, 
a promontory or tableland overlooking the city on 
the east side at a distance of about a mile and a 
half and not at that time occupied by the enemy, 
with the proposition that a detail of a half-dozen 
men from the detachment should make a rush 
and capture this plateau, and hold it until the 
guns could be brought up. The general could not 
authorize the proposed undertaking, as it would 
have endangered the safety of his army, perhaps 
by leading to a premature engagement. By the 
time a sufficient reconnaissance had been made 
and convinced everybody of the value of this plan, 



110 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

the mesa had been strongly occupied by the ene- 
my. It is still believed that the occupation of 
this height was practicable on the 27th of June, 
and thought, if it had been authorized, the Gat- 
lings could have occupied and held this position 
against all the Spaniards in the city of Santiago. 
A glance at the map will show the extreme tact- 
ical importance of this position. 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. Ill 



CHAPTER VII. 

The Battle. 

On the 30th day of June, General Shafter pitched 
his camp about half a mile in advance of Camp 
Wheeler in a valley, and about five o'clock in the 
afternoon communicated the plan of battle to the 
division commanders and to the commander of 
the Gatling Gun Detachment. 

Reconnaissance had developed the fact that the 
enemy occupied the village of El Caney, and that 
their first line of works surrounded the city of 
Santiago at a distance of about a mile, crown- 
ing a semicircular ridge. Between the position 
occupied by the general's camp and this ridge, a 
distance of about two and one-half miles, flowed 
the Aguadores and San Juan rivers, and about 
one mile from the San Juan River, on the east side, 
was a ruined plantation and mission house, called 
El Poso. Midway between El Caney and the 
Spanish position was a large handsome mansion, 
called the Du Cuorot house, standing in the midst 
of a large plantation and owned by a Frenchman, 



112 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

which both sides had agreed to respect as neutral 
property. The general plan of the battle as given 
to these officers on the 30th of June was for one 
division of the army (Lawton's), assisted by one bat- 
tery of artillery (Capron's), to make an attack at 
daybreak upon the village of El Caney, and drive 
the enemy out of it. Another division (Kent's) 
was to make an attack upon the semicircular 
ridge of hills south of El Caney as soon as Lawton 
was well committed to the fight, both for the pur- 
pose of preventing reinforcements from going to 
El Caney and to develop the enemy's strength. It 
was expected that Lawton would capture El Caney 
about eight or nine o'clock in the morning, and 
pursue the retreating enemy, by the way of the Du 
Cuorot house, toward Santiago. This movement 
would cause Lawton to execute, roughly, a left 
wheel, and it was intended that in executing this 
maneuver Kent's right should join, or nearly join, 
Lawton's left, after which the whole line was to 
move forward according to the developments of 
the fight. Kent's attack was to be supported by 
Grimes' Battery from El Poso. The Gatling Gun 
Detachment was to move at daylight on the morn- 
ing of July 1st, take position at El Poso sheltered 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 113 

by the hill, in support of Grimes' Battery, and 
there await orders. 

This outline of the battle, as laid down by Gen. 
Shatter on the 30th day of June, was eventually 
carried out to the letter; its successful operation 
shut up a superior force in the city of Santiago, 
and compelled the surrender of the city. 

Perhaps no better comment can be made upon 
the generalship of the corps commander, no higher 
compliment be paid, than the mere statement that 
he was able, fifteen hours before a shot was fired 
in the battle, to prescribe the movements of the 
different organizations of his command, and to 
outline the plan of battle as it was finally car- 
ried out, with a degree of precision which can be 
fully appreciated only by those to whom the plan 
was communicated in advance. In spite of slight 
changes, made necessary by local failures and 
unforeseen circumstances ; in spite of the very poor 
cooperation of the artillery arm; in spite of the 
absence of cavalry, which made good reconnais- 
sance practically impossible; in spite of the fact 
that he was operating against a superior force in 
strong intrenchments — the plan of battle thus laid 
down was finally carried out with perfect success 
in every detail. 



114 TEE GATLING GUXS AT 8ANTIAG0. 

The Gatling Gun Detachment was assembled 
at six o'clock, and so much of the plan of battle 
was explained to them as it was proper to give 
out, with orders that breakfast was to be prepared 
by four o'clock and the detachment be ready to 
move at 4:30. The plans were heard with care- 
ful attention by the men, and the wisdom of giv- 
ing to them some idea of the work they were ex- 
pected to do was fully vindicated on the following 
day, when they were compelled to lie nearly three 
hours under a dropping fire, waiting for "Lawton 
to become well engaged," after which the detach- 
ment moved forward, without a man missing, with 
the utmost steadiness and coolness, to the attack. 

There was no nervousness displayed by the men. 
They knew their work was cut out for them, and 
each man was eager to play his part in the great 
drama of the morrow. There was no excited talk 
indulged in. None of the buzz of preparation 
nor the hum of anticipation which to the civilian 
mind should precede a desperate battle, but three 
or four members of the detachment took out their 
soldiers' hand-books and wrote in them their last 
will and testament, requesting their commander 
to witness the same and act as executor. The 
courage evinced by these men was not of that 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 115 

brutal order which ignores danger, but of the 
moral quality which, fully realizing that some- 
body must get hurt, quietly resolves to face what- 
ever may happen in the performance of the full 
measure of duty. 

At four o'clock the guard aroused the members 
of the detachment quietly, and each man found 
a good hearty breakfast waiting for him, consist- 
ing of hardtack, coffee, condensed milk, sugar, 
bacon, canned roast beef, and some canned fruit, 
which had been obtained somehow and was 
opened upon this occasion. It was the last square 
meal they were to have for several days. At half 
past four the camp equipage had all been packed 
upon the guns in such a manner as not to interfere 
with their instantly getting into action, and the 
battery started for the front. 

The road to El Poso was very good and the 
mules trotted merrily along, preceded and fol- 
lowed by infantry also bound for the front. The 
Cubans, too, were in evidence ; an irregular, strug- 
gling mob of undisciplined barbarians, vociferous, 
clamorous, noisy, turbulent, excited. Presently 
the Cubans and infantry in front of the battery 
halted and it passed beyond them, immediately 
throwing out the crew of the third gun in front 



116 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

as an advance guard. It reached El Poso at six 
o'clock, at which time there were no other solidiers 
there. The battery took position as directed, un- 
der cover in rear of the hill and to the right front 
of the El Poso house. The camp equipage and 
blanket-rolls, were removed and piled neatly upon 
the ground, and Priv. Hoft was detailed to guard 
them, as well as one of the spare mules. About 
half past seven o'clock Grimes' Battery arrived, 
and Col. McClernand, the assistant adjutant-gen- 
eral of the corps. The battery of artillery halted 
upon the hill near the Gatlings, while its com- 
mander, the adjutant-general, the Army and Navy 
Journal correspondent, and the Gatling gun man 
climbed to the top of the hill to reconnoiter the 
enemy. They were accompanied by several 
attaches and a battalion of newspaper corre- 
spondents. 

To the southwest, at a distance of about 3,000 
yards, the city of Santiago lay slumbering in the 
morning sun. The chain of hills which sur- 
rounded the city, lying between it and our posi- 
tion, was crowned with rank tropical verdure, 
and gave no indications of military fortifications. 
There was no sign of life, a gentle land breeze 
awaved the tops of the~royal palms, and the little 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 117 

birds flitted from bough to bough caroling their 
morning songs as though no such events were im- 
pending as the bombardment of a city and the 
death of 400 gallant soldiers. The gentle ripple of 
the creek, lapping over its pebbly bed at the foot 
of the hill, was distinctly audible. 

The artillery officers produced their range-find- 
ers and made a scientific guess at the distance 
from the hill to a red brick building in the north- 
ern edge of Santiago. This guess was 2600 yards. 
They signalled to the lead piece of Grimes' Light 
Battery to ascend the hill. It was delayed for a 
moment while picks and shovels were plied upon 
the top of the hill to make slight emplacements 
for the guns, and at last, at ten minutes before 
eight o'clock, the first piece started the difficult 
ascent. The drivers stood up in their stirrups 
and lashed their horses and shouted; the horses 
plunged and reared and jumped. The piece stuck 
half way up the hill. The leaders were turned 
slightly to the right to give new direction and 
another attempt was made — ten yards gained. 
The leaders were swung to the left, men and offi- 
cers standing near by added their shouts and 
blows from sticks. A tall artillery officer, whose 
red stripes were conspicuous, jumped up and 



118 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

down and swore; the team gave a few more jumps, 
then they wheeled the gun by a left about, with 
its muzzle pointing toward the city. It was 
quickly unlimbered and run to its place. 

The second piece started up the hill. The driv- 
ers of this piece sat quietly in their saddles, and, 
with a cluck, started up the hill at a walk. The 
tall artillery officer shouted, and a driver mut- 
tered under his breath, "Damned fool!'' Regard- 
less of the orders to rush their horses, the drivers 
of this piece continued to walk up the hill. At 
the steepest part of the hill, they rose slightly in 
their stirrups, as one man, and applied the spur 
to the lead horses, and, at the same time, a lash 
of the quirt to the off horses of the team. The 
horses sprang forward, and in an instant the sec- 
ond piece was in battery. The third and fourth 
pieces were taken up in the same manner as the 
second. 

The pieces were loaded; a party of newsp; 
correspondents produced their lead pencils and 
pads, and began to take notes; the little birds con- 
tinued to sing. The Gatling Gun man, the Army 
and Navy Journal man, and the assistant adju- 
tant-general stepped to the windward a few yards 
to be clear of the smoke. The range was given 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 119 

by the battery commander — 2600 yards; the ob- 
jective was named, a small, almost indistinguish- 
able redoubt, below the hospital about 300 yards. 
The cannoneers braced themselves, No. 3 stretched 
the lanyard taut on his piece, and Grimes re- 
marked, in a conversational tone, "Let her go." 

The report of the field-piece burst with start- 
ling suddenness upon the quiet summer morning, 
and a dense cloud of grayish-colored smoke spurt- 
ed from the muzzle of the gun. Everybody invol- 
untarily jumped, the sound was so startling, al- 
though expected. The piece recoiled eight or ten 
feet, and the gunners jumped to the wheels and 
ran it forward again into battery. Field-glasses 
were glued upon the vicinity of the brick hos- 
pital. There was a puff of white smoke and an 
exclamation, "A trifle too long!" The second piece 
was aimed and fired. There was no response. The 
third, and fourth, and fifth, with like results. It 
was like firing a salute on the Fourth of July. 
There was no indication of any danger whatever; 
laugh and jest were beginning to go round. 

Suddenly a dull boom was heard from some- 
where, the exact direction could not be located. 
The next thing was a shrill whistle overhead, and 
then a most startling report. The first Spanish 



120 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

shell exploded about twenty feet above the sur- 
face of the ground, and about twenty yards in 
rear of the crest of the hill. It exploded in the 
midst of our brave Cuban contingents, killed one 
and wounded several. The valiant sons of Cuba 
libre took to their heels, and most of the news 
paper correspondents did likewise. The members 
of Grimes' Battery, who were not needed at the 
guns, were sent back to the caissons, and another 
round of shrapnel was sent in reply. Again a 
hurtling sound rent the air; again there was the 
fierce crack of a Spanish shell in our immediate 
vicinity, and, on looking around to see where this 
shell struck, it was observed that it had burst 
over the Gatling battery. Luckily, it had gone six 
or eight feet beyond the battery before exploding. 
A fragment of the shell had struck Priv. Bremer 
upon the hand, producing quite a severe contu- 
sion. The Missouri mules stamped the ground 
impatiently; one of them uttered the character- 
istic exclamation of his race, "Aw! hee! aw! hee! 
aw!" and the members of the detachment burst 
into a merry peal of hearty laughter. It was evi- 
dent that this detachment was not going to run, 
and it was equally evident that the Missouri mules 
w T ould stand fire. 




#:■ 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 121 

A third shell whistled over the hill. This one 
burst fairly over Grimes' third piece, killed the 
cannoneer, and wounded several men. 

The members of the detachment were now di- 
rected to lie down under their guns and limbers, 
except the drivers, who declined to do so, and still 
stood at the heads of their mules. Priv. Hoft, dis- 
daining to take cover, shouldered his rifle and 
walked up and down, sentry fashion, over the 
pile of camp equipage. 

Serg. Weigle, who had brought along a small 
portable camera, with a large supply of film-rolls, 
requested permission to photograph the next shot 
fired by Grimes' Battery. It was granted. He 
climbed to the top of the hill, stepped off to the 
left of the battery, and calmly focused his camera. 
Grimes fired another salute, and Weigle secured 
a good picture. A Spanish shell came whistling 
over the hill; Weigle, judging where it would 
burst from previous observations, focused his 
camera, and secured a picture of the burst. He 
then rejoined his detachment, and photographed 
it as it stood. He seemed chiefly worried for fear 
he would not get a picture of everything that hap- 
pened. 



122 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

The artillery duel continued for some twenty 
minutes. The infantry began to pass on, to the 
front. Grimes no longer needed the support of 
the Gatling guns, because he now had an infantry 
support in front of him, and w 7 as firing over their 
heads. Col. McClernand sent orders to the de- 
tachment to move to the rear, out of range. The 
order was obeyed. 

Private Hoft, with the instinct of a true 
soldier, continued to tramp back and forth guard- 
ing the pile of camp equipage. The battery 
moved to the rear at a gentle trot, and, as it turned 
down the hill into the first ford by the El Poso 
house, a Spanish shell whistled over the head of 
Private Shiffer, who was leading the way, and 
burst just beyond his off mule. Shiffer didn't duck 
and nobody was hurt. Providence was taking 
care of this experiment. Corporal Doyle and two 
other members of the detachment got lost, and 
wandered off among the crowd of Cubans, but 
soon found the battery and rejoined. Orders were 
given that as soon as the battery was out of range, 
it should halt and face to the front, at the side of 
the road. 

The battery halted about half a mile to the rear, 
and the 13th Infantry passed it here, on their 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 123 

way to the front. The comments bestowed were 
not calculated to soothe the ruffled feelings of 
people who had been ordered to retreat. "I told 
you so." "Why don't you go to the front?" "Go- 
ing to begin firing here?" "Is this the place where 
you shoot?" "Is this all there is of it?" "I knew 
they would not get into the fight." "Watch them 
hang around the rear." "Going to start in rais- 
ing bananas back here, John Henry?" "What 
do you think of machine guns now?" and similar 
remarks, of a witty but exasperating nature, 
greeted the detachment, from both officers and 
men, as the regiment passed on its way to the 
front. The only thing that could be done was to 
endure it, in the hope of getting a chance to make 
a retort later in the day. 

About nine o'clock, the artillery firing ceased, 
and the Gatling Gun Battery returned to El Poso. 
Grimes' guns were still up on the hill, but there 
were no cannoneers; they had ceased to fire, and 
had left their guns. Two or three dead men were 
lying on the side of the hill ; wounded men were 
limping around with bandages. Cubans were 
again passing to the front. These fellows were 
trying to reach El Caney. They never got into 
the fight. They did reach the vicinity of El Caney, 



124 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

and the Spanish fired one volley at them. The 
Cubans set up a great howl, accompanied by vocif- 
erous gesticulations — and then "skedaddled." 

During all this time the sound of firing had 
been heard toward El Caney. It had been opened 
up there about half an hour before Grimes first 
spoke at El Poso. The fire in this direction sound- 
ed like ranging fire, a shot every two or three 
minutes, and it was supposed that Capron was 
trying to locate the enemy. The sharp crack of 
musketry was heard on our front, it swelled and 
became continuous. It was evident that quite a 
fight was going on at El Caney, which was to our 
right about one mile and to our front perhaps 
half a mile. Kent's Division kept pushing forward 
on the El Poso road. Col. McClernand was asked 
for instructions for the Gatling Gun Detachment. 
He replied, "Find the Tlst New York, and go in 
with them, if you can. If this is not practicable, 
find the best place you can, and make the best 
use of your guns that you can." These were the 
only instructions received by the Gatling Gun 
Detachment until one o'clock. 

The Gatling Gun Detachment moved forward 
about half a mile. They found the 71st New York 
lying down by the side of the road, partially 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 125 

blocking it. Troops passing them toward the 
front were compelled to break into columns of 
twos, because the road was crowded by the 71st. 
The colonel and his adjutant were sought and 
found, and informed of the detachment's instruc- 
tions. Information was requested as to when and 
where the 71st was going into the fight. It ap- 
peared that they had a vague idea that they were 
going in on the left center of the left wing. Law- 
ton's Division at El Caney will be considered the 
right wing; Kent's Division and Wheeler's Divis- 
ion the left wing of the army at San Juan. The 
71st did not seem to know when it was going to 
move toward the front, nor just where it was go- 
ing; and there was no apparent effort being made 
to get further down the road to the front. Wheel- 
er's Division was also pressing forward on the 
road, dismounted cavalrymen, with no arms in 
their hands except their carbines without bay- 
onets. With these same carbines these men were, 
a little later, to storm the intrenchments, manned 
by picked and veteran soldiers, who knew how to 
die at their posts. 

With Wheeler's Division were the Rough Riders, 
the most unique aggregation of fighting men ever 
gathered together in any army. There were cow- 



126 THE GATLINO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

boys, bankers, brokers, merchants, city clubmen, 
and society dudes; commanded by a doctor, second 
in command a literary politician; but every man 
determined to get into the light. About three- 
quarters of a. mile in advance was the first ford, the 
ford of the Aguadores River; beyond this a quar- 
ter of a mile was another ford, the ford of the San 
Juan. The road forked about two hundred yards 
east of the Aguadores ford, turning sharply to 
the left. Down the road from El Toso crept the 
military balloon, it halted near this fork— "Bal- 
loon Fork." Two officers were in its basket, six 
or eight hundred feet above the surface of the 
giound, observing the movements of the troops 
and the disposition of the enemy. 

The sharp crackle of the musketry began in 
front, and still the Gatling Gun Detachment lay 
beside the road with the 71st, waiting, swearing, 
broiling, stewing in their own perspiration, mad 
with thirst, and crazed with the fever of the battle. 
The colonel of the 71st was again approached, to 
ascertain whether he was now going to the front, 
but still there were no signs of any indication to 
move forward. So the long-eared steed was 
mounted and the ford of the Aguadores reconnoi- 
tered. The bullets were zipping through the rank 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 127 

tropical jungle. Two or three men were hit. 
Those who moved forward were going single file, 
crouching low, at a dog trot. There was no evi- 
dence of hesitation or fear here. Some of the 
"Brunettes" passed, their blue shirts unbuttoned, 
corded veins protruding as they slighly raised 
their heads to look forward, great drops of per- 
spiration rolling down their sleek, shiny, black 
skins. There was a level spot, slightly open, be- 
yond the ford of the Aguadores, which offered a 
place for going into battery; from this place the 
enemy's works on San Juan were visible, a faint 
streak along the crest of the hill illumined from 
time to time by the flash of Mausers. 

On return to the battery, there were no signs 
of being able to enter the action with the gallant 
71st, and, acting under the second clause of the 
instructions, the Gatling battery was moved for- 
ward at a gallop. Major Sharpe, a mounted mem- 
ber of Gen. Shafter's staff, helped to open a way 
through this regiment to enable the guns to pass. 
The reception of the battery by these valiant men 
was very different from that so recently given by 
the 13th Regulars. "Give 'em hell, boys!" "Let 
'er go, Gallagher"' "Goin' to let the woodpeckers 
go off?" — and cheer after cheer went up as the 



128 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

battery passed through. Vain efforts were made 
to check this vociferous clamor, which was plainly 
audible to the enemy, less than 1500 yards away, 
The bullets of the enemy began to drop lower. 
The cheering had furnished them the clew they 
needed. They had located our position, and the 
71st atoned for this thoughtlessness by the loss 
of nearly eighty men, as it lay cowering in the 
underbrush near Balloon Fork. 

Just before reaching the Aguadores ford, the 
battery was met by Col. Derby, who had been 
observing the disposition of the troops, from the 
balloon, and had afterward ridden to the front on 
horseback. The colonel was riding along, to push 
the infantry forward in position from the rear, 
as coolly as if on the parade-ground. A blade of 
grass had gotten twisted around a button of his 
uniform and hung down like a buttonhole bouquet 
over his breast. There was a genial smile on his 
handsome face as he inquired, "Where are you 
going?" and, on being informed of the orders 
of the detachment and of the intention to put the 
battery into action, he replied, "The infantry are 
not deployed enough to take advantage of your 
fire. I would advise that you wait a short time. 
I will send you word when the time comes." 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 129 

The advice was acted upon, the guns were turned 
out by the side of the road, and the men directed 
to lie down. 

During the gallop to the front they had been 
compelled to run to keep up, there not being suffi- 
cient accommodation for them to all go mounted 
on the guns. They were panting heavily, and 
they obeyed the order and crept under the guns, 
taking advantage of such little shade as was of- 
fered. Troops continued to pass to the front. The 
crackle of musketry gradually extended to the 
right and to the left, showing that the deployment 
was being completed. More men were hit, but no 
complaints or groans were heard. A ball struck 
a limber-chest; a man lying on his face in the 
road, during a momentary pause of one of the 
companies, was perforated from head to foot; he 
never moved — just continued to lie there; the 
flies began to buzz around the spot and settle on 
the clotted blood, that poured out from the fract- 
ured skull, in the dust of the road. Down at 
the ford, some twenty-five or thirty yards in ad- 
vance, men were being hit continually. 

Shots came down from the trees around. The 
sharpshooters of the Spanish forces, who had 
been up in the trees during the artillery duel, and 



130 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

beyond whom our advance had swept, fully 
believing that they would be murdered if cap- 
tured, expecting no quarter, were recklessly shoot- 
ing at everything in sight. They made a special 
target of every man who wore any indication of 
rank. Some of our heaviest losses during the day, 
especially among commissioned officers, were 
caused by these sharpshooters. They shot indis- 
criminately at wounded, at hospital nurses, at 
medical officers wearing the red cross, and at 
fighting men going to the front. 

The firing became too warm, and the Gatling 
battery was moved back about fifty yards, again 
halted, and faced to the front. It was now nearly 
one o'clock. The members of the detachment had 
picked up their haversacks on leaving El Poso, 
and now began to nibble pieces of hardtack. A 
bullet broke a piece of hardtack which a man was 
lifting to his mouth ; without even stopping in the 
act of lifting it to his mouth, he ate the piece, 
with a jest. 

Suddenly the clatter of hoofs was heard from 
the front. Lieut. Miley dashed up and said, "Gen. 
Shatter directs that you give one piece to me, and 
take the other three beyond the ford, where the 
dynamite gun is, find some position, and go into 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 131 

action." Sergeant YVeigle's gun was placed at 
Miley's disposal, and the other pieces dashed for- 
ward at a dead run, led by the musical mule who 
uttered his characteristic exclamation as he 
dashed through the ford of the Aguadores. 

The place formerly selected for going into 
action had been again twice reconnoitered dur 
ing the wait, and a better place had been found 
about thirty yards beyond the ford of the 
San Juan River. The dynamite gun had stuck 
in the ford of the Aguadores; a shell had got 
jammed in it. The Gatlings were compelled 
to go around it. They dashed through the inter- 
vening space, across the San Juan ford, and up on 
the opening beyond. The position for the battery, 
partially hidden from the view of the enemy by a 
small clump of underbrush, was indicated. The 
right piece, Serg. Green's, was compelled to go 
into action in the middle of the road, and in plain 
sight of the enemy. While the pieces were being 
unlimbered, which was only the work of an in- 
stant, an inquiry was made of Captain Bough- 
ton, of the 3d Cavalry, whose troop had just 
reached this point, as to the position of our troops 
and of the enemy, with the further remark that 
the battery had been under fire since eight o'clock, 



132 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

and had not seen a Spaniard. "I can show you 
plenty of Spaniards," replied Boughton, and, rais- 
ing his hand, pointed toward the San Juan block- 
house and the ridge in its vicinity, sweeping his 
hand toward the right. It was enough. Before 
his hand had fallen to his side, the pieces were 
musically singing. 

Corp. Steigerwald turned and asked, "What 
is the range, sir?" To which was instantly replied, 
"Block-house, 600 yards; the ridge to the right, 
800 yards," and Steigerwald's piece was grinding 
500 shots a minute within a quarter of a second, 
playing upon the San Juan block-house. Serg. 
Green took 800 yards, and began to send his com- 
pliments to the ridge beyond the block-house. In 
an instant Priv. Sine, at Green's gun, who was 
feeding, fell backward dead. At the same instant 
Priv. Kastner fell out. Sine was shot through the 
heart Kastner through the head and neck. At 
this time Byder's gun began to talk. It spoke 
very voluble and eloquent orations, which, al- 
though not delivered in the Spanish language, 
were well understood by our friends, the enemy, 
upon the hill. 

Serg. Green, at the right gun, had run back for 
ammunition, and Corp. Doyle, when Sine fell, 



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THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 133 

seized the pointing lever, and was coolly turning 
the crank while he sighted the gun at the same 
time. He was for the moment the only member of 
the detachment left at the piece, but was given 
assistance, and a moment later Green arrived and 
began to feed the gun. 

Steigerwald was short-handed. Some of his men 
had been sun-struck during the run, and he, too, 
was compelled to work his gun with only one as- 
sistant. Then some of those who had been unable 
to keep up arrived at the battery and began to 
render assistance. Priv. Van Vaningham, who 
had gotten lost from his own command, began to 
pass ammunition. Priv. Merryman, who was 
holding his team back in the river, was im- 
pressed by a doctor to help carry wounded men, 
and Priv. Burkley, another man lost from his com- 
mand, stepped into Merryman's place. Priv. 
Chase left his team, seeing the piece short-handed, 
and began to pass ammunition. The mules mere- 
ly wagged their ears backward and forward and 
stamped on account of the flies. 

All these changes were accomplished, and the 
pieces had not even ceased fire. Doyle had fed 
about 100 rounds, alone. Capt. Landis, of the 1st 
Cavalry, arrived just at this time, and volunteered 



134 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

to assist in observing the effect of the fire. He 
stood fearlessly out in the middle of the road, just 
to the right of Green's piece, in the very best posi- 
tion for observation, but, at the same time, a most 
conspicuous target for the enemy, and observed 
the effect of the Gatling fire, as though he were 
at target practice, reporting the same, continu- 
ally, to the battery commander. 

For the first two minutes the enemy seemed 
dazed, then suddenly a perfect hell of leaden hail 
swept through the foliage. The only thing that 
saved the battery from absolute destruction was 
that the enemy's shots were a little high. As it 
was, many of them struck the ground between the 
guns, and several hit the pieces. Three members of 
the detachment were slightly hurt. One mule was 
shot through the ear. He sang the usual song of 
the mule, shook his head, and was suddenly hit 
again on the fore leg. He plunged a little, but Priv. 
Shiffer patted him on the head and he became 
quiet. A bullet passed by Sniffer's head, so close 
that he felt the wind fan his whiskers, and buried 
itself in the saddle on the same mule. This sud- 
den concentration of the enemy's fire lasted about 
two minutes. 

About the same time the detachment heard a 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 135 

wild cheer start on the left and gradually sweep 
around to the left and right, until in every direc- 
tion, sounding high above the din of battle and the 
crackling of the Mausers, even above the rattle 
of the Gatling guns, was heard the yell of recogni- 
tion from our own troops. There was, for an 
instant, a furious fusillade on our right and left, 
and in a few moments the whole line of our troops 
had risen and were moving forward to the San 
Juan ridge. While moving forward, they neces- 
sarily almost ceased to fire, but the fire of the Gat- 
lings continued, deadly and accurate. A troop 
of the 10th Cavalry, from our right and rear, 
came up, part of the squadron commanded by Col. 
Baldwin. Some of this troop did not understand 
the Gatling gun drama, and were in the act of 
firing a volley into our backs, when Lieut. Smith, 
who was to so heroically lose his life within ten 
minutes afterward, sprang out in front of the 
excited troopers, and, with tears in his eyes, im- 
plored them not to fire, that these were "our own 
Catlings." They did not fire in our direction, but 
they did give a most thrilling and welcome cheer, 
as the squadron swept forward by our right. Col. 
Baldwin ran up, and shouted that he would place 
two troops in support of the battery as long as 



136 THE GATLINQ GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

they were needed. It was the first time the battery 
had ever had a support of any kind. 

After a couple of minutes, the enemy's fire per- 
ceptibly slackened. It was evident they were 
seeking cover from our fire in the bottom of their 
ditches, and our fire at this time was being made 
chiefly from the Gatling battery. This cessation 
of fire on the part of the enemy lasted about 
two minutes, and then the Gatling gunners ob- 
served the Spaniards climbing from their trenches. 
Until that time the Gatling battery had been 
worked with dogged persistency and grim silence, 
but from that moment every member of the bat- 
tery yelled at the top of his voice until the com- 
mand "Cease firing" was given. Groups of the 
enemy, as they climbed from their trenches, were 
caught by the fire of the guns, and were seen to 
melt away like a lump of salt in a glass of water. 
Bodies the size of a company would practically 
disappear an instant after a gun had been turned 
upon them. 

This flight of the enemy from their trenches had 
been caused by the fact that the charging line 
had cut through the barb-wire fences at the foot 
of the hill, and had started up the slope. The Span- 
iards were unable to stay with their heads above 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 137 

the trenches to fire at the charging-line, because 
of the missiles of death poured in by the machine 
guns; and to remain there awaiting the charge 
was certain death. They did not have the nerve 
to wait for the cold steel. They were demoralized 
because they had been compelled to seek the bot- 
tom of their trenches. American troops would 
have awaited the charge, knowing that the ma- 
chine gun fire must cease before contact could oc- 
cur, but the Spaniards forgot this in their excite- 
ment, and made the fatal mistake of running. 

The Gatlings had the range to perfection. Capt. 
Boughton, who was one of the first officers upon 
the hill, stated, on the 1st of September at Man- 
tank, that he visited a portion of the Spanish 
trenches immediately upon arriving at the crest, 
and that the trenches which he inspected were 
literally filled with writhing, squirming, tangled 
masses of dead and wounded Spaniards, and that 
the edge of the trenches was covered with wound- 
ed and dead Spaniards, who had been shot in the 
act of climbing out. This execution was done 
mainly by the machine guns, because the infantry 
and cavalry were not firing much when it was 
done; they were running up the hill to the charge. 
Colonel Egbert, who commanded the 6th Infan- 



138 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

try, states, in his official report, that when his reg- 
iment reached the sharp incline near the top of 
the hill they were brought to a standstill because 
the Gatling bullets were striking along the crest. 
The officers of the 13th Infantry state the same 
thing. It was Lieut. Ferguson, of the 13th, who, 
when the troops had climbed as high as possible 
under the leaden canopy which the Gatlings made 
to cover their charge, waved his white handker- 
chief as a signal to cease firing. At the same mo- 
ment Landis exclaimed, "Better stop; our men are 
climbing the hill now." A shrill whistle gave the 
signal "Cease firing," and the Gatling Gun Bat- 
tery, to a man, rose to their feet and gazed with 
absorbing interest as the long, thin, blue line 
swept forward and crowned the crest of the hill. 
An instant later an American flag floated proudly 
from the San Juan block-house; then the roar of 
musketry and the volley of rifles indicated that 
the fleeing enemy was receiving warm messengers 
as he ran down the hill toward his second line of 
intrenchments. 

The next immediate duty confronting the de- 
tachment was to take stock of losses and to occupy 
the captured position in case of necessity. 

Private Sine had been killed and Private Kast- 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 139 

ner was supposed to be mortally wounded. Pri- 
vate Elkins fell exhausted just as the Stars and 
Stripes were run up on the block-house. He had 
been knocked down by the pole of a limber, which 
struck him over the kidneys, but had continued 
to feed his gun until the very last. He was utter- 
ly exhausted. Sergeant Green had been wounded 
slightly in the foot, but not enough to disable him. 
Private Bremer had been hit early in the morning 
by the fragment of a shell on the hand. One or 
two other members had been merely touched, 
grazed by balls. Private Greenberg had been 
overcome by the heat. Merryman, one of the 
teamsters, as stated before, had been seized to 
carry wounded. Private Lauer was missing and 
Dellett sunstruck. Private Hoft had joined the 
battery on hearing it go into action, and it was 
necessary to send someone back as guard over the 
camp equipage. A volunteer was called for, and 
it was with the utmost difficulty that a member 
of the detachment, Private Pyne, was induced to 
take this duty. He shot four Spanish sharp- 
shooters, who were shooting at our wounded and 
our medical officers, out of trees near El Poso, 
during the remainder of the day. Private Chase 
had sprained his back so badly as to be unable to 



140 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

ride a mule; and two places were vacant for 
drivers. It was necessary to instantly supply 
this deficiency. Private Rurkley, 16th Infantry, 
who had assisted in passing ammunition during 
the firing, volunteered to drive one of the teams, 
and Private Correll the other. Private Raymond,^ 
6th Cavalry, and Private Van Vaningham, of the 
same regiment, also joined the detachment at this 
point, being separated from their own commands. 
The pieces were limbered up as soon as these 
dispositions could be made, except Sergeant Ry- 
der's gun, which had bent the pintle-pin and con- 
sequently could not be limbered quickly. The 
other two pieces and the limber belonging to Ry- 
der's gun were moved forward on a run to the 
captured position on the San Juan ridge, gun 
crews riding or following as best they could. Both 
pieces went into action on the right of the road. 
A limber was then sent back for Ryder's gun, and 
it was brought up, Priv. Shiffer performing this 
duty under a perfect hail of dropping fire. In ad- 
vancing from the position at the ford to the cap- 
tured position it was necessary to cut three barb- 
wire fences. The members of the detachment be- 
haved with the utmost coolness, all working to- 
gether to remove these obstructions, and not a man 




«f!« 






TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 141 

sought shelter, although a dropping fire was strik- 
ing around the detachment, from some source. 
Where this fire came from it was impossible to 
tell; but it did not come from the enemy. 

The two pieces which first reached the top of 
the hill were halted under shelter of the crest, 
while the ground above was reconnoitered. It 
was instantly observed that the enemy was com- 
ing back for a counter-charge. Accordingly the 
pieces were immediately run to the top of the hill, 
the drivers, Sniffer and Correll, riding boldly up 
and executing a left-about on the skirmish line, 
where the skirmishers were lying down. The 
pieces were unlimbered and instantly put into ac- 
tion at point-blank range, the skirmishers giving 
way to the right and left to make way for the 
guns. The enemy was less than 300 yards away, 
and apparently bent on recovering the position. 

The fire immediately became very hot. A skir- 
misher, who had thought to gain a little cover by 
lying down beside the wheel of the right gun 
(Green's), was shot through the arm. "I knowed 
it," he growled; "I might have knowed that if I 
got near that durned gun, I 'd get potted." He 
rolled down behind the crest; a soldier produced 
an emergency packet, staunched the blood, and 



142 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

the wounded soldier, finding no bones broken, 
returned to the firing-line and resumed his work. 
The enemy, at this part of the line, began to waver, 
and again broke toward Jiis second line of in- 
trenchments. 

Just at this moment, Lieut. Traub came up and 
shouted, "Gen. Wood orders you to send one or 
two of your guns over to help Roosevelt." The 
order to move the guns was disregarded, but 
Traub pointed out the enemy, which was menac- 
ing Col. Roosevelt's position, and insisted. About 
600 yards to the right, oblique from the position 
of the guns and perhaps 200 yards, or less, in 
front of the salient occupied by Col. Roosevelt and 
the 3d Cavalry (afterward called Fort Roosevelt), 
there was a group of about 400 of the enemy, 
apparently endeavoring to charge the position. 
There was no time to notify the second piece. 
Serg. Green's gun w T as instantly turned upon this 
group, at point-blank elevation. The group melt- 
ed away. Capt. Marcotte states that, after the 
surrender, some Spanish officers, whom he met, 
and who were members of this group, described 
this to him, stating that the enemy seen at this 
point was a body of about 600 escaping from El 
Caney; that they were struck at this point by 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 143 

machine gun fire so effectively that only forty of 
them ever got back to Santiago; the rest were 
killed. 

Serg. Green's gun, already heated to a red heat 
by the continuous firing of the day, had been 
worked to its extreme limit of rapidity while firing 
at this body of the enemy, and on ceasing to 
fire, several cartridges exploded in the gun before 
they could be withdrawn. A ball lodged in one 
barrel from one of these explosions, and this piece 
was drawn down out of action just as the piece 
which had been left at the ford returned. Subse- 
quently the disabled piece was sent back to the 
ford, with the idea that that would be a safer 
place to overhaul it than immediately in rear of 
the firing-line. The piece remained at the ford 
until the night of the 3d of July, when it was 
brought up to the battery, then at Fort Roosevelt, 
and on the 4th was finally overhauled and put into 
action. This led to the impression, on the part 
of some of the command, that one of the Gatlings 
had been blown up, which was not true. The gun 
w r as not injured, except that one barrel could 
not be used during the remainder of the fighting, 
but the gun was used on the morning of the 4th, 
and during the whole of the engagement on the 



144 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

10th and 11th, as well as on outpost duty, using 
nine barrels instead of ten. 

Following this repulse of the enemy, which oc- 
curred about 4:30 p. m., there was a lull in the 
tiring. Advantage was taken of this to visit Col. 
Roosevelt's position and inspect the line of battle. 
Upon reaching the salient, Col. Roosevelt was seen 
walking up and down behind his line, encouraging 
his men, while a group of them was held, just in 
the rear of the crest, in charge of Maj. Jenkins, 
to support the firing-line if necessary. On the 
right of the Rough Riders, the 3d Cavalry were 
in the fight, and Capt. Boughton was again en- 
countered. 

The firing suddenly began again, and it was 
remarkable to observe the coolness with which 
these two officers sauntered up and down the line, 
utterly regardless of the bullets, which were cut- 
ting the grass in every direction. There were no 
soft places on this part of the hill. The enemy's 
sharpshooters, up in high trees, were able to see 
every point of the cres+, and were dropping their 
shots accurately behind it at all points. 

Just at this moment, Serg. Weigle came up with 
his gun. Serg. Weigle had had a hard time. His 
gun had been taken, under direction of Lieut. 



? 




THE GAT LINO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 145 

Miley, to a point near the San Juan farm-house, 
and pulled to the top of the hill. Weigle, whose 
only idea of a battle, at this time, was a chance to 
shoot, had been, to his intense disgust, restrained 
from opening fire. Then the piece had been taken 
down from the hill and around to the left of the 
line, where Lieut. Miley's duty as aide had carried 
him, to observe the progress of the battle, and 
Weigle had been again denied the privilege of 
"potting" a Spaniard. He was the most disgusted 
man in the American Army; he was furious; he 
was white-hot; he was so mad that the tears rolled 
down his cheeks, as he reported with a soldierly 
salute, "Sir, Serg. Weigle reports, with his gun. 
Lieut. Miley did not allow me to open fire. 1 
would like to have orders." 

In spite of the critical condition of the engage- 
ment, it was extremely ludicrous ; but the reopen- 
ing of the fire at this moment presented an oppor- 
tunity to accommodate the sergeant to his heart's 
content. He was directed to run his piece up on 
the firing-line, report to the officer in charge there- 
of, and go into action as soon as he pleased. 
Within thirty seconds he was getting his coveted 
opportunity. He fired until his gun became ac- 
cidentally jammed, pulled it down behind the 



146 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

crest of the hill and removed the defective cart- 
ridge, returned it and repeated this operation, act- 
ually bringing the gun down three times, and re- 
turning it into action, doing very effective work, 
and all the time displaying the utmost coolness 
and good judgment. A sharpshooter began to 
make a target of Weigle's gun, and "potted v a cou- 
ple of men belonging to the cavalry near it. This 
made Weigle so mad that he turned the gun, for 
a moment, upon the tree in which the sharp- 
shooter was concealed. That sharpshooter never 
shot again. Finally. Weigle's gun got so hot. and 
he himself so cool, that he concluded the piece 
was too warm for further firing. So he ran it 
down behind the hill, and ran his detachment back 
on the hill with rifles, and, during the remainder 
of the evening, the members of this crew practiced 
with "long Toms" upon the Spanish soldiers. 

On returning to the other two pieces near the 
road, they were moved to another position, on the 
other side of the road. This precaution was judi- 
cious in order to conceal the pieces, or change 
their position, because the enemy had pretty thor- 
oughly located them in the previous brush, and it 
was rather dangerous to remain at that place. It 
was now nearly sundown. Scarcely had the pieces 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 147 

opened at this new position, when a battery of 
the enemy's artillery, located near the hospital, 
began to fire at them. There was a heavy gun, 
which made a deep rumbling sound, and this 
sound was supplemented by the sharp crack of 
a field-piece. A shell came whistling overhead 
and exploded within thirty yards of the battery, 
just beyond it. Another one came, and this time 
the enemy's artillery was located. Quick as a flash, 
the two Gatlings were turned upon the enemy's 
guns at the 2000-yard range. Another shell came 
whistling along and exploded about ten feet over- 
head and twenty feet in rear of the battery. 
It tore up the grass in rear of the battery. After 
this engagement was over, Priv. Sniffer picked up 
the still hot fuse of this last shell. It was a large 
brass combination fuse, and set at eight seconds, 
which justified the estimated range. This third 
shell was the last one the enemy was able to fire 
from these pieces. The powerful field-glasses 
which were used in locating the battery revealed 
the fact that as soon as the Gatling guns were 
turned on it, the Spanish gunners ran away from 
their pieces. The big gun turned out to be a 
lG-centimeter converted bronze piece, mounted 
on a pintle in barbette, rifled and using smokeless 



148 TEE GATLINO GUX8 AT SANTIAGO. 

powder. It was also found that they were firing 
four 3-inch field-pieces of a similar character in 
this battery, as well as two mountain guns. 

It is claimed that this is the first time in the his- 
tory of land fighting that a battery of heavy guns 
was ever put out of action by machine-gun fire. 
This battery of the Spanish was never afterward 
able to get into action. Their pieces, which had 
been loaded for the fourth shot, were found on the 
18th of July, still loaded, and a. Spanish officer 
gave the information that they had lost more than 
forty men trying to work that battery, since the 
1st of July. This is accounted for by the fact that 
this Spanish battery was made the subject of crit- 
ical observation by the Gatling Gun Detachment 
from this time on. 

During this last engagement it had been neces- 
sary to obtain more men to assist in carrying am- 
munition, and Capt. Ayers, of the 10th Cavalry, 
had furnished a detail, consisting of Serg. Gra- 
ham and Privates Smith and Taylor, Troop E, 
10th Cavalry. These colored soldiers proved to 
be excellent. They remained with the battery un- 
til the end of the fighting on the 17th, and were 
in every respect the peers of any soldier in the de- 
tachment. Serg. Graham was recommended for 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 149 

a medal of honor. Privates Smith and Taylor 
did as good service, were as willing, as obedient, 
as prompt, and as energetic in the discharge of 
their duties as any commanding officer could wish 
to have. It is a great pleasure to be able to give 
this testimony to the merits of our colored troop- 
ers, and to say, in addition, that no soldiers ever 
fought better than the "Brunettes" of the 9th 
and 10th Cavalry, who fought from the 3d of July 
until the 12th, near or with the Gatlings. 

After the firing at the ford had ceased, Capt. 
Marcotte had returned to El Poso to investigate 
the movements of our artillery. These were then, 
and have remained, one of those inscrutable and 
mysterious phenomena of a battle; incomprehen- 
sible to the ordinary layman, and capable of be- 
ing understood only by "scientific" soldiers. The 
charge upon the San Juan ridge was practically 
unsupported by artillery. No American shells 
had struck the San Juan block-house; none had 
struck or burst in its vicinity; not even a moral 
effect by our artillery had assisted in the assault. 
So Marcotte had gone to investigate the artillery 
arm. He returned at sundown, and brought the 
information that our baggage was safe at El Poso; 
that Private Pyne, still alive and unhurt, had 



150 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

been doing good work against the enemy's sharp- 
shooters; and, better than all this, had brought 
back with him a canteen of water from the San 
Juan River and a pocket full of hardtack. He 
poured out his hardtack, and it was equally dis- 
tributed among the members of the detachment, 
each man's share amounting to two pieces. Each 
man was also given a sup of water from the 
canteen, and this constituted their only supper 
on that night, as they had been compelled to throw 
away everything to keep up with the guns. Hav- 
ing disposed of that, exhausted Nature could do 
no more; they lay down in the mud where they 
stood, and slept so soundly that even the firing 
which occurred that night did not arouse them 
from their slumbers. They were not disturbed un- 
til Best's Battery began to occupy this hill about 
four o'clock in the morning. They were then 
aroused and the Gatling guns were drawn down, 
and the whole battery moved to the salient occu- 
pied by the Rough Riders, because their position 
was at that time closest to the enemy, and, as was 
determined by the previous day's, reconnaissance, 
offered a chance to enfilade several of the enemy's 
trenches with machine gun fire. 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 151 

To dispose of the subject of artillery, it may be 
said that Best's Battery and some other artillery 
occupied the ground vacated by the Gatlings on 
the morning of July 2d, fired four shots, and then 
withdrew with more haste than dignity. They 
remarked, "This is the hottest fire to which artil- 
lery has been subjected in modern times," and lit 
out to find a cooler place. They found it — so far 
in rear that their fire was almost equally danger- 
ous to friends and foes on account of the close 
proximity of the two firing-lines. The obvious 
conclusion is that machine guns can live at close 
ranges, where artillery can not stay. There is no 
better light artillery in the world than that which 
had to withdraw from San Juan block-house and 
its vicinity, on the morning of July 2d. 



152 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

Tactical Analysis of the Battles at Santiago. 

The situation of affairs on the night of the 1st 
of July was rather critical. The plan which the 
general had laid down had been delayed in exe- 
cution at El Caney, while the impetuousity of the 
troops had precipitated an unexpected rapidity 
of movement at San Juan. Capron's Battery had 
opened at El Caney about half past seven o'clock, 
with badly aimed and ill-directed fire, which did 
very little damage to the enemy. The troops en- 
gaged in this part of the battle were pushed for- 
ward until, by about eleven o'clock, they had be- 
come pretty thoroughly deployed around the vicin- 
ity of Las Guamas Creek. They had also extended 
slightly to the right and to the left toward the 
Du Cuorot house. The Spanish forts obstinately 
held out, and the handful of Spanish soldiers in 
El Caney and vicinity stubbornly resisted the at- 
tack made by our troops. 

About nine o'clock, Hamilton's right piece, No. 
3 of Capron's Battery, succeeded in planting a 
shell directly in the old stone fort, which knocked 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 153 

a hole in the masonry; but, just at this juncture, 
the battery was ordered to cease firing at the block- 
house, and to shell the enemy's trenches. The 
enemy forthwith utilized the hole made in the wall 
by the shell as a loop-hole, and continued to fire 
through it until the fort was taken by the infantry 
assault at about half-past four o'clock. No worse 
commentary than this could possibly be made upon 
the tactical handling of this battery of artillery, 
because, having obtained perfectly the range of 
the enemy's stronghold, it was simply asinine not 
to knock that block-house to pieces immediately. 

So Lawton's Division had remained in front of 
El Caney, held by about 1000 Spaniards, while 
the shadows crept from the west to the north, from 
the north to the northeast, and from the northeast 
toward the east. It was coming toward night be- 
fore the artillery was finally turned loose. One 
corner and the roof of this block-house were 
knocked off, but even then the artillery was so 
poorly handled that the enemy had to be dislodged 
from this block-house by hand-to-hand fighting. 
A single Hotchkiss gun, properly handled, should 
have converted it into ruins in thirty minutes. 

While these events were transpiring, Kent and 
Wheeler, constituting the left wing of the army, 



154 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

had moved forward on the El Poso road, parallel 
to the Aguadores River, as far as the San Juan, 
had captured the San Juan farm-house, and had 
gradually deployed to the right and to the left 
along the San Juan River. About one o'clock 
their line had swept forward and had captured 
the first ridge between the San Juan and the city 
of Santiago, the "San Juan ridge," driving the 
enemy on this portion of the field into their last 
trenches. But the right flank of this wing was 
entirely unsupported, and the road by the way 
of Fort Canosa to San Juan, passing by the por- 
tion of the line subsequently occupied by the dyna- 
mite gun, marked the extreme position of the right 
of this wing of the army. The enemy was already 
well toward its right, and had the excellent El 
Caney road to move upon. He was thoroughly 
familiar with the country, while the troops com- 
posing this wing were exhausted by the charge. 
This wing had no reserve that the firing-line 
knew of, and, as a matter of fact, had none except 
two battalions of the 71st New York, which had 
not got into battle, and which were scattered 
along the road from the San Juan River to 
Siboney. 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 155 

The position occupied by the left wing of the 
army was a strong natural position, but had no 
protection for the right flank. In this, Lawton's 
Division did not execute the part of the battle as- 
signed to it. Thus the officers on the San Juan 
ridge, who knew anything about the plan of the 
battle, were constantly directing their gaze, at 
every lull in the fighting, toward El Caney, and to 
the right of Gen. Wood's position, but there were 
no indications of the approach of Gen. Lawton. 

Returning now to the right wing: the San Juan 
block-house and the ridge in its vicinity having 
been captured, a glance at the map will show that 
the retreat of the Spanish forces at El Caney was 
in imminent danger of being cut off. This capture 
occurred at 1:23J p. m. The Spanish commander 
at El Caney had been killed about noon, his 
men had suffered heavily, and the new command- 
ing officer discovered that his retreat by the El 
Caney road was threatened. The only other line 
of retreat was by way of the San Miguel and 
Cuabitas roads. The Spanish forces at El Caney 
were also running low in their ammunition, and it 
was therefore decided to withdraw. Portions of 
the Spanish troops did withdraw, some by way 
of the El Caney road toward Santiago; the re- 



156 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

niainder, some 350 or 400, were crushed in the final 
charge upon El Caney, between 4 and 4 :30 o'clock. 
Gen. Lawton's Division then proceeded down 
the El Caney road to Santa Cruz, passing by way 
of the masonry bridge. This was about dusk. The 
division marched in columns of fours, with the 
artillery in front in column of sections, and with- 
out even an advance guard thrown out. The ar- 
tillery had passed the masonry bridge and had 
nearly reached the Santa Cruz farm-house, when 
the order was given to halt. The division halted 
in the road and began to cook supper. Fires were 
kindled, and coffee put on to boil. Suddenly, a 
few shots came scattering over the ridge and 
dropped in among the troops. A messenger was 
sent back to Gen. Shafter to inform him that fur- 
ther advance in this direction was not practicable, 
as the enemy had been encountered in force. The 
position this division was destined, in the begin- 
ning, to occupy was within less than 300 yards 
of where it halted. There was no large body of 
Spanish troops in that portion of the field. The 
whole valley between that ridge and Santiago 
had been swept by machine gun fire during the 
afternoon. It is possible that there might have 
been a few Spanish pickets on the ridge, but this 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 157 

is not believed to be probable. There was some 
firing about this time from the Spanish trenches 
near Fort Canosa, at the 13th Infantry upon the 
hill where the dynamite gun was subsequently 
placed. A glance at the map will show that these 
shots, having passed over the hill, would drop in 
the vicinity of the masonry bridge and the Santa 
Cruz farm-house. This was the firing that alarmed 
Lawton's Division and caused the report men- 
tioned to be sent back to General Shafter. 

This statement of the conditions has been neces- 
sary in order to understand why the counter- 
march was made by Lawton's Division. The posi- 
tion at El Caney had ceased to be of any import- 
ance as soon as the San Juan block-house and 
ridge were taken; any Spanish troops remaining at 
El Caney were necessarily victims. But it was vi- 
tally important to hold the position gained by the 
left wing. The appearance of a heavy force of thp 
enemy in front of the masonry bridge could signify 
only one thing, and that was that the left wing, 
with its right flank in the air, was liable to be 
doubled up at any moment by a heavy force of the 
enemy striking it upon that flank. Further, that 
Gen. Lawton, with this column advancing on the 
El Caney road as before explained, was liable to be 



158 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

struck at the head of his column and similarly 
doubled up. The enemy would thus interpose be- 
tween the two wings of the army, cutting Lawton 
off, and probably defeating the army in detail, 
unless something be done immediately. 

Of course, it is known now that this opera- 
tion of the enemy was never probable for an in- 
stant; but that was the status of affairs at mid- 
night on July 1st, as then reported to the com- 
manding general. 

Lawton was, therefore, ordered to withdraw, by 
way of the El Caney road, back to Gen Shafter's 
headquarters in rear of El Poso, from which posi- 
tion his division was rushed forward on the El 
Poso road to San Juan on the 2d of July. His men 
were marched almost all night, almost all day the 
next day, and were well-nigh utterly exhausted 
when they reached a position in rear of the right 
flank of the left wing. It was supposed, up to 
this time, at headquarters, that the information on 
which this marching was ordered was correct. 

During the time that Lawton had been counter- 
marching from Santa Cruz, back by way of El Poso, 
there had been, as before stated, no reserve for the 
left wing. The independent division of Gen. Bates 
had been ordered to the front as rapidly as possi- 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 159 

ble. Part of it had reached the vicinity of El Poso, 
and from there one or two of the regiments had 
participated in the fight, late on July 1st; but 
nobody on the firing line knew anything about 
Bates' independent division at this time, and it 
was too much exhausted to be useful as a reserve. 
The morning of the 2d it was used to extend the 
lines. It is therefore evident, now that the history 
of the battle is understood, that the Gatling guns 
were the only effective reserve which the left wing 
of the army had during the night of July 1st and 
all day on the 2d. 

Acting on this belief, the Gatling Gun Battery 
was placed in reserve, in the rear of Fort Roose- 
velt, on the morning of July 2d, and was held 
there in reserve all day on July the 2d and 3d. 
The pieces were placed within twenty yards of the 
firing-line, just below the crest of the hill. The 
feed-guides were filled, and the gun crews lay 
down beside their pieces. The battery was ready 
to either support the firing-line against a charge, 
or protect its flank against a turning movement. 
But it was not considered necessary or desirable 
to run the pieces up on the firing-line in the open, 
and participate in the trench-firing, which was 
the only fighting done on July 2d and 3d. It was 



16C TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

considered that the battery was too valuable as a 
reserve to sacrifice any of its men uselessly. Some 
very well-meaning officers urged that the battery 
be rushed up on the hill and put into action, but 
this was stubbornly refused, under the third 
clause of the instructions given on the 1st of July 
"to make the best use of the guns possible.' 
Gen. Wood and Col. Roosevelt were consulted 
and they concurred with the above views, and the 
battery remained in reserve. 

On the morning of the 2d of July a handsome 
young soldier, in the uniform of a Rough Rider, 
approached the battery commander, saluted, and 
said, "Col. Roosevelt directs me to report to you 
with my two guns." Inquiry elicited the fact that 
the young trooper was Serg. William Tiffany, that 
he had command of two Colt's automatic rapid- 
fire guns, with a crew consisting of Corp. Ste- 
vens and six men, and that he had 4,000 rounds 
of 7-millimeter ammunition. Four thousand was 
not a very large supply for two guns which 
could fire at the rate of 500 shots each per minute. 
Fortunately, the Gatling Gun Detachment had 
found time, on the 1st of July, to collect about 
10,000 rounds of Mauser ammunition in the cap- 
tured trenches, and a comparison of the Mauser 



TEE GATLIXG GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 161 

with the 7-millimeter ammunition at once dis- 
closed the fact that it was precisely the same 
ammunition which Tiffany had brought along for 
his guns. The problem of ammunition supply for 
Tiffany's guns was solved. He now had 14,000 
rounds, and his guns became a very powerful 
reinforcement at this point. 

Serg. Tiffany and his men had carried these guns 
from Siboney to the firing-line upon their backs. 
How they got the four boxes of ammunition 
through they themselves could hardly tell. The 
firing was too heavy to mount the tripods in the 
trenches during the daytime, so placing the guns 
was deferred until night. F,or some reason it was 
not practicable to place the tripods on the night 
of the 2d, and they were finally placed on the 
night of the 3d; Serg. Tiffany, with two of his men, 
aiding in digging the emplacements. 

While digging, suddenly a burst of firing broke 
out, and it was believed by many that a serious 
night attack had been made. During the firing, 
Capt. Avers, of the 10th Cavalry, and Col. Koose- 
velt again displayed those characteristics of fear- 
less bravery which so endeared these two gallant 
officers to their men. Some of the troops in the 
trenches had begun to fire wildly. In fact, all the 



162 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

firing was done wild; there was no sense in any of 
it; there was no occasion for it. Intent listening to 
the enemy's fire made it absolutely certain that 
their firing never approached nearer our lines. 
There may have been some small body seeking to 
explore the road, but there was no indication of 
any attack in force. At any rate, Koosevelt and 
Ayers determined to stop the firing of our line, 
and suddenly, above the din of battle, these two 
officers could be heard, tramping up and down 
the trench in front of their men, haranguing, com- 
manding, ridiculing their men for shooting in the 
dark. Ayers told his men that they were no bet- 
ter than the Cubans, upon which the burly black 
troopers burst into a loud guffaw, and then 
stopped firing altogether. Roosevelt told his men 
that he was ashamed of them. He was ashamed 
to see them firing valuable ammunition into the 
darkness of the night, aiming at nothing; that he 
thought cowboys were men who shot only when 
they could see the "whites of the other fellow's 
eyes." They also stopped firing. The enemy's 
bullets continued to whiz by for a few minutes, 
and they too ceased firing, and everybody began 
to laugh at everybody else. Tiffany had joined 
the two officers in their walk up and down, expos- 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 163 

ing himself with the utmost coolness. He and 
his men now succeeded in placing his guns in the 
trench, and, from that time until the end of the 
fight, they could hardly be induced to leave them 
Jong enough to eat; they didn't leave them to sleep 
— they slept in the trench by the guns. 

About one o'clock on the 3d there was a lull in 
the firing, during which a flag of truce was sent 
with a communication to General Toral, notify- 
ing him that a bombardment would follow unless 
he surrendered. The firing was resumed and con- 
tinued until about half past twelve on the 4th of 
July, at which time another flag of truce went up, 
and there was no more firing until the 10th of 
July at about three o'clock. Troops, however, 
were compelled to lie on their arms; the relief 
was constantly in the trenches, and the nervous 
strain was even worse than the actual dangers of 
battle. 

Negotiations for capitulation having failed, fir- 
ing was resumed about three o'clock on the 10th, 
and continued until one o'clock on the 11th of July. 
In this firing all four of the Gatling guns were 
used; Tiffany's guns and the dynamite gun under 
Serg. Borrowe participated. Three of the Gatling 
guns had been placed in the trench on the night 



164 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

of July 3d. The wheels were taken off and laid on 
the ground in the rear of the pieces; sand-bag re- 
vetments were built up in front of the guns, and 
each crew divided into two reliefs. One relief was 
required to be constantly at the gun and always 
ready for instant action. The fourth gun, the one 
that had been temporarily disabled, was repaired 
on the 4th, thoroughly cleaned, and placed in re- 
serve behind the crest of the hill. On the 4th of 
July, Serg. Borrowe had been directed to obey any 
instructions given him by the Gatling gun com- 
mander, and the dynamite gun had been placed 
in position to cooperate with the battery of ma- 
chine guns. There were now, therefore, seven 
pieces in the battery. It was the most powerful 
and unique battery ever used in battle. 

The Sims-Dudley pneumatic dynamite gun 
throws a Whitehead torpedo, carrying a charge 
of four and one-half pounds of explosive gelatine; 
the effective force of this charge is equal to that 
of nine pounds of dynamite, No. 1. The charge 
explodes, on striking, by means of a percussion 
fuse, and steadiness of flight is secured by means 
of a vane. The propeljing force is a charge of 
seven ounces of smokeless powder. The gun is 
pointed in the same manner as a mortar, and fired 



M 

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w 

PI 

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THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 165 

in the same manner as a field-piece. During the 
10th and 11th considerable attention was devoted 
to the tactical cooperation of the guns composing 
this unique battery. 

The plan adopted was for the dynamite gun to 
throw a shell toward a designated point. Upon the 
explosion of this shell the Spanish soldiers invari- 
ably exposed themselves, and were immediately 
assailed by machine gun fire. Occasionally a dy- 
namite shell would fall with sufficient accuracy 
to do efficient work on its own account. On the 
afternoon of the 10th a dynamite shell fell in a 
long trench near Fort Canosa, clearing out the 
trench. The Spanish survivors were cut down 
almost to a man by the machine gun fire, and the 
Spanish troops were unable to occupy this trench 
until the following morning, when the operation 
was repeated, practically destroying the useful- 
ness of this trench during the whole fight. Oapt. 
Duncan, of the 21st Infantry, states that this re- 
lieved his battalion of an enfilading fire, and was 
a valuable service to them. Another dynamite 
shell, on the afternoon of the 10th, fell into a 
Spanish battery of artillery, near the brick hos- 
pital, and completely destroyed the battery, which 
consisted of two 3-inch guns. In all, about a 



166 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

dozen dynamite shells were thrown with some de- 
gree of accuracy, and with good effect. 

The fourth Gatling gun, which had been held 
in reserve, was used during the afternoon of July 
10th, and all day on the 11th, to pour a vertical 
fire upon the city of Santiago, beyond that por- 
tion that was visible to the American troops. Per- 
haps 6,000 or 7,000 shots were thus dropped into 
the heart of the city, making the streets unsafe, 
communication difficult, and striking terror to 
the hearts of the Spanish troops who were held 
there in reserve. Gen. Toral, in his official state- 
ment to his own government, specifically men- 
tions this fire as one of his principal reasons for 
surrender. 

On the afternoon of the 10th and during the 
11th of July a battery of mortars, under command 
of Capt. Ennis, posted about half a mile to the 
right of the machine gun battery, threw a few 
shells at the enemy's intrenchments. There were 
four of these mortars in action and they w ere 
placed behind the ridge in a perfectly safe posi- 
tion. They threw, perhaps, twenty-five shells all 
told. The first eight or ten failed to explode for the 
reason that the fuses had not been punched. Final- 
ly, Capt. Ennis discovered that his shells were not 



THE GATLING GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 167 

exploding, and, on inquiry, found that there was 
no fuse-punch in the battery. He succeeded in 
finding a brad-awl, which, luckily, some member 
of the battery had in his pocket, and showed a 
sergeant how to punch the fuse with a brad-awl. 
After this the mortar shells exploded all right. 
None of this fire, however, was directed at the 
city; it was directed at the trenches of the enemy, 
and not oyer eight or ten of the shells fell with 
any precision. The mortar fire was effective in 
the sense that it tended to demoralize the enemy, 
but its material effect was very small. 

There was no firing of field-pieces during 
all this time of which any account is necessary. 
The field-pieces were even less useful during this 
time than they were on the 1st of July, if such a 
thing could be possible. 

On the night of the 4th of July the reserve Gat- 
ling gun was posted to command the Fort Canosa 
road, in support of a picket on that road, and from 
that time until the surrender this piece was post- 
ed there every night. The members, therefore, 
of this detachment did practically double duty. 
This was the gun in charge of Sergts. Weischaar 
and Kyder, referred to in the official report. Luck- 



168 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

ily, it was not fired, but there can be no doubt of 
the immense value it would have had if its use 
had been necessary. 

Summing up the use of machine guns from 
the 2d to the 11th of July, inclusive, it may be 
said that they demonstrated the use of the arm 
as a tactical reserve and an auxiliary to an out- 
post, and that, in combination with a dynamite 
gun, they demonstrated that a new arm of the ser- 
vice had been formed which can live at closer range 
to the enemy, and do far more effective work, than 
artillery. Nor is this all to be considered. It 
should be remembered that a field-piece throws a 
shell which breaks into 273 fragments. The ma- 
chine gun throws 1000 shots, and each of these 
shots is aimed with absolute precision. There- 
fore, at any effective range, the machine gun is 
far superior to a field-piece against anything ex- 
cept material obstacles. Of course the machine 
guns will not do to batter down stone walls, nor 
to destroy block-houses. It had already been dem- 
onstrated on the 1st of July that "machine guns 
can go forward with the charging-line to the lodg- 
ment in the enemy's position," and that "their 
presence on the field of battle, with a supply of 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 169 

ammunition for ten minutes, is a decisive factor 
in the engagement." 

These were the principal points claimed for the 
machine gun in the discussion of the subject on 
the 1st of January. The use of the machine gun 
for advance and rear guards was not demonstrated 
at Santiago, for the reason that no opportunity 
was presented. 



170 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 



CHAPTER IX. 

The Volunteers. 

The white flag went up at one o'clock on the 
11th, and this was the end of the fighting at San- 
tiago. The Rough Riders had been moved from 
the hill at Fort Roosevelt to a position west of the 
El Caney road, and one of the Gatling guns had 
been sent with them. This gun was brought back 
on the 17th after the surrender. Various other 
movements of troops occurred before the 17th, 
which had been decided upon by the generals as 
the last day of grace. Gen. Toral had been noti- 
fied that one o'clock on the 17th was the time for 
either the surrender or the signal for the assault. 
The hour approached, and still the Spaniard at- 
tempted to delay. The orders for the assault were 
issued. The troops lay in the trenches with their 
fingers on the triggers. Gen. Randolph had come 
and pushed the artillery into better positions. 
The pieces were loaded and the gunners stood 
with their lanyards in their hands. The ammuni- 
tion-boxes were opened. The nervous tension of 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 171 

the line was terrific. The troops on the extreme 
right and left, designated for the assault, were 
only waiting the word to dash forward upon the 
intrenchments of the enemy. Then suddenly from 
Gen. Wheeler's headquarters a mounted officer 
was seen spurring eastward along the crest. He 
was waving his hat over his head. His horse 
gathered speed, and the foam began to fly from 
his flanks and nostrils, and as Capt. McKittrick 
passed he called, "No cheering, please; the city 
and province of Santiago have surrendered." 

The members of the Gatling Gun Detachment 
walked to the top of the hill, and, facing toward 
the gallant enemy who had so valiantly defended 
the foredoomed city, silently took off their hats. 

All along the line the reception of the glorious 
news was marked by comments upon the gallant 
defense which had been made. There was no dem- 
onstration which could have hurt the feelings of 
so magnificent a foe. Five minutes after the sur- 
render the American trench was lined by Amer- 
ican troops on our side and Spanish troops on the 
other. The Spanish troops brought bottles of mes- 
cal, aguardiente, and wine. Our troops carried 
hardtack and canned roast beef. These recent 
foes began at once to exchange the necessaries 



172 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

of life and souvenirs of the siegeof Santiago. They 
fraternized as all brave men do after the battle. 
A few Cubans skulked around the rear of our line, 
despised by both sides. 

The next day witnessed the formal surrender 
of the city. At twelve o'clock, the preliminary 
formalities having been complied with, the 9th In- 
fantry and a battalion of the 13th Infantry, the 
two regiments which had been adjudged first hon- 
ors in the assault, were ready as an escort to raise 
the flag in the heart of the city. All of the other 
regiments were formed upon the ground which 
they occupied during the siege. As the second- 
hands of our watches showed the minute of 
twelve, noon, a field-piece burst upon the stillness 
of the sultry day, and the band began the strains 
of "The Star-spangled Banner." Every hat was 
taken off, and an instant later, efforts to restrain 
it being ineffectual, six miles of solid cheering en- 
compassed the latest American city. 

Grizzled old soldiers, scarred with wounds from 
Indian wars, and gay recruits who had arrived 
too late to join in the fighting, gray-haired gener- 
als and athletic young subalterns, all forgot pro- 
priety and the silence usually enjoined in ranks 
and joined in that tremendous yell. From over on 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 173 

the right of the El Caney road we could hear the 
"Bah! rah! rah!" of Harvard and the "Rah! rah! 
rah !" of Yale, mingled with the cowboy yell of the 
Indian Territory. From the ranks of the Regu- 
lars came the old Southern yell, mingled with the 
Northern cheer. The most thrilling and dramatic 
moment of the Spanish-American War had passed 
into history. 

The troops settled themselves down to wait for 
developments, and while they waited, opportuni- 
ties were presented for the first time to make ob- 
servations of the personnel of this heterogeneous 
army. 

The American Regular is a type of his own, and 
no description of him is necessary. He was the 
fighting strength of the 5th Corps. Only three 
Volunteer regiments participated in the charges 
of July 1st— the 71st New York, the 2d Massachu- 
setts, and the 1st Volunteer Cavalry. 

The Volunteers presented many different types, 
some good, some otherwise. There should be no 
sympathy with that servile truckling to popular 
sentiment which speaks of our brave Volunteers 
indiscriminately, as if they were all good and all 
equally well instructed. There were Volunteers 
who were the equals of the Regulars in fighting 



174 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

and in leadership. And there were some who 
should have been at home pulling on a nursing- 
bottle or attending a kindergarten. To praise 
them indiscriminately creates a false impression 
on the public, and works a rank injustice toward 
those who were really good and efficient in the 
service. It does even worse than that: it fosters 
the popular idea that all there is to do to make 
soldiers is to take so many laborers, clerks, hod- 
carriers, or farmers, and put on them uniforms, 
arm them with rifles, and call them "gallant Vol- 
unteers"! Out upon such an insane delusion! 

Fighting is a scientific trade. It would be no 
more absurd to give an idiot a tambourine and 
call him a musician — he would be an idiot all the 
same. So with the clerk, the laborer, the hod-car- 
rier, the teacher; he remains the same in spite of 
all the polished arms, resplendent uniforms, and 
pompous titles bestowed upon him. He remains 
just what he was before, until he learns his new 
trade and becomes a soldier by the acquisition of 
the necessary knowledge and experience to prac- 
tice his new calling. 

It is one of the duties of trained officers to tell 
these homely truths to the people who have not 
made a study of the matter, in order that they 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 175 

who foot the bills may understand what they pay 
for and why they do it. And it is equally the 
duty of the citizen who has no knowledge of the 
subject to give a fair hearing to such statements, 
and, if he finds them correct after due investiga- 
tion, to translate the information thus imparted 
into such laws as will in future supply an army 
composed of soldiers who can fight, instead of a 
herd of ignorant incompetents who die like rotten 
sheep within half an hour's ride by rail of their 
own homes. 

These remarks can be illustrated by observa- 
tions in Cuba. 

For example, the 34th Michigan pitched its 
camp on the hill at Fort Roosevelt on the 2d of 
August. They were in an awful condition. A 
man had died in one company the day before, and 
there had not been enough able-bodied men in the 
company to bury him. A detail had to be made 
from another company to dig the grave. More 
than fifty per cent of the regiment were sick, and 
the remainder were far from well. At this time, 
more than two weeks after the surrender, they 
were still cooking individually. Within fifteen 
minutes after their arrival they were overrunning 
the Gatling gun camp, picking up the firewood 



176 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

which had been gathered by the detachment for 
cooking purposes. An attempt to stop this 
marauding was received with jeers. A green- 
looking Wolverine at once began to make rat- 
calls, and was ably seconded by his comrades. 
Sentinels were then posted over the Gatling gun 
camp, with orders to keep the Michiganders out; 
they abused the sentinels in the same manner, 
and their officers made no effort to restrain 
them. It became necessary to make a personal 
matter of it, which was promptly done, and one 
Wolverine was thereafter respectful — so respect- 
ful, in fact, that he jumped to attention and took 
off his hat to even the privates of the detachment. 
The regiment took a delicate revenge. They 
had dug neither latrines nor sinks. Up to this 
time they used the surface of the camp-ground 
over their own camp for this purpose. They now 
took possession of a trench within twenty yards 
of the battery's tents. The nuisance was intoler- 
able, and was reported to their brigade head- 
quarters. No attention was paid to the report. 
Twelve hours later it was again reported, with the 
same result. Twelve hours after this it was a 
third time reported, with the same result. In the 
meantime not a single shovelful of dirt had been 



W 
w 

w 
o 






THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 177 

thrown on the trench and an odor arose from it 
which was not exactly like the perfume of "Araby 
the blest." 

Forty-five hours after the arrival of the regi- 
ment notice was served upon the brigade com- 
mander thereof that, unless the nuisance was 
abated immediately, a sentinel would be placed 
over the offending ditch and notice would be given 
to General Bates, the division commander, re- 
questing the action of an inspector; notice was 
further served that if any resistance were made, 
four Gatling guns would be turned loose upon 
the 34th Michigan and the regiment swept off the 
face of the hill and into Santiago Bay for a much- 
needed bath. It was enough. Officers and men 
ran instantly for spades and proceeded to fill up 
the trench. Report was then made to Gen. Bates, 
the division commander, of the offense and action 
had thereon, with the information that the Gat- 
ling gun commander awaited to answer any com- 
plaints. An investigation was immediately made, 
with the result that such action was sustained. 

There were some ignorant Volunteers at Santi- 
ago, but of all the willful violation of all the laws 
of sanitation, camp hygiene, and health ever seen, 
these particular Volunteers did the most outra- 



178 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

geous things. They threw their kitchen refuse out 
on the ground anywhere; half of the time they did 
not visit the sink at all, but used the surface of 
the ground anywhere instead; and they continued 
these offenses at Montauk Point. They raked 
over an abandoned camp of the Spanish prisoners 
on their arrival at Fort Roosevelt, and appropri- 
ated all the cast-off articles they could find, using 
the debris for bedding. This surgeon, a "family 
doctor" from the pine woods in northern Michi- 
gan, did not seem to regard these matters as of 
any importance. His attention was called to 
them, but he took no action. In short, there was 
no law of health which these people did not utterly 
ignore, no excess dangerous to health which they 
did not commit. Three-fourths of them were too 
sick for duty, and the rest looked like living skele- 
tons. They fairly wallowed in their own filth — 
and cursed the climate of Cuba on account of their 
sickness. 

In sharp contrast to the 34th Michigan was the 
1st U. S. Volunteer Cavalry, the Rough Riders. 
This was an organization the peer of any in the 
Regular Army in morale, in fighting, and in every 
quality that goes to make up a fine body of soldiers. 
They were picked men ; all classes were shown in 



THE OAT LING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 179 

that organization. The tennis champion was a 
private, the champion oarsman of Harvard a cor- 
poral. On the 2d of July a stockbroker of Wall 
Street who can sign his check for |3, 000, 000 was 
seen haggling with a cow-puncher from the Indian 
Territory over a piece of hardtack. Both were 
privates and both were fine soldiers. The whole 
regiment was just such a medley, but fought like 
Regulars, and endured like Spartans. They hung 
on like bull-dogs, and charged like demons. They 
were as strict about the camp police as Regu- 
lar Army surgeons, and as punctilious about salut- 
ing as a K. O. on "official relations." Withal, they 
were a clean-mouthed, clean-clad, clean-camped 
lot of gentlemen, each in his way, from the "Hello, 
pard!" of the cowboy to the frozen stare of the 
monocled dude from Broadway. And they fought 
— like Regulars; there is no other just comparison. 
Roosevelt said: "They are the 11th Cavalry." 
He found enthusiastic endorsers of this remark 
in every Regular who saw them fight. They were 
the finest body of Volunteers who ever wore uni- 
form, and they were stamped indelibly with the 
personality of Theodore Roosevelt. Pushing, ag- 
gressive, resolute, tenacious, but self-contained, 
cool, and restrained, they represented the very 



180 THE QATLINO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

best type of what the Volunteer ought to be — 
but often was not. 

Above them all, however, shone out three types. 

Theodore Roosevelt. He needs no eulogy from 
my pen. He has done everything, and in each oc- 
cupation has been conspicuously successful. He 
is, however, a born soldier. His virile frame con- 
tains the vigorous mind, the keen intellect, the 
cool judgment, and the unswerving, never-hesi- 
tating courage of the natural soldier. He is affa- 
ble and courteous, or stern and scathing, as cir- 
cumstances demand. One instant genial smiles 
overspread his expressive countenance, whereon 
the faintest emotion writes its legend with in- 
stantaneous and responsive touch; the next, on 
occasion, a Jove-like sternness settles on his face, 
and, with a facility of expression bewildering to 
less gifted tongues, scathing invective, cutting 
sarcasm, or bitter irony impress upon an offender 
the gravity of a breach of discipline. Withal, he is 
modest. He appreciates his own power, but 
there is no undue display of that appreciation, no 
vainglorious boasting over achievements which 
read like a fairy-tale. Fittest to lead or follow, 
idol of every true soldier. Who, that knows him 
as those who fought beside him, does not wish to 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 181 

see him at the head of that army and that nation 
of which he is the brightest ornament in every po- 
sition, civil, military, or political? 

Woodbury Kane — social leader. Fortune's fav- 
orite, aristocratic, refined, cultured, wealthy, haut 
ton de haut ton, and sdbreur sans peur et sans reproche 
— how shall I paint him to you as I learned to 
know him in those dreadful, delightful seventeen 
days in which we lived only from instant to in- 
stant, and every man unconsciously bared his soul 
to his comrades because he could not help it? 

A gentleman — he always looked that in the 
fullest sense of the word. Well groomed; in those 
days when our bed was a mud-puddle and our 
canopy the stars, when the music which lulled us 
to sleep was the hum of the Mauser bullets and 
the vicious popping of the Eemingtons, when water 
to drink had to be brought at the peril of life for 
every mouthful, Kane turned up every morning 
clean-shaved and neatly groomed, shoes duly pol- 
ished, neat khaki, fitting like a glove and brushed 
to perfection, nails polished, and hair parted as 
nicely as if he were dressed by his valet in his 
New York apartments. How did he do it? We 
never knew. He kept no servant: he took his 
regular turn in the ditches, in the mud, or tor- 



182 TEE GATLIXG GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 

rid sun, or smothering rain. No night alarm came 
that did not find Kane first to spring to the trench 
— and yet he did it, somehow. The courteous 
phrases of politest speech fell ever from his 
ready lips, as easily as they would have done in 
the loudoir of any belle in the metropolis. The 
shrieking of a shell or tingling hiss of a sharp- 
shooter's close-aimed bullet never came so near 
as to interrupt whatever polished expression of 
thanks, regret, or comment he might be uttering. 
And it was the real thing, too. The gentle heart 
was there. No man was readier to bind a wound 
or aid a sun-struck soldier in the ranks; none 
more ready to deny himself a comfort or a luxury 
to help a more needy comrade. A braver man, a 
surer or more reliable officer, never trod in shoe 
leather. A grand example to our pessimistic, 
socialistic friends and cheap demagogues of the 
sterling worth and noble, chivalric character of 
a "society man of wealth." He is a living type 
of u Bel a faire peur" without the idiotic sentiment- 
ality of that maudlin hero, and with all his other 
characteristics. 

Greenway and Tiffany. The one a Harvard 
football-player, just out, plunging into the great 
game of war with all the zest he formerly found 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 183 

in the great college game. The other the petted 
son of wealthy parents, also a college graduate, 
and the idolized fiance of his childhood's sweet- 
heart. Equally ready for fight or fun, they were 
the finest type of youthful manhood to be found. 
Endowed by Nature with every gift, educated at 
the best of colleges, bred in the best of society, 
ready to enter upon the most desirable of careers, 
they threw all upon the altar of country's love. 
They entered battle as one might go to a game 
or begin a play. All of unbounded zeal, youthful 
enthusiasm, restless energy, keen enjoyment — 
everything seemed to be equally acceptable to 
them, and no discomfort ever assumed any guise 
other than that of a novel and untried sensation. 
They are the type of our young manhood — our 
representative American youth — as Eoosevelt is 
of its vigorous manhood. They are the salt of the 
earth, and Kane— is both salt and spice. All 
were comrades in arms, types of American man- 
hood unspoiled by Fortune's favors, capable of 
anything and everything. Such men mould the 
destiny of this great nation, and in their hands it 
is safe. 

But neither of these two regiments is a fair type 
of the Volunteers; they are the two extremes. For 



184 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

a type, take the 1st Illinois. They were a Chicago 
regiment with fifteen years' service, and they en- 
listed in a body to a man. They reached the firing 
line on the 10th and participated in the fight with 
two battalions, with distinguished gallantry. The 
third battalion was detailed on the necessary but 
unpleasant duty of caring for the yellow fever 
hospital at Siboney. These city-bred Volunteers 
peeled off their coats, buried yellow fever corpses, 
policed the hospital and hospital grounds, and 
nursed the victims of the scourge. They did not 
utter a complaint nor ask -for a "soft" detail; they 
did their duty as they found it. Another battal- 
ion was detailed immediately after the surrender 
to guard the Spanish prisoners. This most thank- 
less duty was performed by them with fidelity and 
care. The commander of the battalion and half 
his officers were proficient in the Spanish lan- 
guage as a part of their preparation for the cam- 
paign, and they soon established cordial relations 
with the prisoners they were set to guard. It was 
a trying duty, but they performed it faithfully. 
Sickness visited this battalion, and sometimes 
guard duty had to be performed with only one 
day off, but they never whimpered. The other bat- 
talion was detailed after the surrender to do steve- 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 185 

dore work at the commissary dep6t. The slender 
clerks and soft-handed city men slung boxes of 
hardtack and sacks of bacon and barrels of coffee, 
and performed manual labor with all the faithful- 
ness that would be expected of men accustomed 
to such work, and with never a complaint. The 
sanitary measures of this regiment were perfect, 
and they bore themselves like Kegulars. It is 
now recognized that this is a compliment to any 
Volunteer organization. 



186 THE QATLINO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 



CHAPTER X. 

The Sufferings of the Fifth Army Corps. 

In such a campaign as that of Santiago, a cer- 
tain amount of suffering is inevitable. In such a 
climate as that of southern Cuba, a certain amount 
of disease is unavoidable. In the very hot-bed of 
yellow fever and malaria, no army could hope to 
escape without contracting these diseases; and 
in a campaign conducted with the marvelous ce- 
lerity of the one at Santiago, some difficulty 
in forwarding supplies must necessarily be en- 
countered. 

The root of all our difficulties lay in the fact 
that the commanding general had under him sup- 
ply departments whose officers reported to heads 
of bureaus not under control of the corps com- 
mander. This caused unnecessary delays in ob- 
taining supplies, entailed confusion in their dis- 
tribution, and led to suffering beyond what was 
necessarily the result of the climate and the 
campaign. 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 187 

A brief description of the method of obtaining 
supplies will make this point more clear . When a 
given article was wanted, whether it was soap, 
quinine, tentage, or transportaion, a requisition 
upon the chief of the proper bureau at Washington 
had to be made, with full statement of the reasons 
for the request ; this requisition had to be approved 
by all intermediate commanders and go through 
military channels to the chief of the bureau, 
who might or might not be convinced of the 
necessity for the article wanted. His action be- 
ing endorsed thereon, the requisition returned 
through the same devious route, and possibly 
might be followed in course of time, either by 
invoices from some distant purchasing agent of 
the required articles, or by directions of the bureau 
chief to make further explanations. The usual 
length of time allowed for an official communi- 
cation through military channels, in time of peace 
at home, from any regimental headquarters to 
Washington and return, is from ten to thirty days. 
Here was the first cause of suffering. 

If the heads of the supply departments in the 
field, beginning at Tampa, could have acted 
promptly upon the orders of their respective com- 
manding officers, without the action of any other 



188 THE GATLING GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 

authority, unnecessary delay would have been 
avoided. 

To illustrate this point: The Gatling Gun De- 
tachment was ordered to be equipped with revolv- 
ers upon reporting to the detachment commander, 
and this order was issued on the 11th of June, 
before sailing from Port Tampa. They did not 
so report, and it devolved upon the detachment 
commander to make requisition for the necessary 
equipment. This was done, but no revolvers ar- 
rived. The invoices for revolvers reached the de- 
tachment commander on the 15th of September, 
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he was then, 
on leave of absence, sick, ten days after the de- 
tachment was disbanded. 

This is an extreme case, but the same difficulty 
was experienced in obtaining supplies of all de- 
scriptions. It was, therefore, very difficult for a 
quartermaster, a commissary, a medical officer, or 
any other officer whose duty it was to obtain sup- 
plies, to have the same when emergency demanded 
it. The necessity for supplies could not always 
be foreseen, the quantity desired could not always 
be estimated for with precision, and it followed 
that sometimes there was a deficiency when the 
articles were needed. 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 189 

Again, the transportation of the 5th Army 
Corps could not be made available at first to carry 
supplies up from the landing-place. The troops 
had drawn travel rations, which lasted them until 
they disembarked. The first supply problem, upon 
landing, was that of issuing rations; and, at the 
moment when every available boat was engaged 
in carrying troops ashore, it became necessary 
to put rations ashore also. The exigency demand- 
ed the speedy disembarkation of the greatest pos- 
sible number of men. The fight of La Guasimas 
emphasized the necessity of getting men to the 
front. It was no time to delay the movement of 
troops for the purpose of waiting on wagons, tent- 
age, or rations. The safety of the expedition, 
the fate of the whole campaign, depended upon 
energetic and rapid movement to the front. Con- 
sequently regiments were put forth with only such 
amounts of rations and tentage as they could 
carry upon their backs. It will be readily seen 
that this amount was very limited, and the only 
tentage possible was the shelter tent. 

There were 118 wagons in the hold of the Chero- 
kee, but it was not practicable to delay the dis- 
embarkation of the corps and hazard the fate of 
the whole campaign by utilizing the only wharf 



190 THE GAT LING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

and all the boats two or three days to land these 
wagons. By the time they could be taken off, the 
pains had made the roads almost impassable, and 
they could not all be used. It was therefore a daily 
struggle to get enough rations forward to food the 
fighting-line from day today. Greatly tothecredit 
of those who performed the duty, it can be >.i : <! 
that, with rare exceptions, all the soldiers of the 
5th Army Corps had every day, when they could 
possibly <-ook the sain-, hardtack and bacon, roast 
beef, and coffee. This much was accomplished in 
the face of insurmountable obstacles by the heroic 
exertions of the pack-train. When the 1st of 
July arrived, and the battle began, it was ordered 
that all soldiers carry three days' rations. The 
heat was intense, the fight exceedingly hot, and 
marching through the jungle extremely difficult. 
The consequence was that the soldiers threw aside 
all impedimenta in order to fight more effectively, 
and, of course, the rations went with the blankets 
and the overcoats. The man who held on to a 
canteen and haversack was fortunate; very many 
abandoned the haversack, and a considerable 
number abandoned everything except rifle and 
ammunition. That was what won the fight; but it 
made hungry men, and it caused men to sleep on 



THE GATLINO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 191 

the wet ground under the open sky, without 
blankets or tentage. The pack-train continued 
its magnificent work. During the fighting it had 
to bring ammunition. The men were supposed 
to have three days' rations. As soon as the defi- 
ciency became known to the higher officials, the 
pack-train began to bring food. Commissary de- 
pots were established immediately in rear of the 
firing-line, and issues of hardtack, bacon, and cof- 
fee, which were about the only components of the 
ration that could be brought forward in sufficient 
quantities, were made without formality or red 
tape. It was almost impossible to get a sufficient 
quantity of even these components to the front. 
Sometimes the ration was a little short. Bacon 
and hardtack for seventeen consecutive days, 
after three weeks of travel ration, do not form the 
most appetizing diet in the world. The exposure 
consequent upon the fighting and lack of tentage 
had its inevitable result in sickness. 

The same difficulties which had beset the quar- 
termaster and commissary departments were also 
encountered by the surgeons. Hospital accom- 
modations were scanty, the quantity of medicines 
available was very limited, the number of wound- 
ed men disproportionately large, and, when sick- 



192 TEE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

ness was added to the wounds, the small number 
of surgeons available at the front were not able 
to give the individual attention and scientific 
treatment which forms a part of our admirable 
medical system in time of peace. There were 
only three or four ambulances available until 
after the 11th of July. A considerable number of 
the surgeons were on duty at the general hospitals 
far in the rear; the number at the front was not 
sufficient to attend to all the duties which de- 
volved upon them. This deplorable condition re- 
acted, causing a greater amount of illness. To 
add to this difficulty, the Volunteers began to 
suffer excessively from the results of their own 
ignorance and carelessness; and when the yel- 
low fever scourge was added to all the other diffi- 
culties which beset the 5th Corps, the outlook be- 
came gloomy. 

The attempt has been made in the foregoing ex- 
position of the conditions at Santiago to repre- 
sent fairly the difficulties under which all parts 
of the army labored. The fact remains, neverthe- 
less, that there was an appalling amount of suffer- 
ing due to causes which might have been foreseen 
and which were easily preventable. 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 193 

On the 18th day of July the transports entered 
the harbor of Santiago. From that day forward 
there was unlimited wharfage at disposal, and 
there were excellent macadamized roads leading to 
all parts of the command. The fall of Santiago had 
been foreseen more than a week, and if there was 
not a sufficient quantity of wagons present on 
board the ships, there had been ample time to 
make telegraphic requisition for them to Wash- 
ington. Up to the surrender, the suffering from 
sickness had been exceedingly light. There was 
something stimulating about the nervous strain 
and excitement of the time which kept the men up 
to their work; but the inadequacy of the medical 
supplies on hand had been amply demonstrated 
by the 10th, and it had become fully apparent that 
the medical corps was unable to handle the number 
of patients on hand. The previous remark about 
the practicability of telegraphing to headquarters 
for additional force applies to this department 
also. 

The principal sufferings after the surrender 
were due to four causes: first, improper clothes; 
second, improper food; third, lack of shelter; 
fourth, lack of proper medical attention. 

In regard to clothing and these other neces- 



194 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

saries, it should be borne in mind that the corps 
which went to Santiago was virtually the Reg- 
ular Army. Every regiment which went to Tampa 
went there ready for service. Its equipment was 
just as complete on the 26th of April as it was on 
the 6th of June. There should have been no prob- 
lems to solve in regard to them — and yet there 
were many. 

First — Clothing. 

The troops wore the same clothing to Cuba 
they had brought from Sheridan, Assinniboine, 
and Sherman. They wore winter clothing for 
their service in the torrid zone, and those who 
received summer clothing at all received it late 
in August, just in time to return to the bracing 
breezes of Montauk Point, where, in their en- 
feebled condition, winter clothing would have 
been more suitable. It did not require a professor 
of hygiene to foresee that the winter clothing used 
in northern Michigan would not be suitable for 
campaigning in southern Cuba in July; or that 
summer clothing suitable for southern Cuba 
would be too light for men returning to the north- 
ern part of Long Island. Is it to be concluded that 
it was impossible to obtain summer clothing for 



THE GATLINO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 195 

18,000 men between the 26th of April and the 6th 
of June? 

Second — Improper Food. 

Most of the troops were embarked upon the 
transports by the 10th of June. Their food on 
transport consisted of the travel ration: canned 
roast beef, canned baked beans, canned tomatoes, 
and hardtack, with coffee, were the components. 
They subsisted upon this food, imprisoned in fetid 
holds of foul transports, unfit for the proper trans- 
portation of convicts, until the 25th day of June, 
when they disembarked. On drawing rations for 
the field, it was found that the field ration would 
be of the same components, with the addition of 
bacon and minus the baked beans and tomatoes. 
During the emergency, up to include the 18th day 
of July, this was the ration. Occasionally a few 
cans of tomatoes found their way to camp, but 
rarely. The ration was always short, such as it 
was, but this the soldiers could have endured 
and did endure without a murmur. 

But on the 18th of July, with unlimited wharf- 
age at a distance of two miles and a half, with 
excellent roads, and with abundance of transpor- 
tation (see Gen. Shafter's Official Report), and 



196 TEE GATLINO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

with surrender foreknown for a sufficient length 
of time to have brought any quantity of vege- 
tables from New York City, the ration continued 
to be bacon, canned beef, hardtack, and coffee. 
Finally, about the 25th of July, small amounts of 
soft bread began to be doled out, and an occasional 
issue of frozen fresh beef was made. It was soon 
demonstrated that not sufficient fresh beef could 
be made available. The vegetables which had been 
brought had nearly all spoiled on the transports. 
Hundreds of barrels of potatoes and onions were 
unloaded upon the docks and were so badly de- 
cayed as to make them useless. These vegetables 
had been drifting about the Caribbean Sea and 
upon the Atlantic Ocean since the 9th and 10th 
of June. Occasionally it was practicable to get a 
quarter or a half ration of potatoes and half of 
the usual allowance of canned tomatoes, but that 
was all. 

It did not require a professor of hygienic dietet- 
ics to predict that men fed in the tropics upon a 
diet suited to the icy shores of Greenland would 
become ill, especially when they were clad in a 
manner suited to the climate of Labrador. Are we 
to conclude that it was impossible to get rice, 



i. 



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i _ 






THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 197 

beans, canned fruits, canned corn, and other vege- 
tables to take the place of potatoes and onions? 

Third — Lack of Shelter. 

The allowance of tentage was prescribed for 
each regiment. Granted that it was impossible to 
get tentage up until after the surrender; jet 
it should have been practicable to forward tent- 
age over two and one-half miles of macadamized 
roads. Yet whole regiments remained without 
tentage until they embarked for the United States. 
The 13th Infantry did not get tentage until the 
5th of August. The 20th Infantry and the 3d 
Infantry obtained a portion of their tentage about 
the same time, but a large part of these regiments 
remained under shelter tents until they reem- 
barked. The 1st Illinois and the 34th Michigan 
remained in shelter tents until the 15th of August, 
at which time the author embarked for the United 
States. These regiments are fair examples. 

The Gatling Gun Detachment was provided 
with shelter-halves and remained under them un- 
til the 10th of August. Repeated applications 
for proper tentage were made, accompanied by 
medical certificates that the issue of tentage 
was imperatively necessary for the health of 



198 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

the command. Endorsements thereon by the chief 
quartermaster of the 5th Corps as late as the 5th 
of August show that there was no available tent- 
age for issue. Application was made to the regi- 
mental commander, 13th Infantry, for a portion 
of regimental tentage for the detachment of the 
13th Infantry; but, in spite of the fact that the 
reduced regiment had on hand all the canvas pre- 
scribed for the full regiment, none could be ob- 
tained for the detachment. The detachment com- 
mander was entirely without tentage from the 
25th of June until the 5th of August — forty-five 
days in the rainy season in Cuba, exposed to the 
torrid sun by day, to chilling dews by night, and 
the drenching rains of the afternoon, without 
shelter from any inclemencies of the weather, and 
this in spite of repeated applications to proper 
authorities for the suitable allowance of tentage. 
Is it any wonder that men grew sick, and that 
death stalked broadcast through the camp of 
the 5th Corps, under these conditions? 

Fourth — Lack of Proper Medical Attendance. 

The surgeons who were at the front with the 
firing-line worked heroically, but were burdened 
beyond their physical powers. Owing to the fore- 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 199 

going causes, great numbers of men became ill as 
soon as the strain and tension of the battle were 
relieved. It was not uncommon to find twenty or 
twenty-five per cent of a command on the sick- 
report, and in some cases the sick-list went as 
high as fifty per cent. There were no well men in 
the 5th Army Corps. Those who refused to go 
on the sick-report were, nevertheless, sick. The 
author has yet to find a single member of the 
expedition who did not suffer from the climatic 
fever. The surgeons themselves were not exempt, 
and the very limited supply of doctors was speed- 
ily decreased by sickness. Were there no doctors 
in the United States who were willing to come to 
Cuba? 

Up to the 25th of July the supply of medicines 
was very deficient. There was never a sufficient 
supply of ambulances. The accommodations in 
the hospitals were even worse than those on the 
firing-line. A sick soldier on the firing-line could 
always find some comrade who would cut green 
boughs or gather grass for a bed, but the one 
who went to the hospital had to lie on the ground. 
The supply of hospital cots was ridiculously in- 
adequate, and this condition did not improve. 



200 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

The difficulty of obtaining adequate medical at- 
tendance may be illustrated by the case of Priv. 
Fred C. Elkins, of the 17th Infantry, member of 
the Gatling Gun Detachment. Priv. Elkins had 
been hurt in the fight on the 1st of July and had 
been sent to the hospital. He found the accommo- 
dations so wretched that he feigned improvement 
and returned to his detachment. He remained with 
the detachment until the 14th of July, improving so 
far as his injury was concerned, but contracted the 
climatic fever. During this time he was prescribed 
for twice by the assistant surgeon with the Rough 
Riders, Dr. Thorpe, previous to the time this reg- 
iment was moved westward on the firing-line. His 
condition became worse, and on the 12th of July 
Dr. Brewer, 1st lieutenant and assistant surgeon 
with the 10th Cavalry, was called upon to examine 
him. This surgeon had then under treatment over 
100 cases pertaining to his proper command, and 
was himself ill, but he readily came and inspected 
the patient. He promised to send medicines for 
him, but in the rush of overwork forgot to do so, 
and on the 13th of July he was again summoned. 
This time he sent a hospital attendant to take the 
patient's temperature, which was 104°. No medi- 
cines were sent. On the 14th of Julythe patient be- 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 201 

came delirious. The detachment commander went 
in person to request the same surgeon to attend to 
the case, he being the only one available at that 
time. The hospital attendant was again ordered to 
take the temperature. At the end of an hour even 
this had been neglected. The hospital man was 
sick, and had been without sleep for fifty hours. 
Priv. Elkins was put upon a board and carried to 
Brewer's tent, with his descriptive list in his 
pocket. The surgeon was told the name of the 
patient and the facts that he was related to a dis- 
tinguished family and had been recommended for 
a commission for gallantry upon the field of battle. 
Dr. Brewer was himself suffering at the time, with 
a temperature of 103°, but he rose from his own 
sick-bed and administered remedies which relieved 
the patient. The following day, the third of his 
illness, Dr. Brewer was found to be suffering from 
yellow fever, and was carried back to the yellow 
fever hospital at Siboney along with Priv. Elkins. 
He had been sick all the time, but had done his 
best. Priv. Elkins improved sufficiently to write 
a letter to his commanding officer from the hos- 
pital at Siboney, on the 25th of July, which 
reached that oflficer at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 
on the 12th day of September. In spite of the fact 



202 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

that the patient was furnished with descriptive 
list, and was specially commended to the care of 
the surgeon as a soldier marked for extreme gal- 
lantry, all trace of him had been lost; and although 
two private detectives were searching for him a 
month, no further clew had been found to his 
whereabouts or fate as late as the 1st of October. 
Even if his descriptive list had not been furnished 
with this man, the fact that he was alive and ra- 
tional enough on the 25th day of July to write a let- 
ter concerning his approaching discharge should 
have made it easy for some record of his case to 
have been kept. 

But this one isolated case sinks into insignifi- 
cance beside the condition in which some of the 
sick were left by commands returning to the 
United States. All cases of yellow fever sus- 
pects were left behind, and in the mad scramble 
to embark for the return voyage many of these 
were left without proper attention or supplies. 

Gen. Kent's Division had left by the 11th of 
August. The following extract from a letter dated 
Santiago de Cuba, August 12, 1898, will convey 
some idea of the condition in which the sick of 
this division were left: 

"Yesterday Gen. Kent's Division left for Mon- 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 203 

tauk, and they left behind 350 sick, many of them 
too ill to care for themselves. This humane coun- 
try, of course, left ample care for them? There was 
left one surgeon, one steward, and one case of 
medicines. Many of these men are too ill to rise. 
They are 'suspected' of having yellow fever. They 
are suffering from Cuban malaria, and many of 
them from diarrhea. There was not left a single 
bedpan for this battalion of bed-ridden, suffering 
humanity, nor any well men to nurse the sick. 
There was not even left any to cook food for them. 
Those left by the 9th Infantry had to bribe ma- 
rauding, pilfering Cubans, with a part of their 
rations, to carry food to the camp of the 13th, 
where there were a few less ill, to get it cooked. 

"They are too sick to dig sinks; some are delir- 
ious. When the poor emaciated wrecks of man- 
hood have to obey the calls of Nature, they must 
either wallow in their own filth or stagger a few 
paces from their wet beds on the slimy soil to de- 
posit more germs of disease and death on the sur- 
face already reeking with ghastly, joint-racking 
rheums. 

"There were left less than fifty cots for these 
350 sick men— men compelled by sheer weakness 
to lie on the ground which will soon lie on them, 



204 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

if enough strong men are left by that time to cover 
them mercifully over with the loathsome, reeking 
vegetable detritus which passes here for soil, and 
which is so fairly animate that you can see every 
spadeful of it writhe and wriggle as you throw it 
over the rotting hour-dead shell of what was a 
free American citizen and a Chevalier Bayard. 

"When the last man and wagon of the flying 
division disappeared over the hill toward health 
and home, a despairing wail went up from the 
doomed 350 left in this condition of indescribable 
horror. 'We are abandoned to die!' they cried; 
'we are deserted by our own comrades in the hour 
of danger and left to helplessly perish !' 

"These men are those who fought the climate, 
hunger, and the enemy on the battle-field which 
has shed so much undying glory on the American 
arms. They are the men who have accomplished 
unheard-of feats of endurance and performed in- 
credible feats of valor on the same ground — not 
for Cuba, but at the call of duly. They are citi- 
zens. They are brave soldiers who have done 
their full duty because it was duty." 

The mail facilities were wretched. Cords of 
mail were stacked up at Siboney for weeks; and 
although there was more transportation on hand 





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TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 205 

than could be used, the officer detailed to attend 
to the mail business of the corps, Lieut. Saville, 
of the 10th Infantry, could not succeed in secur- 
ing a wagon to haul this mail to the front. Since 
the corps returned to the United States a dozen 
letters have reached the author which have chased 
him by way of Santiago and Montauk, since dates 
between the 1st and 20th of July, inclusive. The 
person to whom these letters were addressed was 
well known to every officer and employee in the 
corps, and if the mail addressed to one so well 
known could go astray in this manner, what could 
an unknown private expect? This may seem like 
a little hardship, but to men in the weakened and 
enfeebled condition of the survivors of the 5th 
Corps a letter from home was both food and medi- 
cine. Scores of men who are to-day rotting in 
Cuban graves died of nostalgia, and might have 
lived if they had received the letters from home 
which were sent to them. 



206 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 



CHAPTER XI. 

The Cause. 

The causes of these conditions are not far to 
seek. The United States has not had an army 
since 1866. There has been no such a thing as a 
brigade, a division, or a corps. There has been no 
opportunity to study and practice on a large scale, 
in a practical way, the problems of organization 
and supply. The Army has been administered as 
a unit, and the usual routine of business gradually 
became such that not a wheel could be turned nor 
a nail driven in any of the supply departments 
without express permission, previously obtained 
from the bureau chief in Washington. The same 
remarks apply equally to all the other staff de- 
partments. The administration had become a 
bureaucracy because the whole Army for thirty 
years had been administered as one body, without 
the subdivisions into organizations which are in- 
evitable in war-time and in larger bodies. 

War became a reality with great suddenness. 
Those w 7 ho have grown gray in the service, and 
whose capacity, honesty, and industry had never 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 207 

been and can not be impeached, found them- 
selves confronted with the problem of handling 
nearly three hundred thousand men, without au- 
thority to change the system of supply and trans- 
portation. The minutest acts of officers of these 
departments are regulated by laws of Congress, 
enacted with a view of the small regular force in 
time of peace, and with no provisions for modifi- 
cations in war. In authorizing the formation of 
large volunteer armies, Congress did not author- 
ize any change in the system of administration 
or make any emergency provision. As before, 
every detail of supply and transportation had to 
be authorized from the central head. 

The administrative bureaus were handicapped 
to some extent by incompetent and ignorant mem- 
bers. Late in the campaign it was learned that 
the way to a "soft snap" was through the Capitol, 
and some came in that way who would certainly 
never have entered the Army in any other. 

There were alleged staff officers who had tried 
to enter the service through the regular channels 
and who had failed, either by lack of ability or 
bad conduct, to keep up with the pace set by class- 
mates at the Academy; there were others who 
were known as failures in civil life and as the 



208 TEE GAT LING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

"black sheep"' of eminent families; and there were 
some who must have been utterly unknown before 
the war, as they will be afterward. 

How these persons ever obtained places high 
above deserving officers of capacity and experi- 
ence is a question which cries aloud lor exposure 
— but in a good many cases they did. Indeed, it 
is to be observed that, for that matter, the next 
register of the Army will show, a great many more 
promotions into the Volunteer service, of offi- 
cers who never heard a hostile bullet during the 
war, who never left the United States at all, than 
it will of deserving officers who bore the heat and 
burden of the march and the battle. 

The most discouraging thing about it all to a 
line officer is that this same register will afford 
no means of determining who did the service and 
who did the "baby act." Lieut. Blank will be 
borne thereon as major and subsequently colonel 
of the Steenth Volunteers (which never left the 
State rendezvous, probably) during the war with 
Spain; Lieut. Blank No. 2 will be carried on the 

same book as second lieutenant, Infantry, 

during the same war. The gentle reader will at 
once "spot" the man who was so highly promoted 
as a gallant fellow who distinguished himself 



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TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 209 

upon the bloody field; the other will be set down 
as the man who did nothing and deserved nothing. 

Yet — the ones who went received no promotion, 
and those who staid behind and by their careless 
incompetence permitted camps amid the peaceful 
scenes of homes and plenty to become the hot-beds 
of fever and disease — these are the ones borne as 
field and other officers of the Volunteers. 

To illustrate some of the material with big titles 
sent to "assist" in running the staff departments, 
two incidents will suffice. 

On the 11th of June, at a certain headquarters, 
it was desired to send a message, demanding reply, 
to each transport. A gray-haired officer turned 
to another and said, "Whom shall we send with 
this? Will So-and-so do?" naming one of the be- 
fore-mentioned civil appointments. "For heaven's 
sake, no! He would tie up the whole business. 
Send an orderly," was the reply. The orderly, an 
enlisted man of the Regulars, was sent. The offi- 
cer thus adjudged less competent to carry a mes- 
sage than a private soldier was perhaps actuated 
by a high sense of duty; but he filled a place which 
should have been occupied by an experienced and 
able officer— no, he did not fill it, but he prevented 
such a man from doing so. 



210 THE OATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

The second incident was related by an officer 
on a transport bound for home. Say his name 
was — oh well, Smith. 

Smith went, on the 20th of July, to a certain 
headquarters in the field on business. Those who 
could have attended to it were absent, but there 
was one of the recent arrivals, a high-ranking aide, 
there, and he, sorry for Smith's worn-out look of 
hunger, heat, and thirst, asked if he would have 
a drink. Smith, expecting at the best a canteen 
of San Juan River water, said he was a little dry. 

The newly-arrived clapped his hands, and, at the 
summons, a colored waiter in spotless white duck 
appeared. "Waitah, take this gentleman's ordah," 
said the host. Smith, greatly astonished, asked 
what could be had, and was yet more astonished 
to learn that he could be served with Canadian 
or domestic whisky, claret, champagne, or sherry. 
Much bewildered, and utterly forgetting the aw- 
ful dangers of liquor in the tropics, he called for 
Canadian Club. When it came, on a napkin-cov- 
ered tray, he looked for water, and was about to 
use some from a bucket full of ice which he at 
that moment espied. "Aw! hold on," exclaimed 
the host; "we nevah use that, don't y' know, ex- 
cept to cool the apollinaris. Waitah, bring the 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 211 

gentleman a bottle of apollinaris to wash down 
his liquor." 

Within half a mile were soldiers and officers 
lying sick in hospital on the ground, eating hard- 
tack and bacon, and drinking San Juan straight, 
because hospital supplies and rations could not 
be got to the front! 

It was this same officer who explained that he 
approached his headquarters "by rushes," upon 
his arrival, for fear the enemy would see him and 
consider this reinforcement a violation of the 
truce. 

These are two examples of some of the able as- 
sistants from civil life who were sent to help feed, 
clothe, and transport the 5th Corps. 

With such assistants, is it any wonder that, un- 
der such extraordinary circumstances as those en- 
countered in Cuba, a system designed for peace 
and 25,000 men weakened in some respects when 
the attempt was made to apply it to 300,000 in 
time of war? 

The great wonder is that it did the work as 
well as it did. And this was due to the super- 
human exertions of the chief officers of the supply 
departments and their experienced assistants. 
These men knew no rest. They were untiring 



212 THE GATLING GUNB AT SANTIAGO. 

and zealous. On their own responsibility they out 
the red tape to the very smallest limit. Instead 
of the regular returns and requisitions, the mere- 
est form of lead-pencil memorandum was suffi- 
cient to obtain the necessary supplies, whenever 
they were available. This much was absolutely 
necessary, for these officers were personally re- 
sponsible for every dollar's worth of supplies and 
had to protect themselves in some degree. As it 
is now, many of them will find it years before their 
accounts are finally settled, unless some provision 
be made by law for their relief. This disregard of 
routine was essential; but how much to be desired 
is a system suited to the exigencies of the service, 
both in peace and war! 

There is a lesson to be learned from these ex- 
periences, and it is this: The commanding officer 
of any army organization should not be hampered 
in the matter of supplies by having to obtain the 
approval or disapproval of a junior in rank, in a 
distant bureau, who knows nothing about the cir- 
cumstances. In other words, the system which 
causes the staff departments of the United States 
Army to regard a civilian as their head, and makes 
them virtually independent of their line command- 
ers, is an utterly vicious system. If an officer is 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 213 

competent to command an organization, he should 
be considered competent to look after the details 
of its administration, and should be held responsi- 
ble, not only for its serviceable condition at all 
times, but for the care of its property and for all 
the other details connected with its service. 

The quartermaster, or commissary, or other offi- 
cer of a supply department should not know any 
authority on earth higher or other than the officer 
in command of the force he is to serve, except 
those in the line above such chief, and then only 
when such orders come through his chief. 

The commanding officer having ordered supplies 
to be procured, there should be no question what- 
ever in regard to their being furnished. They 
should come at once and without fail. If they 
were not necessary, hold him responsible. 

This theory of administration eliminates the 
bureaucracy which has insidiously crept upon the 
Army, and relegates to their proper position the 
supply departments. 

The General Staff proper has a higher field of 
usefulness than the mere problems of supply. 
Its business is to care for the organization, mobil- 
ization, and strategic disposition of all the forces, 
both naval and military, of the United States. 



214 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

Its head should be the President, and the two divi- 
sions should be under the general commanding 
the Army and the admiral commanding the Navy. 
The remainder of this staff should be composed of 
a small but select personnel, and should limit its 
duties exclusively to those set forth above. 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 215 



CHAPTER XII. 

The Voyage Home and the End of the Gatling 
Gun Detachment. 

The detachment received permission on the 10th 
of August to use any standing tentage which it 
could find, and it was thoroughly under shelter an 
hour after this permission was received. The cli- 
mate of Cuba was not so disagreeable when one 
could look at it through the door of a tent, but we 
were not destined to enjoy our tentage very long. 
On the 15th, at two o'clock, orders were received to 
go on board the Leona at Santiago, bound for Mon- 
tauk Point, and at half-past five o'clock men, 
guns, and equipment were duly stowed for the 
voyage home. 

It was much more agreeable than the one to 
Cuba. The transport was not crowded, the men 
had excellent hammocks, which could be rolled 
up during the day, thus leaving the whole berth 
deck for exercise and ventilation, and the Leona 
was a much better vessel than the Cherokee. 

The detachment finally disembarked at Mon- 
tauk Point on the 23d, passed through the usual 



216 THE GAT LING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

detention camp, and was assigned a camping- 
place. It was disbanded per instructions from 
headquarters, Montauk Point, on the 5th of Sep- 
tember, the members of the detachment returning 
to their respective regiments, well satisfied with 
the work they had done and with each other. 

In concluding this memoir the author desires 
to pay a personal tribute of admiration and re- 
spect to the brave men composing the detachment, 
both individually and collectively. Some of them 
have figured more prominently in these pages than 
others, but there was not a man in the detachment 
who was not worthy to be called the highest term 
that can be applied to any man — a brave Ameri- 
can soldier. 

The End. 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 217 



APPENDIX I. 

Headquarters U. S. Troops, 
Santiago de Cuba, July 19, 1898. 
General Orders No. 26. 

The successful accomplishment of the campaign 
against Santiago de Cuba, resulting in its downfall and 
surrender of Spanish forces, the capture of large mili- 
tary stores, together with the destruction of the entire 
Spanish fleet in the harbor, which, upon the investment 
of the city, was forced to leave, is one of which the Army 
can well be proud. 

This has been accomplished through the heroic deeds 
of the Army and its officers and men. The major-general 
commanding offers his sincere thanks for their endurance 
of hardships heretofore unknown in the American Army. 

The work you have accomplished may well appeal to 
the pride of your countrymen and has been rivaled upon 
but few occasions in the world's history. Landing upon 
an unknown coast, you faced dangers in disembarking 
and overcame obstacles that even in looking back upon 
seem insurmountable. Seizing, with the assistance of the 
Navy, the towns of Baiquiri and Siboney, you pushed 
boldly forth, gallantly driving back the enemy's out- 
posts in the vicinity of La Guasimas, and completed 
the concentration of the army near Sevilla, within sight 
of the Spanish stronghold at Santiago de Cuba. The out- 
look from Sevilla was one that might have appalled 



218 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

the stoutest heart. Behind you ran a narrow road made 
well-nigh impassable by rains, while to the front you 
looked upon high foot-hills covered with a dense tropical 
growth, which could only be traversed by bridle-paths 
terminating within range of the enemy's guns. Nothing 
daunted, you responded eagerly to the order to close upon 
the foe, and, attacking at El Caney and San Juan, drove 
him from work to work until he took refuge within his 
last and strongest entrenchment immediately surround- 
ing the city. Despite the fierce glare of a Southern sun, 
and rains that fell in torrents, you valiantly withstood 
his attempts to drive you from the position your valor 
had won, holding in your vise-like grip the army op- 
posed to you. After seventeen days of battle and siege, 
you were rewarded by the surrender of nearly 24,000 
prisoners, 12,000 being those in your immediate front, 
the others scattered in the various towns of eastern Cuba, 
freeing completely the eastern part of the island from 
Spanish troops. 

This was not done without great sacrifices. The death 
of 230 gallant soldiers and the wounding of 1,284 others 
shows but too plainly the fierce contest in which you were 
engaged. The few reported missing are undoubtedly 
among the dead, as no prisoners were taken. For those 
who have fallen in battle, with you the commanding 
general sorrows, and with you will ever cherish their 
memory. Their devotion to duty sets a high example 
of courage and patriotism to our fellow-countrymen. 
All who have participated in the campaign, battle, and 
siege of Santiago de Cuba will recall with pride the 
grand deeds accomplished, and will hold one another 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 219 

dear for having shared great suffering, hardships, and 
triumphs together. 

All may well feel proud to inscribe on their banners 
the name of Santiago de Cuba. 

By command of Major-General Shafter. 

Official: John B. Miley, E. J. McClernand, 

Aide. Asst. Adj. -Gen. 



220 THE GATLING GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 

APPENDIX II. 

The Santiago Campaign. 

Report of Major-General Wm. R. Shafter, Commanding. 

September 13, 1898. 

Sir, — I have the honor to submit the following report 
of the campaign which terminated in the fall of Sant- 
iago de Cuba and the adjacent territory, and the estab- 
lishment of the military government therein. 

The expedition was undertaken in compliance with 
telegraphic instructions of May 30, 1898, from Head- 
quarters of the Army, in which it was stated: 

"Admiral Schley reports that two cruisers and two 
topedo boats have been seen in the harbor of Santiago. 
Go with your force to capture garrison at Santiago and as- 
sist in capturing harbor and fleet." 

On this date there were a large number of transports 
in Port Tampa Bay. which had been collected for the 
purpose of an expedition which it had been previously 
contemplated I should command, and for such other 
emergencies as might arise. Orders were immediately 
given for loading aboard those transports the necessary 
subsistence and quartermaster supplies, and for the em- 
barkation of the authorized number of troops and their 
material. General Orders No. 5, from these headquarters, 
indicate the organizations it was at first proposed to take. 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 221 

The order is as follows: 

"Headquarters 5th Army Corps, 
"G. O. 5. Tampa, Fla., May 31, 1898. 

"The following troops will hold themselves in readi- 
ness to move immediately on board transports upon noti- 
fication from these headquarters: 

"1. The 5th Army Corps. 

"2. The Battalion of Engineers. 

"3. The detachment of the Signal Corps. 

"4. Five squadrons of cavalry, to be selected by the 
commanding general of the cavalry division, in accord- 
ance with instructions previously given. 

"5. Four batteries of light artillery, to be commanded 
by a major, to be selected by the commanding officer of 
the light artillery brigade. 

"6. Two batteries of heavy artillery, to be selected by 
the commanding officer of the siege artillery battalion, 
with eight (8) guns and eight (8) field mortars. 

"7. The Battalion of Engineers, the infantry and cav- 
alry will be supplied with 500 rounds of ammunition per 
man. 

"8. All troops will carry, in addition to the fourteen 
(14) days' field rations now on hand, ten (10) days' travel 
rations. 

"9. The minimum allowance of tentage and baggage 
as prescribed in G. 0. 54, A. G. O., c. s., will be taken. 

"10. In addition to the rations specified in paragraph 
8 of this order, the chief commissary will provide sixty 
(60) days' field rations for the entire command. 

"11. All recruits and extra baggage, the latter to be 
stored, carefully piled and covered, will be left in camp 



222 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

in charge of a commissioned officer, to be selected by the 
regimental commander. Where there are no recruits 
available, the necessary guard only will be left. 

"12. Travel rations will be drawn at once by the sev- 
eral commands, as indicated in paragraph 8. 

"By comamnd of Maj.-Gen. Shafter. 

"E. J. McGlernand, 
"A. A. G." 

This order was afterwards changed to include twelve 
squadrons of cavalry, all of which were dismounted 
because of lack of transportation for the animals, and 
because it w r as believed, from the best sources of infor- 
mation obtainable, that mounted cavalry could not oper- 
ate efficiently in the neighborhood of Santiago. This 
was found subsequently to be correct. 

The facilities at Tampa and Port Tampa for embark- 
ing the troops and the large amount of supplies re- 
quired were inadequate, and with the utmost effort it 
was not possible to accomplish this work as quickly as 
I hoped and desired. 

On the evening of June 7th I received orders to sail 
without delay, but not with less than 10,000 men. 

The orders referred to caused one division, composed 
of Volunteer troops, commanded by Brig. -Gen. Snyder, 
and which it had been intended to include in my com- 
mand, to be left behind. I was joined, however, by Brig.- 
Gen. Bates, who had already arrived on transports from 
Mobile, Ala., with the 3d and 20th Infantry and one 
squadron of the 2d Cavalry with their horses, the latter 
being the only mounted troops in my command. 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 223 

After some of them had already reached the lower 
bay, telegraphic instructions were received from the 
honorable Secretary of War, directing that the sailing of 
the expedition be delayed, waiting further orders. This 
delay was occasioned by the Navy reporting that a Span- 
ish war vessel had been sighted in the Nicholas Channel. 
The ships in the lower bay were immediately recalled. 
On the next day, in compliance with instructions from 
the adjutant-general of the Army, the necessary steps 
were taken to increase the command to the full capacity 
of the transports, and the expedition sailed on June 14th 
with 815 officers and 16,072 enlisted men. 

The passage to Santiago was generally smooth and 
uneventful. The health of the command remained re- 
markably good, notwithstanding the fact that the con- 
veniences on many of the transports, in the nature of 
sleeping accommodations, space for exercise, closet accom- 
modations, etc., were not all that could have been de- 
sired. While commenting upon this subject, it is appro- 
priate to add that the opinion was general throughout 
the Army that the travel ration should include tomatoes, 
beginning with the first day, and that a small quantity 
of canned fruit would prove to be a most welcome ad- 
dition while traveling at sea in the tropics. If the fu- 
ture policy of our Government requires much transpor- 
tation for the military forces by sea, definite arrange- 
ments should be determined upon to provide the neces- 
sary hammock accommodations for sleeping. Ham- 
mocks interfere immeasurably less than bunks with the 
proper ventilation of the ships and during the day can 



224 THE GATLING GUNS AT 8 AX T I AGO. 

be easily removed, thus greatly increasing space for ex- 
ercise; moreover, they greatly diminish the danger of 
fire. 

AVhile passing along the north coast of Cuba one of 
the two barges we had in tow broke away during the 
night, and was not recovered. This loss proved to be 
very serious, for it delayed and embarassed the disem- 
barkation of the army. On the morning of June 20th 
we arrived off Guantanamo Bay, and about noon reached 
the vicinity of Santiago, where Admiral Sampson came 
on board my headquarters transport. It was arranged 
between us to visit in the afternoon the Cuban general 
(Garcia) at Aserraderos, about eighteen miles to the west 
of the Morro. During the interview Gen. Garcia offered 
the services of his troops, comprising about 4,000 men 
in the vicinity of Aserraderos and about 500, under Gen. 
Castillo, at the little town of Cujababo, a few miles 
east of Baiquiri. I accepted his offer, impressing it 
upon him that I could exercise no military control over 
him except such as he would concede, and as long as 
he served under me I would furnish him rations and 
ammunition. 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 225 



DISEMBARKATION IN CUBA. 

Ever since the receipt of my orders I had made a 
study of the terrain surrounding Santiago, gathering in- 
formation mainly from the former residents of the city, 
several of whom were on the transports with me. At 
this interview all the possible points of attack were for 
the last time carefully weighed, and then, for the infor- 
mation and guidance of Admiral Sampson and Gen. 
Garcia, I outlined the plan of campaign, which was as 
follows: 

With the assistance of the small boats of the Navy, 
the disembarkation was to commence on the morning 
of the 22d at Baiquiri; on the 21st 500 insurgent troops 
were to be transferred from Aserraderos to Cujababo, 
increasing the force already there to 1,000 men. This 
force, under Gen. Castillo, was to attack the Spanish 
force at Baiquiri in the rear at the time of disembarka- 
tion. This movment was successfully made. To mis- 
lead the enemy as to the real point of our intended land- 
ing, I requested Gen. Garcia to send a small force (about 
500 men), under Gen. Rabi, to attack the little town of 
Cabanas, situated on the coast a few miles to the west 
of the entrance to Santiago harbor, and where it was 
reported the enemy had several men intrenched, and 
from which a trail leads around the west side of the bay 
to Santiago. 

I also requested Admiral Sampson to send several 
of his warships, with a number of my transports, oppo- 



226 THE GATLING GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 

site this town, for the purpose of making a show of dis- 
embarking there. 

In addition, I asked the admiral to cause a bombard- 
ment to be made at Cabanas and also at the forts around 
the Morro and at the towns of Aguadores, Siboney, and 
Baiquiri. The troops under Gen. Garcia remaining at 
Aserraderos were to be transferred to Baiquiri or Sib- 
oney on the 24th. This was successfully accomplished 
at Siboney. 

These movements committed me to approaching Sant- 
iago from the east over a narrow mad. at first in some 
places not better than a trail, running from Baiquiri 
through Siboney and Sevilla, and making attack from 
that quarter. This, in my judgment, was the only feas- 
ible plan, and subsequent information and results con- 
firmed my judgment. 

On the morning of the 22d the Army commenced to 
disembark at Baiquiri. The following general order in- 
dicates the manner in which the troops left the trans- 
ports and the amount of supplies carried immediately with 
them: 

"Headquarters 5 th Army Corps, 
"On board S. S. Segwranga, 
"G. O. 18. "At Sea. June 20, 1898. 

(Extract.) 

"1. Under instructions to be communicated to the 
proper commanders, troops will disembark in the follow- 
ing order: 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 227 

"First— The 2d Division, 5th Corps (Lawton's). The 
Gatling Gun Detachment will accompany this division. 

"Second — Gen. Bates' Brigade. This brigade will form 
as a reserve to the 2d Division, 5th Corps. 

"Third — The dismounted cavalry division (Wheeler's). 

"Fourth— The 1st Division, 5th Corps (Kent's). 

"Fifth— The squadron of the 2d Cavalry (Rafferty's). 

"Sixth— If the enemy in force vigorously resist the 
landing, the light artillery, or a partof it, will be disem- 
barked by the battalion commander, and brought to the 
assistance of the troops engaged. If no serious opposi- 
tion be offered this artillery will be unloaded after the 
mounted squadron. 

"2. All troops will carry on the person the blanket- 
roll (with shelter-tent and poncho), three days' field ra- 
tions (with coffee, ground), canteens filled, and 100 rounds 
of ammunition per man. Additional ammunition, al- 
ready issued to the troops, tentage, baggage, and com- 
pany cooking utensils will be left under charge of the 
regimental quartermaster, with one non-commissioned 
officer and two privates from each company. 

"3. All persons not immediately on duty with and 
constituting a part of the organizations mentioned in the 
foregoing paragraphs will remain aboard ship until the 
landing be accomplished, and until notified they can land. 

"4. The chief quartermaster of the expedition will 
control all small boats and will distribute them to the 
best advantage to disembark the troops in the order indi- 
cated in paragraph 1. 

"5. The ordnance officer— 2d Lieut. Brooke, 4th Infan- 
try—will put on shore at once 100 rounds of ammunition 



228 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

per man, and have it ready for distribution on the firing- 
line. 

"6. The commanding general wishes to impress offi- 
cers and men with the crushing effect a well-directed 
fire will have upon the Spanish troops. All officers con- 
cerned will rigidly enforce fire discipline, and will caution 

their men to fire only when they can he see the enemy. 
************* 

"By command of Maj.-Gen. Shatter. 

"E. J. McGlernand, 
"A. A. G." 

The small boats belonging to the Navy and the trans- 
ports, together with a number of steam launches, fur- 
nished by the Navy, were brought alongside and loaded 
with troops as prescribed in the order just quoted. 
When Gen. Lawton's Division was fairly loaded in the 
small boats, the latter were towed in long lines by the 
steam launches toward the shore. The sea was some- 
what rough, but by the exercise of caution and good 
judgment the beach was reached and the troops disem- 
barked satisfactorily. As a precaution against a possible 
attack upon the part of any Spaniards who might have 
been hidden in the adjacent block-houses and woods, the 
Navy opened a furious cannonade on these places while 
the troops were moving toward the shore. It was learned 
afterward that the Spanish garrison had retired in the 
direction of Siboney soon after daylight. 

By night about 6,000 troops were on shore. Gen. Law- 
ton was ordered to push down a strong force to seize 
and hold Siboney. 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 229 

On the 23d the disembarkation was continued and 
about 6,000 more men landed. Early on this date Gen. 
Lawton's advance reached Siboney, the Spanish garri- 
son of about 600 men retiring as he came up, and offer- 
ing no opposition except a few scattering shots at long 
range. Some of the Cuban troops pursued the retreat- 
ing Spaniards and skirmished with them. During the 
afternoon of this date the disembarkation of Kent's Di- 
vision was commenced at Siboney, which enabled me to 
establish a base eight miles nearer Santiago and to con- 
tinue the unloading of troops and suppplies at both 
points. 

The disembarkation was continued throughout the 
night of the 23d and 24th, and by the evening of the 24th 
the disembarkation of my command was practically 
completed. 



230 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 



PREPARING FOR THE ADVANCE. 

The orders for June 24th contemplated Gen. Lawton's 
Division taking a strong defensive position a short dis- 
tance from Siboney, on the road to Santiago; Kent's Di- 
vision was to be held near Santiago, where he disem- 
barked; Bates' Brigade was to take position in support 
of Lawton, while Wheeler's Division was to be some- 
what to the rear on the road from Siboney to Baiquiri. 
It was intended to maintain this situation until the 
troops and transportation were disembarked and a rea- 
sonable quantity of necessary supplies landed. Gen. 
Young's Brigade, however, passed beyond Lawton on the 
night of the 23d-24th, thus taking the advance, and on 
the morning of the latter date became engaged with a 
Spanish force intrenched in a strong position at La Guas- 
ima, a point on the Santiago road about three miles from 
Siboney. Gen. Young's force consisted of one squadron 
of the 1st Cavalry, one of the 10th Cavalry, and two of 
the 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry; in all, 964 offi- 
cers and men. 

The enemy made an obstinate resistance, but were 
driven from the field with considerable loss. Our own 
loss was 1 officer and 15 men killed, 6 officers and 4G men 
wounded. The reported losses of the Spaniards were 9 
killed and 27 wounded. The engagement had an inspiring 
effect upon our men and doubtless correspondingly de- 
pressed the enemy, as it was now plainly demonstrated 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 231 

to them that they had a foe to meet who would advance 
upon them under a heavy fire delivered from intrench- 
ments. Gen. Wheeler, division commander, was present 
during the engagement and reports that our troops, offi- 
cers and men, fought with the greatest gallantry. His 
report is attached, marked "A." This engagement gave 
us a well-watered country farther to the front on which to 
encamp our troops. 

My efforts to unload transportation and subsistence 
stores, so that we might have several days' rations on 
shore, were continued during the remainder of the month. 
In this work I was ably seconded by Lieut.-Col. Charles F. 
Humphrey, deputy Q. M. G., U. S. A., chief quarter- 
master, and Col. John F. Weston, A. C. G. S., chief com- 
missary; but, notwithstanding the utmost efforts, it was 
difficult to land supplies in excess of those required daily 
to feed the men and animals, and the loss of the scow, 
mentioned as having broken away during the voyage, 
as well as the loss at sea of lighters sent by Quartermas- 
ter's Department was greatly felt. Indeed, the lack of 
steam launches, lighters, scows, and wharves can only 
be appreciated by those who were on the ground direct- 
ing the disembarkation and landing of supplies. It was 
not until nearly two weeks after the army landed that 
it was possible to place on shore three days' supplies in 
excess of those required for the daily consumption. 

After the engagement at La Guasima, and before the 
end of the month, the army, including Gen. Garcia's 
command, which had been brought on transports to Si- 
boney from Aserraderos, was mostly concentrated at Se- 



232 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

villa, with the exception of the necessary detachments 
at Baiquiri and Siboney. 

On June 30th I reconnoitered the country about San- 
tiago and made my plan of attack. From a high hill, from 
which the city was in plain view, I could see the San 
Juan Hill and the country about El Caney. The roads 
were very poor, and, indeed, little better than bridle- 
paths until the San Juan River and El Caney were 
reached. 

The position of El Caney, to the northeast of Santi- 
ago, was of great importance to the enemy as holding the 
Guantanamo road, as well as furnishing shelter for a 
strong outpost that might be used to assail the right 
flank of any force operating against San Juan Hill. 

In view of this, I decided to begin the attack next 
day at El Caney with one division, while sending two 
divisions on the direct road to Santiago, passing by the 
El Pozo house, and as a diversion to direct a small force 
against Aguadores, from Siboney along the railroad by 
the sea, with a view of attracting the attention of the 
Spaniards in the latter direction and of preventing them 
from attacking our left flank. 

During the afternoon I assembled the division com- 
manders and explained to them my general plan of bat- 
tle. Lawton's Division, assisted by Capron's Light Bat- 
tery, was ordered to move out during the afternoon to- 
ward El Caney, to begin the attack there early the next 
morning. After carrying El Caney, Lawton was to move 
by the El Caney road toward Santiago, and take position 
on the right of the line. Wheeler's Division of dismount- 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 233 

ed cavalry, and Kent's Division of infantry, were direct- 
ed on the Santiago road, the head of the column resting 
near El Pozo, toward which heights Grimes' Battery 
moved on the afternoon of the 30th, with orders to take 
position thereon early the next morning, and at the 
proper time prepare the way for the advance of Wheeler 
and Kent, on San Juan Hill. The attack at this point 
was to be delayed until Lawton's guns were heard at El 
Caney and his infantry fire showed he had become well 
engaged. 

The remainder of the afternoon and night was devoted 
to cutting out and repairing the roads, and other nec- 
essary preparations for battle. These preparations were 
far from what I desired them to be, but we were in a 
sickly climate; our supplies had to be brought forward 
by a narrow wagon road, which the rains might at any 
time render impassable; fear was entertained that a 
storm might drive the vessels containing our stores to 
sea, thus separating us from our base of supplies; and, 
lastly, it was reported that Gen. Pando, with 8,000 re- 
inforcements for the enemy, was en route from Manza- 
nillo, and might be expected in a few days. Under these 
conditions, I determined to give battle without delay. 



234 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 



THE BATTLE OF EL CANEY. 

Early on the morning of July 1st, Lawton was in 
position around El Caney, Chaffee's Brigade on the right, 
across the Guantanamo road, Miles' Brigade in the cen- 
ter, and Ludlow's on the left. The duty of cutting off 
the enemy's retreat along the Santiago road was assigned 
to the latter brigade. The artillery opened on the town 
at 6:15 a. m. The battle here soon became general, and 
was hotly contested. The enemy's position was nat- 
urally strong, and was rendered more so by block-houses, 
a stone fort, and intrenchments cut in solid rock, and 
the loop-holing of a solidly built stone church. The oppo- 
sition offered by the enemy was greater than had been 
anticipated, and prevented Lawton from joining the right 
of the main line during the day, as had been intended. 
After the battle had continued for some time, Bates' Bri- 
gade of two regiments reached my headquarters from 
Siboney. I directed him to move near El Caney, to give 
assistance if necessary. He did so, and was put in posi- 
tion between Miles and Chaffee. The battle continued 
with varying intensity during most of the day and until 
the place was carried by assault about 4:30 p. m. As 
the Spaniards endeavored to retreat along the Santiago 
road, Ludlow's position enabled him to do very effective 
work, and to practically cut off all retreat in that 
direction. 

After the battle at El Caney was well opened, and 
the sound of the small-arm fire caused us to believe that 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 235 

Lawton was driving the enemy before him, I directed 
Grimes' Battery to open fire from the heights of El 
Pozo on the San Juan block-house, which could be seen 
situated in the enemy's intrenchments extending along 
the crest of San Juan Hill. This fire was effective, and 
the enemy could be seen running away from the vicinity 
of the block-house. The artillery fire from El Pozo was 
soon returned by the enemy's artillery. They evidently 
had the range of this hill, and their first shells killed 
and wounded several men. As the Spaniards used 
smokeless powder, it was very difficult to locate the posi- 
tion of their pieces, while, on the contrary, the smoke 
caused by our black powder plainly indicated the posi- 
tion of our battery. 

At this time the cavalry division, under Gen. Sum- 
ner, which was lying concealed in the general vicinity 
of the El Pozo house, was ordered forward with direc- 
tions to cross the San Juan River and deploy to the right 
of the Santiago side, while Kent's Division was to follow 
closely in its rear and deploy to the left. 

These troops moved forward in compliance with or- 
ders, but the road was so narrow as to render it imprac- 
ticable to retain the column of fours formation at all 
points, while the undergrowth on either side was so 
dense as to preclude the possibility of deploying skirmish- 
ers. It naturally resulted that the progress made was 
slow, and the long-range rifles of the enemy's infantry 
killed and wounded a number of our men while march- 
ing along this road, and before there was any opportu- 
nity to return this fire. At this time Generals Kent and 
Sumner were ordered to push forward with all possible 



236 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

baste and place their troops in position to engage the 
enemy. Gen. Kent, with this end in view, forced the 
head of his column alongside of the cavalry column as 
far as the narrow trail permitted, and thus hurried his 
arrival at the San Juan and the formation beyond that 
stream. A few hundred yards before reaching the San 
Juan the road forks, a fact that was discovered hy Lieut. - 
Col. Derby of my staff, who had approached well to the 
front in a war balloon. This information he furnished 
to the troops, resulting in Sumner moving on the right- 
hand road, while Kent was enabled to utilize the road 
to the left. 

Gen. Wheeler, the permanent commander of the cav- 
alry division, who had been ill, came forward during 
rlie morning, and later returned to duty and rendered 
most gallant and efficient service during the remainder 
of the day. 

After crossing the stream, the cavalry moved to the 
right with a view of connecting with Lawton's left, 
when he could come up, and with their left resting near 
the Santiago road. 

In the mantime Kent's Division, with the exception 
of two regiments of Hawkins' Brigade, being thus un- 
covered, moved rapidly to the front from the forks pre- 
viously mentioned in the road, utilizing both trails, but 
more especially the one to the left, and. crossing the 
creek, formed for attack in front of San Juan Hill. 
During the formation the 2d Brigade suffered severely. 
While personally superintending this movement, its gal- 
lant commander, Col. Wlkoff, was killed. The command 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 237 

of the brigade then devolved upon Lieut.-Col. Worth, 
13th Infantry, who was soon severely wounded, and 
next upon Lieut.-Col. Liscum, 24th Infantry, who, five 
minutes later, also fell under the terrible fire of the ene- 
my, and the command of the brigade then devolved upon 
Lieut.-Col. Ewers, 9th Infantry. 

While the formation just described was taking place, 
Gen. Kent took measures to hurry forward his rear bri- 
gade. The 10th and 2d Infantry were ordered to fol- 
low. Wikoff's Brigade, while the 21st was sent on the 
right-hand road to support the 1st Brigade, under Gen. 
Hawkins, who had crossed the stream and formed on 
the right of the division. The 2d and 10th Infantry, 
Col. E. P. Pearson commanding, moved forward in good 
order on the left of the division, passed over a green 
knoll, and drove the enemy back toward his trenches. 

After completing their formation under a destructive 
fire, and advancing a short distance, both divisions found 
in their front a wide bottom, in which had beeu placed 
a barbed-wire entanglement, and beyond which there was 
a high hill, along the crest of which the enemy was 
strongly posted. Nothing daunted, these gallant men 
pushed on to drive the enemy from his chosen position, 
both divisions losing heavily. In this assault Col. Ham- 
ilton, Lieuts. Smith and Shipp were killed, and Co?. Car- 
roll, Lieuts. Thayer and Myer, all in the cavalry, were 
wounded. 

Great credit is due to Brig.-Gen. H. S. Hawkins, who, 
placing himself between his regiments, urged them on 



238 THE Q \ I Li VQ Gl VB M 8ANT1 L0O. 

by voice and bugle calls to the attack so brilliantly 
executed. 

In this fierce encounter words fail to do justice to the 
gallant regimental commanders and their heroic men, 
for, while the generals indicated the formations and the 
points of attack, it was, after all, the Intrepid bn 
of the subordinate officers and men thai planted our col- 
ors on the crest of Ban Juan inn and drove the enemy 
from his trenches and block-houses, thus gaining a posi- 
tion which Bealed the fate Of Santiago. 

/// this action mi this part of tin fa hi must efficient iff- 

via was rendered />!/ Lieut. -f<>hn 11. Parker, tSth Infantry, 

(Dal tin Gatling enn i>< t<i<-iim> at under his oommand. The 
fighting continued <it Intervals until nightfall, hut our men 
in til resolutely t<> the positions <j<iin<<i at tin cost of s<> much 
blood ")i<i toil. 

I am greatly indehted to Gen. Wheeler, who, as pre- 
viously stated, returned from the sick-list to duty during 
the afternoon. His cheerfulness and aggressiveness made 
itself felt on this part of the battle-field, and the infor- 
mation he furnished to me at various stages of the bat- 
tle proved to be most useful. 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 239 



THE BATTLE OF SANTIAGO. 

My own health was impaired by overexertion in the 
sun and intense heat of the day before, which prevented 
me from participating as actively in the battle as I de- 
sired; but from a high hill near my headquarters I had 
a general view of the battle-field, extending from El 
Caney on the right to the left of our lines on San Juan 
Hill. His staff officers were stationed at various points 
on the field, rendering frequent reports, and through them, 
by the means of orderlies and the telephone, I was en- 
abled to transmit my orders. During the afternoon I 
visited the position of Grimes' Battery on the heights of 
El Pozo, and saw Sumner and Kent in firm possession of 
San Juan Hill, which I directed should be intrenched 
during the night. My engineer ofiicer, Lieut.-Col. Derby, 
collected and sent forward the necessary tools, and dur- 
ing the night trenches of very considerable strength were 
constructed. 

During the afternoon, Maj. Dillenback, by my order, 
brought forward the two remaining batteries of his bat- 
talion and put them in position at El Pozo, to the left 
of Grimes. Later in the afternoon all three batteries 
were moved forward to positions near the firing-line, 
but the nature of the country and the intensity of the 
enemy's small-arm fire was such that no substantial re- 
sults were gained by our artillery in the new positions. 
The batteries were intrenched during the night. Gen. 
Duffield, with the 33d Michigan, attacked Aguadores, as 



240 THE CATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

ordered, but was unable to accomplish more than to de- 
tain the Spaniards in that vicinity. 

After the brilliant and important victory gained at El 
Caney, Lawton started his tried troops, who had been 
fighting all day and marching much of the night before, 
to connect with the right of the cavalry division. Night 
came on before this movement could be accomplished. 
In the darkness the enemy's pickets were encountered, 
and the division commander, being uncertain of the 
ground and as to what might be in his front, halted 
his command and reported the situation to me. This in- 
formation was received about 12:30 a. m., and I directed 
Gen. Lawton to return by my headquarters and the El 
Pozo house as the only certain way of gaining his new 
position. 

This was done, and the division took position on the 
right of the cavalry early next morning; Chaffee's Bri- 
gade arriving first, about half-past seven, and the other 
brigades before noon. 

On the night of July 1st, I ordered Gen. Duffield, at 
Siboney, to send forward the 34th Michigan and the 9th 
Massachusetts. Both of which had just arrived from 
the United States. These regiments reached the front 
the next morning. The 34th was placed in rear of Kent, 
and the 9th was assigned to Bates, who placed it on his 
left. 

Soon after daylight on July 2d the enemy opened bat- 
tle, but because of the intrenchments made during the 
night, the approach of Lawton's Division, and the pres- 
ence of Bates' Brigade, which had taken position during 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 241 

the night on Kent's left, little apprehension was felt as 
to our ability to repel the Spaniards. 

It is proper here to state that Gen. Bates and his 
brigade had performed most arduous and efficient ser- 
vice, having marched much of the night of June 30th- 
July 1st, and a good part of the latter day, during which 
he also participated in the battle of El Caney, after 
which he proceeded, by way of El Pozo, to the left of 
the line at San Juan, reaching his new position about 
midnight. 

All day on the 2d the battle raged with more or less 
fury, but such of our troops as were in position at day- 
light held their ground, and Lawton gained a strong 
and commanding position on the right. 

About 10 p. m. the enemy made a vigorous assault to 
break through my lines, but he was repulsed at all points. 



242 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 



SUMMONING THE ENEMY TO SURRENDER. 

On the morning of the 3d the battle was renewed, but 
the enemy seemed to have expended his energy in the 
assault of the previous night, and the firing along the 
lines was desultory until stopped by my sending the 
following letter within the Spanish lines: 

"Headquarters U. S. Forces, near San Juan River, 

"July 3, 1898—8:30 a. m. 
"Sir,— I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell 
Santiago de Cuba. Please inform the citizens of for- 
eign countries, and all the women and children, that they 
should leave the city before 10 o'clock to-morrow morning. 
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"William R. Shatter. 
"Maj.-Gen. U. S. Vols. 
"The Commanding General of the Spanish Forces, 
Santiago de Cuba." 

To this letter I received the following reply: 

"Santiago de Cuba, July 3, 1898. 
"Eis Excellency the General Commanding Forces of the 
United States, near San Juan River: 
"Sir, — I have the honor to reply to your communica- 
tion of to-day, written at 8:30 a. m. and received at 1 
p. m., demanding the surrender of this city, or, in the 
contrary case, announcing to me that you will bombard 
this city, and that I advise the foreigners, women and 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 243 

children, that they must leave the city before 10 o'clock 
to-morrow morning. 

"It is my duty to say to you that this city will not sur- 
render, and that I will inform the foreign consuls and 
inhabitants of the contents of your message. 

"Very respectfully, Jose Toral, 

"Commander-in-Chief 4th Corps." 

Several of the foreign consuls came into my lines and 
asked that the time given for them— the women and 
children— to depart from the city be extended until 10 
o'clock on July 5th. This induced me to write a second 
letter, as follows: 

"Santiago de Cuba, July 3d, 1898. 

"Sir, — In consideration of a request of the consular 
officers in your city for further delay in carrying out 
my intentions to fire on the city, and iri the interests of 
the poor women and children who will suffer very great- 
ly by their hasty and enforced departure from the city, 
I have the honor to announce that I will delay such ac- 
tion, solely in their interests, until noon of the 5th, pro- 
vided that during the interim your forces make no dem- 
onstration whatever upon those of my own. 

"I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, 

"William R Shafter, 
"Maj.-Gen. U. S. A. 

"The Commanding General, Spanish Forces." 

My first message went under a fiag of truce at 12:42 
p. m. I was of the opinion that the Spaniards would 
surrender if given a little time, and I thought this re- 
sult would be hastened if the men of their army could be 



244 TEE OATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

made to understand they would be well treated as pris- 
oners of war. Acting upon this presumption, I deter- 
mined to offer to return all the wounded Spanish officers 
at El Caney who were able to bear transportation, and 
who were willing to give their paroles not to serve 
against the forces of the United States until regularly 
exchanged. This offer was made and accepted. These 
officers, as well as several of the wounded Spanish pri- 
vates, twenty-seven in all, were sent to their lines under 
the escort of some of our mounted cavalry. Our troops 
were received with honors, and I have every reason to 
believe the return of the Spanish prisoners produced a 
good impression on their comrades. 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 245 



OPERATIONS AFTER SANTIAGO— OUR LOSSES. 

The cessation of firing about noon on the 3d prac- 
tically terminated the battle of Santiago; all that oc- 
curred after this time may properly be treated under the 
head of the siege which followed. After deducting the 
detachments required at Siboney and Baiquiri to render 
those depots secure from attack, organizations held to 
protect our flanks, others acting as escorts and guards 
to light batteries, the members of the Hospital Corps, 
guards left in charge of blanket-rolls which the intense 
heat caused the men to cast aside before entering battle, 
orderlies, etc., it is doubtful if we had more than 12,000 
men on the firing-line on July 1, when the battle was 
fiercest and when the important and strong positions of 
El Caney and San Juan were captured. 

A few Cubans assisted in the attack at El Caney, and 
fought valiantly, but their numbers were too small to 
materially change the strength, as indicated above. The 
enemy confronted us with numbers about equal to our 
own; they fought obstinately in strong and intrenched 
positions, and the results obtained clearly indicate the 
intrepid gallantry of the company officers and men, and 
the benefits derived from the careful training and instruc- 
tion given in the company in the recent years in rifle 
practice and other battle exercises. Our losses in these 
battles were 22 officers and 208 men killed, and 81 officers 
and 1,203 men wounded; missing, 79. The missing, with 
few exceptions, reported later. 



246 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

The arrival of Gen. Escario on the night of July 2d, 
and his entrance into the city was not anticipated, for 
although it was known, as previously stated, that Gen. 
Pando had left Manzanillo with reinforcements for the 
garrison of Santiago, it was not believed his troops 
could arrive so soon. Gen. Garcia, with between 4,000 
and 5,000 Cubans, was intrusted with the duty of watch- 
ing for and intercepting the reinforcement expected. 
This, however, he failed to do, and Escario passed into 
the city along on my extreme right and near the bay. 
Up to this time I had been unable to complete in- 
ventment of the town with my own men; but to prevent 
any more reinforcements coming in or the enemy escap- 
ing. I extended my lines as rapidly as possible to the 
extreme right, and completed the investment of the place, 
leaving Gen. Garcia's forces in the rear of my right flank 
to scout the country for any approaching Spanish rein- 
forcements, a duty which his forces were very compe- 
tent to perform. 

It had been reported that 8,000 Spanish troops had left 
Holquin for Santiago. It was also known that there 
was a considerable force at San Luis, twenty miles to 
the north. 

In the battle of Santiago the Spanish navy endeavored 
to shell our troops on the extreme right, but the latter 
were concealed by the inequalities of the ground, and 
the shells did little, if any, harm. Their naval forces 
also assisted in the trenches, having 1,000 on shore, and 
I am informed they sustained considerable loss; among 
others, Admiral Cervera's chief-of-staff was killed. Be- 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 247 

ing convinced that the city would fall, Admiral Cervera de- 
termined to put to sea, informing the French consul it was 
better to die fighting than to sink his ships. The news 
of the great naval victory which followed was enthu- 
siastically received by the Army. 

The information of our naval victory was transmitted 
under flag of truce to the Spanish commander in San- 
tiago on July 4th, and the suggestion again made that he 
surrender to save needless effusion of blood. 

On the same date I informed Admiral Sampson that 
if he would force his way into the harbor the city would 
surrender without any further sacrifice of life. Commo- 
dore Watson replied that Admiral Sampson was tempo- 
rarily absent, but that in his (Watson's) opinion the 
Navy should not enter the harbor. 

In the meanwhile letters passing between Gen. Toral 
and myself caused the cessation of hostilities to continue. 
Each army, however, continued to strengthen its in- 
trenchments. I was still of the opinion the Spaniards 
would surrender without much more fighting, and on 
July 6th called Gen. Toral's attention to the changed 
conditions, and at his request gave him time to consult 
his home government. This he did, asking that the Brit- 
ish consul, with the employees of the cable company, 
be permitted to return from El Caney to the city. This I 
granted. 

The strength of the enemy's position was such I did 
not wish to assault if it could be avoided. 



248 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

An examination of the enemy's works, made after the 
surrender, fully justifies the wisdom of the course 
adopted. The intrenchments could only have been car- 
ried with very great loss of life, probably with not less 
than 6,000 killed and wounded. 



THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 249 



NEGOTIATIONS WITH GENERAL TORAL. 

On July 8th Gen. Toral offered to march out of the 
city with arms and baggage, provided he would not be 
molested before reaching Holquin, and to surrender to 
the American forces the territory then occupied by him. 
I replied that while I would submit his proposition to 
my home government, I did not think it would be ac- 
cepted. 

In the meanwhile arrangements were made with Ad- 
miral Sampson that when the Army again engaged the 
enemy the Navy would assist by shelling the city from 
ships stationed off Aguadores, dropping a shell every few 
minutes. 

On July 10th the 1st Illinois and the 1st District of 
Columbia arrived and were placed on the line to the 
right of the Cavalry division. This enabled me to push 
Lawton farther to the right and to practically command 
the Cobre road. 

On the afternoon of the date last mentioned the truce 
was broken off at 4 p. m., and I determined to open with 
four batteries of artillery and went forward in person 
to the trenches to give the necessary orders, but the 
enemy anticipated us by opening fire with his artillery a 
few minutes after the hour stated. His batteries were 
apparently silenced before night, while ours continued 
playing upon his trenches until dark. During this firing 
the Navy fired from Aguadores, most of the shells fall- 



250 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

ing in the city. There was also some small arms firing. 
On this afternoon and the next morning, we lost Capt. 
Charles W. Rowell, 2d Infantry, and one man killed, and 
Lieut. Lutz, 2d Infantry, and ten men wounded. 

On the morning of July 11th the bombardment by the 
Navy and my field guns was renewed, and continued 
until nearly noon, and on the same day I reported to 
the Adjutant General of the Army that the right of Lud- 
low's brigade of Lawton's division rested on the bay. 
Thus our hold upon the enemy was complete. 

At 2 p. m. on this date, the 11th, the surrender of the 
city was again demanded. The firing ceased, and was 
not again renewed. By this date the sickness in the 
Army was increasing very rapidly, as a result of expo- 
sure in the trenches to the intense heat of the sun and 
the heavy rains. Moreover, the dews in Cuba are almost 
euqal to rains. The weakness of the troops was be- 
coming so apparent I was anxious to bring the siege 
to an end, but in common with most of the officers of 
the Army, I did not think an assault would be justifiable, 
especially as the enemy seemed to be acting in good 
faith in their preliminary propositions to surrender. 

On July 11th I wrote to General Toral as follows: 

"With the largely increased forces which have come 
to me and the fact that I have your line of retreat 
securely in my hands, the time seems fitting that I 
should again demand of your excellency the surrender 
of Santiago and of your excellency's army. I am author- 
ized to state that should your excellency so desire, the 
Government of the United States will transport the en- 
tire command of your excellency to Spain." 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 251 

General Toral replied that he had communicated my 
proposition to his General-in-Chief, General Blanco. 

July 12th I informed the Spanish commander that 
Major General Miles, Commander-in-Chief of the Amer- 
ican Army, had just arrived in my camp, and requested 
him to grant us a personal interview on the following 
day. He replied he would be pleased to meet us. The 
interview took place on the 13th, and I informed him 
his surrender only could be considered, and that as he 
was without hope of escape he had no right to continue 
the fisht. 

On the 14th another interview took place, during 
which General Toral agreed to surrender, upon the basis 
of his army, the 4th Army Corps, being returned to 
Spain, the capitulation embracing all of Eastern Cuba, 
east of a line passing from Aserraderos, on the south, 
to Sagua de Tanamo, on the north, via Palma, Soriano. 
It was agreed Commissioners should meet during the 
afternoon to definitely arrange the terms of surrender, 
and I appointed Major Generals Wheeler and Lawton 
and Lieutensnt Miley to represent the United States. 

The Spanish Commissioners raised many points, and 
were especially desirous of retaining their arms. The 
discussion lasted until late at night and was renewed 
at 9:30 o'clock next morning. The terms of surrender 
finally agreed upon included about 12,000 Spanish troops 
in the city and as many more in the surrendered district. 

It was arranged that the formal surrender should take 
place between the lines on the morning of July 17th, 
each army being represented by 100 armed men. At the 



252 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

time appointed, I appeared at the place agreed upon, with 
my general officers, staff, and 100 troopers of the 2d 
Cavalry, under Captain Brett. General Toral also ar- 
rived with a number of his officers and 100' infantry. 
We met midway between the representatives of our two 
Armies, and the Spanish commander formally consum- 
mated the surrender of the city and the 24,000 troops in 
Santiago and the surrendered district. 

Alter this ceremony I entered the city with my staff 
and escort, and at 12 o'clock, noon, the American flag 
was raised over the Governor's palace with appropriate 
ceremonies. 

The 'Jth Infantry immediately took possession of the 
city and perfect order was maintained. The surrender 
included a small gunboat and about 200 seamen, together 
with five merchant ships in the harbor. One of these 
vessels, the Mexico, had been used as a war vessel, and 
had four guns mounted on it. 

In taking charge of the civil government, all officials 
who were willing to serve were retained in office, and 
the established order of government was preserved as 
far as consistent with the necessities of military rule. 

I soon found the number of officials was excessive, 
and I greatly reduced the list, and some departments 
were entirely abolished. 

A collector of customs, Mr. Donaldson, arrived soon 
after the surrender, and, due to his energy and efficiency, 
this department was soon working satisfactorily. The 
total receipts had. up to my departure, been $102,000. 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 253 

On August 4th I received orders to begin the embark- 
ation of my command and ship them to Montauk Point 
Long Island, New York. The movement continued with- 
out interruption until August 25th, when I sailed for 
Montauk with the last troops in my command, turning 
over the command of the district to Major General 
Lawton. 



254 THE <: VTLrSQ GUNS \l SANT1 100. 



DIFFICULTIES BNCOtJNTBRBD IN THE CAM1W 

Before closing my report I wish to dwell upon the 
natural obstacles i had to encounter and which no tore- 
Bight could hav< overcome or obviated. The rocky and 

pitous ci.ast afforded no sheltered landing ; 
the roads were mere bridle-paths, the effect i f the tr 

sun and rains upon tin- una< climated troops was deadly, 
and a dread of strange and unknown diseases had its 
effect on the At my. 

At Baiquirl the landing of the tnx tores was 

made a small wooden wharf, which the Bpaniardi 
:.) burn, but unsuccessfully, and the animals were pushed 

into the water and guided to a sandy beach about 'J'Mi 
yards in e\t. nt. At Siboney the landing was made on 
the beach and at a small wharf erected by the engineers. 

I had neither the time nor the men to spare to con- 
struct permanent wharves. 

In Bpite of the tact that I had nearly 1.000 men con- 
tinuously at work on the roads, they were at times im- 
passable for wagons. 

The San Juan and Aguadores rivers would often sud- 
denly rise ho as to prevent the passage of wagons, and 
then the eight pack trains with the command had to 
be depended upon for the victualing of my Army, as 
well as the 20,000 refugees, who could not in the interests 
of humanity be left to starve while we had rations. 

Often for days nothing could be moved except on pack 
trains. 



THE GATLIXG GUX8 AT SAX TI AGO. 255 

After the great physical strain and exposure of July 
1st and 2d, the malarial and other fevers began to rapidly 
advance throughout the command, and on July 4th the 
yellow fever appeared at Siboney. Though efforts were 
made to keep this fact from the Army, it soon became 
known. 

The supply of Quartermaster and Commissary stores 
during the campaign was abundant, and notwithstand- 
ing the difficulties in landing and transporting the ration, 
the troops on the firing line were at all times supplied 
with its coarser components, namely, of bread, meat, 
sugar, and coffee. 

There was nc lack of transportation, for at no time 
up to the surrender could all the wagons I had be used. 

In reference to the sick and wounded, I have to say 
that they received every attention that was possible to 
give them. The medical officers, without exception, 
worked night and day to alleviate the suffering, which 
was no greater than invariably accompanies a campaign. 
It would have been better if we had had more ambulances, 
but as many were taken as was thought necessary, judg- 
ing from previous campaigns. 

The discipline of the command was superb, and I wish 
to invite attention to the fact that not an officer was 
brought to trial by court martial, and, as far as I know, 
no enlisted men. This speaks volumes for an Army of 
this size and in a campaign of such duration. 

In conclusion, I desire to express to the members of 
my staff my thanks for their efficient performance of all 
the duties required of them, and the good judgment and 
bravery displayed on all occasions when demanded. 



266 THE QATLINQ Ql VB LI m\ Tl 100. 

I submit the- following recommendations for promo- 
tion, which I earnestly desire to see made. It is a very 
Ilttl6 reward to give them for their devotion and fear- 
less exposure of their lives in their country's cause: 

B, .1. licClernand, Lieutenant Colonel ami Adjutant 
General, r. B. a., to be brevetted Colonel for gallantry 
in the Face of 'in- enemj on iii.- 1st ami 2d of Julj 
to i" brevetted Brigadier General for faithful and meri- 
torious s< rvice throughout the campaign, 

Geo. McC. Derby, Lieutenant Colonel of ffi] 

\ '., co be breretted Colonel for baiardoui service 
on July 1st ano 2d in reconnoitering the enemy's lines, 
ami to be brevetted Brigadier General for hazardous and 
meritorious Bervice in ascending, under a hot lire, in a 
war balloon on July 1st, thus gaining valuable Informa- 
tion. 

J. D. Miley, Lieutenant Colonel and Inspector Gen- 
eral, I r . S A., to be brevetted Colonel for conspicuous 
gallantry in the battle of San Juan on July 1st, and to 
be brevetted Lrigadier General for faithful and meritori- 
ous serviet> throughout the campaign. 

R. H. Noble, Major and Adjutant General, V. S. V.. 
to be bre\etted Lieutenant Colonel for faithful and meri- 
torious service throughout the campaign. 

J. J. Astor, Lieutenant Colonel and Inspector General, 
U. S. V., to be brevetted Colonel for faithful and meri- 
torious service during the campaign. 

B. F. Pope. Lieutenant Colonel and Surgeon, V. 8. V.. 
to be brevetted Colonel for faithful and meritorious ser- 
vice during the campaign. 



THE GATLnta GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 257 

Maj. S. Vv\ Grcesbeck, Judge Advocate, U. S. A., to be 
bre vetted Lieutenant Colonel for faithful and meritori- 
ous service throughout the campaign. 

Charles F. Humphrey, Lieutenant Colonel, Quarter- 
master's Department, to be brevetted Brigadier General 
for faithful and meritorious service throughout the cam- 
paign. 

John F. Weston, Colonel and Assistant Commissary- 
General of Subsistence, Chief Commissary, to be brev- 
etted Brigadier General for meritorious service through- 
out the campaign. 

C. G. Starr, Major and Inspector General, U. S. V., to 
be brevetted Lieutenant Colonel for faithful and meri- 
torious service throughout the campaign. 

Leon Roudiez, Major and Quartermaster, U. S. V., to 
be brevetted Lieutenant Colonel for faithful and meri- 
torious conduct throughout the campaign. 

H. J. Gallagher, Major and Commissary of Subsist- 
ence, U. S. V., to be brevettei Lieutenant Colonel for 
faithful and meritorious service throughout the cam- 
paign. 

Capt. Brice, Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. V., to 
be brevetted Major for faithful and meritorious service 
throughout the campaign. 

E. H. Plummer, Captain, U. S. A., A. D. C, to be 
brevetted Major for faithful and meritorious service 
throughout the campaign. 

J. C. Gilmore, Jr., Captain and Assistant Adjutant 
General, U. S. V., to be brevetted Major for faithful and 
meritorious service during the campaign. 

W. H. McKittrick, Captain and Assistant Adjutant 



258 THE QATLINQ QUITS IV SANTIAGO. 

General, U. S. V., to be brevetted Major for faithful and 
meritorious service during the campaign. 

Capt. Johnson, Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V., to 
be brevetted Major for faithful and meritorious service 
during the campaign. 

I wish to invite special attention to Dr. G. Goodfel- 
low, of New York, who accompanied me throughout the 
campaign and performed much professional service as 
well as duties as Volunteer aid. I recommend him for 
favorable consideration of the War Department. 

Mr. G. F. Hawkins, of New York, also accompanied 
me as Volunteer aid. and I recommend him for favorable 
consideration of the War Department for faithful and 
important services rendered. 

My thanks are due to Admiral Sampson and Captain 
Goodrich, U. S. N., for their efficient aid in disembark- 
ing my Army. Without their assistance it would have 
been impossible to have landed in the time I did. 

I also express my warmest thanks to division, brigade, 
and regimental commanders, without exception, for th> ir 
earnest efforts in carrying out my wishes and for the 
good judgment they invariably displayed in handling 
their troops. 

The reports of the division commanders are attached 
hereto, and those of the brigade and regimental com- 
manders forwarded herewith, and attention respectfully 
invited to them. Very respectfully, 

Wm. R. Shaffer, 
Major-General, United States Volunteers, 
Cammanding United States Forces in Cuba. 

Adjutant General of the Army, Washington, D. C. 



THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 259 



APPENDIX III. 

Bivouac, near Santiago, Cuba, 
July 23, 1898. 
The Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. G. 

Sir, — In compliance with orders I have the honor to 
submit the following report of my command, the Gatling 
Gun Detachment, 5th Army Corps, covering its opera- 
tions down to the present date: 

1. Organization. — Pursuant to instructions from Gen. 
Shafter I was given a detail of two sergeants and ten 
men on the 26th of May, 1898, from the 13th Infantry, 
then in camp near Tampa, Fla., and directed to report to 
1st Lieut. John T. Thompson, O. D., ordinance officer, 
Tampa, "for duty with Gatling guns." I was placed in 
charge of four guns, model 1895, cal. 30, and at once 
began the instruction of the detachment. On June 1st 
I received verbal instruction to assist Lieut. Thompson 
in his work at the ordinance depot, and performed this 
duty in addition to my duties with the guns until June 
6, 1S98, superintending issues to the expedition (5th 
Corps) then fitting out for Cuba. 

On June 6th I took my men and guns aboard the 
transport Cherokee, and on June 11th, per special orders 
No. 16 of that date, my detail was increased to thirty- 
seven men, all told, of whom one was left sick in hospi- 
tal at Tampa. About twelve of these did not join me, 
however, until after debarkation at Baiquiri, Cuba. On 



260 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

June 25th I received verbal instructions from Gen. Shat- 
ter to disembark at once, select the necessary number of 
mules (two per gun), and get to the front as soon as pos- 
sible, reporting on my arrival there to Gen. Wheeler, 
then in command of all the troops at the front. I was 
unable to obtain any tentage for myself, and had only 
shelter-tents for my men. 

I was joined on June 25th by Capt. Henry Marcotte, 
17th Infantry, retired, regularly authorized correspon- 
dent of the Army and Navy Journal, who has been with 
me ever since, enduring all the vicissitudes of the season 
with Spartan fortitude, although equally destitute of 
cover as myself and 60 years of age. I desire to express 
here officially and fully, my sincere gratitude for the 
kindness which permitted him to accompany my com- 
mand, and the great appreciation of the valuable advice 
and assistance which he has given continually. His large 
experience of war, his clear head and good judgment have 
always been at hand to aid, and his cool example to my- 
self and my men under fire did much to steady us and 
keep us up to our work when we were first called on to 
face that ordeal. 

All of the detachments, who had not previously joined 
me, did so on June 26th, on which day I reached the ex- 
treme front and reported to Gen. Wheeler. The guns 
were posted in a position to sweep the neighboring hills 
toward the enemy, and I went into camp, remaining there 
until the morning of July 1st. 

Summing up the organization, it should be stated here 
that the detachment was organized at the first, and has 



TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 261 

ever since remained an independent command, receiving 
its orders directly from the corps commander. It has 
had its own records, returns, rolls, etc., and has been 
rationed separately all the time, and is composed of men 
selected by myself from various regiments. 

2. The Battery in Action. — On the morning of July 
1st, I broke camp at 4:30 a. m., and pursuant to instruc- 
tions from Gen. Shafter, proceeded to El Poso, placing 
my battery, as I shall henceforth call it, in support be- 
hind the position taken by a battery of artillery. I took 
this position about 6 a. m., and soon after the artillery 
arrived, went on to battery and opened fire at Santiago, 
the range being 2,600 yards. After some time the enemy 
replied with a well-directed fire, the second shell burst- 
ing directly over my battery in rear of artillery. Neither 
my men nor mules showed any signs of disturbance, and 
we remained in our perilous position nearly twenty min- 
utes, the enemy's shells bursting all around us, until 
ordered to the rear by the chief-of-staff. The battery 
went to the rear under fire quietly until out of range, and 
remained there unt'l the artillery ;^re ceased, at about 9 
a. m. Private Hoft, Company D, 13th Infantry, a mem- 
ber of the detachment who had been detailed to guard 
the camp equipage at El Poso, remained at his post during 
the whole of the artillery fight, and deserves great credit 
therefor, his battery having been ordered to the rear. 

At 9 a. m. I returned to El Poso, and there received 
the following instructions from Col. McClernand, A. A. 
G., 5th Corps: "Find the 71st N. Y. V. and go on with 
them, if you can. If this is not practical, find the best 



262 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

position you can, and use your guns to the best advan- 
tage." Pursuant to these instructions, I went forward 
about a half-mile and found the 71st N. Y. V. halting to 
learn what their instructions were. I could get no clear 
idea of what they were going to do, but waited about 
fifteen minutes in their rear to find out. Meantime 
troops continually passed us toward the front. Then, 
about 10:15, firing began in front. I rode forward alone 
along the rode, which was a narrow defile through the 
jungle, and found that about a half-mile in front was a 
creek, upon the crossing of which the enemy's fire seemed 
concentrated. In front of this crossing seemed to be a 
level plain of about 400 to S00 yards, beyond which was 
a semi-circular ridge crowned with Spanish trenches from 
which the Spanish fire seemed to come. Men were being 
hit continually at this place (the ford), but it seemed to me 
to be a good place to work my battery effectively. 

I rode back, finding the Seventy-first still lying beside 
the road without any apparent intention of moving. I 
determined to leave them and go into action. Taking a 
gallop I moved the battery forward nearly to the ford 
(about 150 yards), where I met Col. Derby of Gen. Simf- 
ter's staff, who informed me that the troops were not yet 
sufficiently deployed to take advantage of my fire, and 
advised me to wait. The bullets were cutting through all 
around, and, as we learned afterward, the enemy's sharp- 
shooters were actually in the woods near us, up in tall 
trees, picking off officers and men. It should be stated 
here that the sudden increase of the enemy's fire at this 
time was caused by a wild cheering set up by the 71st N. 



THE GATLING GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 263 

Y. V., as the battery passed them on its way to the front. 
The cheering located our position for the enemy and drew 
his fire. Many a brave soldier who had gone to the front 
was put forever beyond the possibility of cheering by 
this outburst of ignorant enthusiasm. 

I acted on Col. Derby's advice, and he promised to send 
me word when the moment for proper action came. This 
was necessary, as I knew only part of the plan of battle 
and might have jeopardized other parts of prematurely 
exposing our strength at this point. The gun crews lay 
down under their guns and steadily remained at this posts. 
The fire finally grew so hot that I moved about 100 
yards back. This was about 12, noon. At 1 p. m., or about 
that time, I received a message sent by Col. Derby, I think, 
as follows: "Gen. Shafter directs that you give one of 
your guns to Lieut. Miley, take the others forward beyond 
the ford where the dynamite gun is, and go into action at 
the best point you can find." I obeyed the order, giving 
Lieut. Miley Sergeant Weigle's gun and crew and moving 
the rest forward at a gallop to the point beyond the ford, 
which I had already selected as a good place. The battery 
opened with three guns simultaneously at ranges of 600 to 
800 yards at 1:15 p. m. The enemy at first concentrated 
his fire upon us, but soon weakened and in five minutes 
was clambering from his trenches and running to the rear. 
We fired as rapidly as possible upon the groups thus pre- 
sented until I saw a white handkerchief waved by some 
one of my own regiment, the 13th Infantry, and at the 
same moment Capt. Landis, 1st Cavalry, who had volun- 
tarily assisted me throughout, said: "Better stop; our 



264 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

own men are climbing up the ridge." I ordered the fire to 
cease at 1:23% p. m., and a moment later saw our own 
troops occupy the crest of the hill. The firing had been 
continued by the battery until our own troops were within 
150 yards of the enemy's trench, a fact made possible by 
the steep slope of the hill upon which the enemy had been. 

At the time when my battery went into action I had 
no support, and the position I took was at least 100 yards 
in front of any of our troops along this part of the line. 
About the time I ceased firing Lieut.-Col. Baldwin, 10th 
Cavalry, put two troops in support of my battery. 

I have advanced in a letter to the Adjutant General 
from Fort Leavenworth, dated January 1st, 1898, the 
theory that such guns as these can be used offensively. 
The conditions of this assault were favorable, the morale 
of my men superb, and the use made of the guns followed 
the theory therein set forth with the exactness of a math- 
ematical demonstration. The infantry and cavalry had 
been pounding away for two hours on these positions; in 
eight and one-half minutes after the Gatlings opened the 
the works were ours. Inspired by the friendly rattle of 
the machine guns, our own troops rose to the charge; 
while the enemy amazed by our sudden and tremendous 
increase of fire, first diverted his fire to my battery, and 
then, unable to withstand the hail of bullets, augmented 
by the moral effect of our battery fire and the charging 
line, broke madly from his safe trenches and was merci- 
lessly cut by fire from these guns during his flight. 

I at once limbered up and took stock of my losses. One 
man was killed, one badly wounded, one mule hit twice, 
but not much injured, and several men were missing. 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 265 

Suddenly the fire was resumed at the front. I moved my 
three pieces forward again at a gallop, and went into 
action on the skirmish line on top of the captured position, 
with two pieces to the right and one to the left of the 
main road from El Poso to Santiago. I was compelled to 
make the skirmishers give way to the right and left in 
order to get room for my guns on the firing-line, and to 
impress stragglers to carry ammunition. Capt. Ayres, 
10th Cavalry, gave me a detail of one sergeant and two 
privates, all of whom did fine service. It seemed to me 
that the enemy was trying to retake the position. About 
4 to 4:14 p. m. I saw a body, apparently about 400, of the 
enemy to the right front of my position, apparently in 
front of the position occupied by Lieut. -Col. Roosevelt 
with the 1st Volunteer Cavalry. I turned a Gatling gun 
on them, using 000-yard range, and they disappeared. 
Soon after the firing sensibly slackened. 

In the rapid fire on this last body of the enemy I had 
overheated one piece, and it went temporarily out of action. 
I went over to Col. Roosevelt's position, about a quarter 
of a mile to the right of a salient, and reconnoitered. 
While there Sergeant Weigle reported to me with his 
piece, informing me that Lieut. Miley had not put it into 
action, and asked for instructions. This was about the 
hour of 5 p. m., and the fire became warmer at that mo- 
ment. I directed Sergeant Weigle to run his piece up on 
the firing-line and to report to the officer in charge thereof. 
He did so and went into action at once. Col. Roosevelt, 
who was and remained present, informs me that the gun 
was very effectively used. I rejoined my other two guns 



266 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

and put both of them on the line at the left of the El 
Poso road. At sundown the enemy made a sharp attack, 
and all three of my guns were effectively used. During 
the fight a battery in the city opened on my two guns, fir- 
ing 16 cm. shells. I at once turned my guns on it and kept 
up so warm a fire that the cannoneers left their battery 
and did not return. In all they had fired three shells at us, 
all of which broke just over or beyond the battery. I 
secured the fuse of one, still warm, and after the sur- 
render visited the battery which had fired at us and ex- 
amined the gun. It is a 16 cm. (6.2992 inches) bronze 
rifle gun in barbette on a pintle. This is probably the 
first time in land fighting that such a piece was ever sil- 
enced by machine-gun fire. The range I used was 2,000 
yards (estimated). 

The guns were used during the remainder of the fight- 
ing in the trenches. I took off the wheels and put the 
guns on the carriages in emplacements, erecting a sand- 
bag parapet in front as cover during the night of July 4th. 
The disabled gun was brought up and repaired, subse- 
quently participating in the fighting. The dynamite gun, 
under Sergeant Borrowe, 1st Volunteer Cavalry, co- 
operated with the battery thus formed, and the whole 
battery, including the two Colt automatic rapid-fire guns 
under Lieut. Tiffany, 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry, 
did good work in all the subsequent fighting. I supplied 
about eight thousand rounds of captured Mauser cartridges 
to Tiffany, which had been captured by my battery, and 
which he used effectively in his Colt's guns. I had a 
strong fire directed upon a battery of seven pieces of the 



TEE GATLING GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 267 

enemy's artillery at a distance of 1,500 yards in front every 
time any attempt was made to use this battery. The re- 
sult was that only three shots were fired from these guns 
after July 4th. I visited this battery after the surrender 
and found every gun in working order, the 16 cm. gun be- 
ing actually loaded. As no organization, except my bat- 
tery, of which I had general direction, had such orders, so 
far as I can learn, the conclusion is that this battery of 
machine guns kept out of action seven pieces of the ene- 
my's artillery by making it too warm for his gunners to 
stay in their batteries. 

I have made certain recommendations in hasty reports 
for gallantry, which I personally witnessed. They were 
as follows: 

Capt. J. R. F. Landis, 1st Cavalry, medal of honor. 
Volunteered to assist observation of fire July 1st, and 
rendered great service at imminent peril of his life made 
necessary in order to render such service. 

Sergeant John N. Weigle, 9th Infantry, 2d Lieutenant 
U. S. Army (regulars). For conspicuous daring, intelli- 
gence, and coolness in action, July 1st. 

Corporal Charles C. Steigenwald, 13th Infantry, 2d 
Lieutenant U. S. Army (regulars). For coolness and judg- 
ment in keeping his gun in action with only one man to 
help on July 1st. 

Private Fred C. Elkins, 17th Infantry, 2d Lieutenant 
United States Volunteers. For conspicuous daring and 
courage in action. Although wounded, he remained at 
his post until he fell from exhaustion, July 1st. 

Corporal Matthew Doyle, 13th Infantry, medal of hon- 



268 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

or. Conspicuous gallantry and coolness In action. When 
two men had been shot down by his side he continued to 
work his gun effectively alone until assistance arrived, 
July 1st. 

Sergt. Green, Company H, 13th Infantry, medal of 
honor. Conspicuous coolness and steadiness in handling 
his piece under hot fire, July 1st. 

Sergt. John Graham, 10th Cavalry, medal of honor. 
Conspicuous coolness and steadiness under fire, July 1st. 

Sergt. Weischaar, Company A, 13th Infantry, certificate 
of merit. Particularly meritorious steadiness, night of 
July 6th. Being put on outpost duty with a Gatling gun 
in time of truce, and having been alarmed by a sentinel, 
whose duty it was to warn him of the enemy's approach, 
he cooly reserved his fire for personal investigation and 
prevented a violation of the truce. 

Sergt. Ryder, Company G, 13th Infantry, certificate of 
merit. Particularly meritorious steadiness, night of July 
6th. Being on outpost duty with a Gatling gun in time of 
truce, and having been alarmed by a sentinel, whose duty 
it was to warn him of the enemy's approach, he coolly 
held his fire for personal investigation and prevented a 
violation of the truce. 

In making these recommendations, I have limited my- 
self to those which I personally observed. If I recom- 
mended for every deserving act, there is not a man in my 
whole detachment who has not deserved a certificate of 
merit. They were selected in the beginning from an army 
corps for what I knew of them, and they have abundantly 
justified my confidence in them. With a less efficient per- 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 269 

sonnel it would have been absolutely impossible to or- 
agnize, equip and instruct the first battery of Gatling guns 
ever used in the history of war, in the short space of 
time allotted me, and put it in effecient fighting shape. 
They fought their guns on the skirmish line and in ad- 
vance of it, standing boldly up to do it when the skirmish- 
ers themselves lay down close for cover. My loss, as 
footed up on the night of July 1st, was 33 1-3 per cent, 
killed, wounded, and missing. The efficiency of the work 
of my guns was attested to me by numerous Spanish offi- 
cers and prisoners. Their favorite expression was: "It 
was terrible when your guns opened, always. They went 
b- r _ r _ r _r, like a lawn mower cutting the grass over our 
trenches. We could not stick a finger up when you fired 
without getting it cut off— so!" 

The work of this experimental battery proves that in 
this weapon we have a new arm supplementary to in- 
fantry and cavalry, independent of both as one arm is of 
another, and more nearly capable of independent action 
than any other arm of the service. It is equally demon- 
strated that this new arm is entirely different from artil- 
lery in its functions, and can live where the latter is com- 
pelled to retire. 

It should, therefore, be organized as a separate arm. I 
have, at the request of General Wheeler, drawn up a 
scheme of such an organization and submitted it to him. 

Experience shows me that the carriage is too heavy. 
I can only renew the representations contained in my 
letter of January 1, 1898, to the Adjutant General, ac- 
companying drawing, etc., of my proposed carriage for 



270 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

machine guns. I would now, based on experience, mod- 
ify my theory of oragnization as then proposed, and 
would make several changes in the model of carriage 
then proposed without departing from the general 
principles. 

If any expression of such views is desired, I shall be 
very glad to submit them when called upon by the War 
Department to do so. 

Very respectfully, 

John H. Parker, 
2d Lieut., 13th Infantry, 
Commanding Gatling Gun Detachment, 5th Corps. 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 271 



INDEX. 



CHAPTER I. 
L'ENVOI. 

Record of the Detachment 9 

The New Arm of the Service 12 

CHAPTER II. 

INCEPTION OP THE SCHEME. 

Conditions at Tampa 16 

Florida Climate and its Effects IT 

Description of the Gatling Gun 18 

Difficulties Encountered 20 

Politics at Tampa 21 

First Efforts to obtain Authority 21 

Original Plan of Organization 24 

Tactical Employment of Machine Guns 20 

A Lucky Accident 29 

The First Detail 30 

CHAPTER III. 

THE ORDNANCE DEPOT. 

Defects in the Guns 33 

Instruction of the Detachment 36 

Status of the Detachment 37 

Interview with General Wheeler 37 

General Wheeler's Views 38 

Interview with General Lee 39 



272 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

Issues of Ordnance 41 

Fire in the Magazine 43 

Embarkation 46 

CHAPTER IV. 

THE VOYAGE AND DISEMBARKATION. 

A Night Alarm on Transport 54 

Decisive Interview with General Shafter 56 

The Official Authority at Last 58 

Condition of Transports 61 

Disembarkation 03 

Private J. Sniffer— Corral Boss 67 

The Missouri Mule 67 

The First March 70 

CHAPTER V. 
THE MARCH. 

The 13th Infantry Detail 74 

The Cuban Guide 75 

The Cuban as He Is 76 

Roads in Cuba 78 

Private Jones and the Scorpion 80 

The Medical Department 83 

The Newspaper Fraternity 87 

Chaplain Springer 89 

Arrival at the Front 90 

CHAPTER VI. 
THE BATTERY IN CAMP WHEELER. 
Theory and Practice of Artillery and Machine Gun. . 93 
The Problem Presented to this Detachment 95 



THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 273 

Personnel of the Detachment 95 

Roster on July 1st 101 

Captain Marcotte 101 

Oil for an Army 106 

Futile Plans 109 

CHAPTER VII. 
THE BATTLE. 

The Plan of Battle by General Shafter Ill 

Did General Shafter Capture Santiago? HE DID. . . .113 

The Night Before the Battle 114 

El Poso 115 

The Final Instructions 124 

The 71st New York 124 

Waiting for the Decisive Moment 128 

In Action at Last 132 

The Killed and Wounded 138 

On the Skirmish Line 141 

Reconnoissance 144 

Weigle Gets His Opportunity 144 

The Gatlings Knock out a Heavy Battery 14G 

The Brunettes 148 

The Artillery 151 

CHAPTER VIII. 

TACTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLES AT SAN- 
TIAGO. 

El Caney 152 

San Juan 154 

Movements of Lawton's Division 151 

The Gatlings as a Tactical Reserve 159 



274 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 

Sergeant William Tiffany 160 

The Night Alarm 161 

The Dynamite Gun 161 

The Mortar Battery 166 

Summary of Tactical Deductions on use of Machine 
Guns as Demonstrated in Battle 168 

CHAPTER IX. 
THE VOLUNTEERS. 

The Surrender 170 

General Observations upon the Volunteers 173 

The 34th Michigan. 175 

The Rough Riders 178 

The 1st Illinois 184 

CHAPTER X. 
THE SUFFERINGS OF THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS. 

The Difficulties of the Campaign 186 

Unnecessary Sufferings; the Causes 193 

The Case of Private Elkins 200 

The Sick Left by Kent's Division 202 

Some Staff— and Some Others 207 

The Lesson to be Derived 212 

The General Staff— Proper 213 

CHAPTER XI. 
HOME AGAIN. 

The Home Voyage 215 

The End of the Detachment 215 

Appendix 1 217 

Appendix II 220 

Appendix III 259 











































































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